UNPACKING HEALTH AID EFFECTIVENESS by Jalles D'Orey, Maria Ana
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNPACKING HEALTH AID EFFECTIVENESS 
 
 
By 
MARIA ANA OOM DE SOUSA TOVAR JALLES D’OREY 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
University of East Anglia 
School of International Development 
© September 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to 
recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any information derived there 
from must be in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. In addition, any quotation or extract 
must include full attribution. 
 
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides an unpacked analysis of health aid effectiveness using 
Mozambique as a case-study. It comprises of three main papers of independent but 
related research.  
The first paper adds to the literature by employing a new model to study the 
impact of health aid on health outcomes. By taking into account the heterogeneity 
that exists in the amount of health aid received between Mozambican provinces, a 
multilevel model is specified. After recognizing significant variation of health 
outcomes between provinces, I found no statistical evidence that health aid was a 
cause of those variations.  
The second paper provides a systematic analysis of donors’ health aid 
disbursement decisions in-country. Using a game theoretic framework and 
grounded in qualitative evidence from Mozambique, this paper shows that donors 
have allocation tactics other than state-to-state aid to pursue their goals which are 
translated into opting for alternative channels of delivery. Simultaneously, this 
research acknowledges the non-passive role of the recipient country, i.e., donors’ 
decisions of how to allocate aid are mediated by the recipient’s response to their 
actions. This chapter suggests that recipient-donors’ strategic interactions are 
crucial to understand donors’ allocation behaviour and have direct consequences 
for aid effectiveness. 
The last paper explores empirically and theoretically aid coordination efforts of aid 
agencies. After providing an insight into the implementation of coordination in the 
health sector in Mozambique, this chapter explores why different agencies differ in 
their motivations to coordinate, based on the distinction between public and 
private good properties of coordination. Finally, using a collective action theory 
framework and aided by Schelling’s (1973) diagrams, this chapter illustrates why 
it is so hard to coordinate. My results show that individual incentives to coordinate 
are neither strong nor stable. Furthermore, the success of coordination depends, 
inter alia, on the number of agencies that perceive coordination as a public versus 
private good and the role and involvement of the lead donor and the recipient 
country. 
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KEY DEFINITIONS 
Aid External resources provided to countries as grants, loans, 
subsidies or in-kind donations (synonyms: development 
assistance, external assistance, development aid) 
 
Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) 
Official financing administered with the promotion of the 
economic development and welfare of developing countries as 
the main objective and which are concessional in character. 
ODA flows comprise contributions of donors’ government 
agencies (bilateral ODA) and of multilateral institutions 
(OECD, 2008a). 
 
Health Aid Aid directed to the health sector.  It includes all financial and 
in-kind contributions from aid agencies (synonyms: 
development assistance for health (DAH), aid to/for health). 
 
Aid Agency Any organization that provides financial or in-kind 
contributions. Different types of agencies include bilateral and 
multilateral donors, private foundations, international NGOs 
and global health initiatives (synonym: aid organization).  
 
Aid Effectiveness Delivering aid in a way that maximizes its impact on 
development and achieves value for aid money (OECD, 2010). 
 
Impact Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term 
effects produced by a development intervention, directly or 
indirectly, intended or unintended (OECD/DAC, 2004).  
 
Health Outcome An impact indicator that measures the longer-term and more 
widespread health changes in the society. Often these are 
captured via national sector or subsector statistics 
(OECD/DAC, 2000) (synonyms: health indicator, impact 
indicator)  
 
Result The output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, 
positive and/or negative) of a development intervention. 
(OECD/DAC, 2004). 
 
Channel of Delivery It is the first implementing partner. It is the entity that has 
implementing responsibility over the funds and is normally 
linked to the extending agency by a contract or other binding 
agreement, and is directly accountable to it (OECD, 2007). 
 
Projects Interventions comprising pre-specific ring-fenced activities 
developed to reach a certain short to medium term objective, 
with a specific budget and a limited timeframe. Projects are 
subject to their own plan and budget and to own 
administrative, staffing, accounting and reporting procedures. 
In some cases, projects include the provision of technical 
assistance in the form of foreign personnel (MoU 2009 in 
MPD, 2011). 
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Direct Budget Support (DBS) A method of financing a partners country’s budget through a 
transfer of resources from a donor to a partner government’s 
treasury (in Mozambique funds are deposited in the Single 
Treasury Account = ON-CUT). The funds thus transferred are 
managed in accordance with the recipient’s budgetary rules 
and procedures defined by the government. This definition 
includes General Budget Support and Sector Budget Support 
(OECD/DAC, 2006). 
 
General Budget Support (GBS) Is a sub-category of DBS whereby the dialogue between the 
government and the partners concentrates on overall policies 
and on budgetary priorities (OECD/DAC, 2006). In 
Mozambique, GBS is made operational through the G19, who 
are the Programme Aid Partners (PAPs) (MPD, 2011). 
 
Sector Budget Support (SBS) SBS, also called “Common Funds”, are a sub-category of DBS 
which dialogue between the government and its partners 
focuses on sector-specific concerns rather than an overall 
policy and budget priorities (OECD/DAC, 2006). 
 
Programme-Based Approach 
(PBA) 
A way of engaging in development cooperation based on the 
principles of coordinated support for a locally owned 
programme of development, such as a national poverty 
reduction strategy, a sector programme, a thematic 
programme or a programme of a specific organization 
(OECD/DAC, 2006). 
  
Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) A programme-based approach operating at the level of an 
entire sector. Relying on common arrangements for 
budgeting, disbursement, accounting, procurement and 
reporting is a key objective for any SWAp (OECD/DAC, 2006). 
  
Ownership Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their 
development policies, and strategies and coordinate 
development actions (OECD, 2008b). 
 
Alignment Donors base their overall support on partner countries' 
national development strategies, institutions and procedures 
(OECD, 2008b). 
 
(Health) Aid Coordination Any activity or set of activities, formal or non-formal, at any 
level, undertaken by recipients in conjunction with donors, 
individually and collectively, which ensures that external 
inputs to the health sector enable the health system to 
function more effectively, and in accordance with local 
priorities, over time (Buse and Walt, 1996). 
 
Aid Agencies’ Coordination Aid agencies maintain their individual programmes but try to 
work with each other in order to maximize cooperation and 
minimize competition (Acharya et al., 2006) (synonyms: 
horizontal coordination, harmonization).  
 
Fragmentation The extent of dispersion in the sources of aid received by an 
aid recipient (Acharya et al., 2006). 
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CHAPTER 1 
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
“If you spend your own money on yourself, you are very concerned about how much is spent and how it 
is spent. 
If you spend your own money on someone else, you are still very much concerned about how much is 
spent, but somewhat less concerned about how it is spent. 
If you spend someone else's money on yourself, you are not too concerned about how much is spent, 
but you are very concerned about how it is spent. 
However, if you spend someone else's money on someone else, you are not very concerned about how 
much is spent or how it is spent.” 
 
--Milton Friedman 
1.1 CONNECTING THE AID LITERATURE  
The literature on aid effectiveness arises from a fundamental question: Does aid 
work? The debate around this subject focuses essentially on three positions: i) 
more aid, ii) less aid (also called “problem aid”) and iii) aid under certain 
conditions (see de Haan, 2009; Tierney et al., 2011 for a broad discussion on the 
aid effectiveness debate).  
Calling for increased aid has been common since the 2nd World War (de Haan, 
2009) with a range of scholars advocating for the benefits of aid. The report by the 
United Nations (UN) Millennium Project led by Jeffrey Sachs called for aid to all 
developing countries to rise from $80 billion in 2005 to $195 billion by 2015 
(Sachs, 2005a).  Sachs (2005b) has been one of the major advocates for increasing 
the levels of aid arguing that aid is crucial for helping poor countries to escape 
from poverty traps. He argues that without aid, poor countries will not able to 
prosper. Similar thoughts were shared by Stiglitz (2002), Stern (2002), Addison et 
al. (2005: 83), among others, with the later arguing that “poverty would be higher 
in the absence of foreign aid”.  
The debate on aid effectiveness has developed essentially around the relationship 
between aid and growth. Proponents of aid have shown that there is a positive 
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relationship between aid and growth (Hansen and Tarp, 2000 and 2001; Arndt et 
al., 2010, etc.). This finding is not supported by others who do not believe that “aid 
buys growth” (Easterly, 2003) or find it difficult to discern any significant effect of 
aid on growth (Boone, 1996; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008).  Methodological and 
ideological approaches are in the base of such opposite findings (Moreira, 2005).1 
Critics of aid have made strong claims that aid does not work. Hancock (1989) has 
long ago pointed out that the “lords of poverty” – name given to the highly paid aid 
workers – should depart and the aid business should be abolished. Easterly (2006: 
4) calls it a “tragedy” and asks why “the West spent [U.S.] $2.3 trillion of foreign aid 
over the last five decades and still had not managed to get 12-cent medicines to 
children to prevent half of all malaria deaths.” Mosse and Lewis (2006) share the 
same thought while referring to the lack of progress in a wide range of 
development indicators.  These arguments are completely endorsed by Moyo 
(2009: 47) who adds that “aid is no longer part of the potential solution, but part of 
the problem - in fact aid is the problem”. Calling for the Africans to start 
representing themselves without western intervention, Moyo (2009) argues that is 
time to stop pitying Africa. According to Easterly (2006) the current aid system has 
been driven by decisions of “planners” who made aid unproductive, since there is a 
huge disjoint between them and the “searchers” who have the on-ground 
knowledge in recipient countries. 
The other strand of the literature favours aid, under certain conditions. Estimates 
from a World Bank report (World Bank, 1998: 2) refer that “with sound country 
management, 1 percent of GDP in assistance translates into a 1 percent decline in 
poverty and a similar decline in infant mortality. In a weak environment however, 
money has much less impact aid.” Focusing essentially on the quality of 
governance of recipient countries, Collier and Dollar (2002) advocated for a 
selectivity approach where aid should be delivered to countries able to use aid 
effectively. Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) influential study showed that aid works 
better in a good policy environment. Soon these claims were contested (Hansen 
and Tarp, 2001; Easterly et al., 2004; Dalgaard et al., 2004). These scholars 
asserted the difficulties of finding a causal effect between aid and growth, while 
                                                        
1 See for instance Clemens et al. (2012) for a review on the aid-growth debate. 
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considering the interactions between aid and policy environment. This literature 
was soon linked with conditionalities with a variety of scholars questioning its 
effectiveness (Crawford, 1997; Collier et al., 1997; Killick, 1997; Gibson et al., 
2005).  
The distinguishing factor between more aid/less aid and conditional aid literature 
is that the former is interested in knowing exactly whether aid works or not and by 
what amount - the quantity of aid, while the latter is particularly interested on how 
aid is given – the quality of aid. In order to advance deeper explanations on the 
poor quality of aid, new inquiries emerged at the structural level giving rise to a 
new, but still little researched, subset strand of the literature which includes topics 
on aid fragmentation, proliferation of projects and multiplication of aid channels 
(e.g., Birsdall, 2005; Acharya et al., 2006; Anderson, 2011; among others).  
Calls for increasing aid coordination have taken place at both policy and research 
level (OECD, 2005/2008) with research showing that fragmentation and 
proliferation hamper aid effectiveness (Djankov et al., 2009) and imply a number 
of costs for the recipient and donors (Acharya et al., 2006). However, reality is 
different from prescription: aid fragmentation and proliferation persist and little 
progress has been made on coordination efforts (Aldasoro et al., 2010). Facing the 
facts, some researchers started to inquire whether coordination is achievable 
(Annen and Moers, 2012; Steinwand, 2013).  
Scholars became recently more interested on the strategic interactions between 
different aid agencies and between them and the recipient countries (Torvisk, 
2005; Steinwand, 2013). The incentive structure underlying these players’ 
interactions has a bridge with the long-standing aid allocation literature. Seeking 
to find explanations for donor behaviour, it draws on agencies’ motives to provide 
aid in the first place. In this regard, the debate starts broadly on whether donors 
have self-interested or altruistic motives (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and 
Dollar, 2000). This literature considers that beyond poverty alleviation, donors 
also use aid as a tool for foreign policy influence. Donor allocation decisions, which 
are directly translated into specific aid modalities, choice of aid delivery channels 
and geographic distribution of aid within a country, have a huge impact on aid 
effectiveness (Tierney et al., 2011).  
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As a result of the growing critiques of aid, donors are pressured for measuring 
impact of their projects while striving for short-term results: that influences their 
choice of modality, the relationship with the recipient country (Dietrich, 2011) and 
the work developed on the ground by the “searchers”, like NGOs, who, striving for 
financial survival are forced to follow donors’ rules (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). 
Calls for better assessments gave rise to a new field of analysis that covers a wide 
spectrum: at one end there are numerous studies evaluating the impact of specific 
agencies’ projects, at the middle new programmes and sector wide approaches 
have developed their own form of evaluation, and on the other end it folds back to 
the macro level literature which measures the impact of aid using cross-country 
analysis (Bigsten et al., 2006). 
1.2 HEALTH AID EFFECTIVENESS  
Growth has been the main focus on aid effectiveness studies. However, with the 
great volume of development assistance for health (DAH), scholars and 
practitioners start questioning its effectiveness. According to the IHME (2012) aid 
devoted to the health sector has risen from US$5.74 billion in 1990 to US$28.1 
billion in 2012 (real 2010 US$). Around 2002 there was a steep increase on aid 
with the insurgence of global health partnerships2 and private foundations 
devoted to a number of vertical initiatives in which HIV/AIDS took the biggest 
share of DAH. At the same time in face of the contradictory findings from aid-
growth relationships, it was argued that aid effectiveness should not be measured 
by its impact on GDP growth but rather on social indicators (Boone, 1996). 
Advocates of “more aid” believe that foreign aid has been having an enormous 
impact on health by saving lives, providing vaccines and improving health services 
(Levine et al., 2004). Sachs (2005b), when referring particularly to health aid, 
highlights that at current levels it is impossible for health ministries in Africa to 
maintain a health care system. Mishra and Newhouse (2009) using data from 1975 
to 2004 show empirically that doubling health aid decreases infant mortality by 
                                                        
2 Also called global health initiatives (GHI), they are typically programmes targeted at specific 
diseases and are supposed to bring additional resources to health efforts. Some of the more 
prominent GHI include the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Global Fund Against Aids, 
Tuberculosis & Malaria (GFATM), the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) and the 
President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) (Martínez-Álvarez and Acharya, 2012). 
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2% in a subsequent five-year period. Ambitiously, they estimate that DAH might 
have saved 170,000 lives at the costs of US$ 76 million ($432/life). Fenny and 
Ouattara (2013) provide evidence that increases of health aid are linked with 
improvements on child health promotion, using immunizations as proxies. 
However, positive findings are not universal: Kosack and Tobin (2006) found no 
impact of aid in improving infant mortality or life expectancy, Williamson (2008) 
looking specifically at DAH did not find any significant effect of DAH on mortality. 
Wilson (2011: 2032) corroborates these findings showing that the effectiveness of 
DAH has not increased over time and suggesting that DAH appears to be “following 
success rather than causing it”, i.e. health aid has been going to the states that had 
greatest reductions in mortality in the past years, which might justify the 
disappointing results of aid effectiveness. 
Questions about the process of health aid-giving have also taken place. A strand of 
the literature looks at the recipient’s domestic efforts to increase the internal 
health budget, while focusing on issues of fungibility and additionality of aid3. 
Another recent field of inquiries looks at the pros and cons of different modalities 
of aid giving, focusing essentially on a discussion of funds provided through the 
government (such as general budget and sector budget support) versus project aid 
(see Martínez-Álvarez and Acharya, 2012). 
Due to its above average aid flows, the health sector has become the tracer sector4 
in terms of aid effectiveness and coordination (DSW, 2011).  The huge increase of 
health aid has been accompanied by a proliferation of actors each one with its own 
motivations, objectives and strategies (Martínez-Álvarez and Acharya, 2012, 
2012). Lack of coordination has become a critical issue. In practice, harmonization 
means “coordinating among agencies to ensure that two wells are not built side by 
side in the same place; or that two different agencies do not vaccinate the same 
                                                        
3 Fungibility refers to the fact when aid substitutes rather than supplements local spending (Foster 
and Leavy, 2001). Additionality refers to the expectation that the domestic funding matches the 
increased in donor funding (Brown et al., 2006). Fungibility differs essentially from additionality as 
there is an expectation of some type of optimal behaviour. See Martínez-Álvarez and Acharya 
(2012) for a more complete explanation of these concepts and review of this literature. 
4 According to OECD (2012) looking at aid effectiveness through the lens of a sector can provide 
valuable information for the aid effectiveness agenda. The health sector specifically is particularly 
relevant since it highlights many of the development challenges today in different areas 
(fragmentation, innovative financing for development, and achievement of the MDGs, among 
others) and due to its complexity many lessons can be useful for aid effectiveness framework. 
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children twice inadvertently damaging them” (Woods, 2011: 5). However, there is 
still a long way to go.  
This research argues that there is a need to look at the ground, using a bottom-up 
approach to research aid effectiveness. It focuses on the structural level of aid, by 
delving deeper on its delivery and implementation on the ground. By doing so, its 
main goal is to uncover some missing pieces in the ‘factors-affecting-the-
effectiveness-of-aid’ puzzle.  
1.3 DISAGGREGATING TO A SECTOR AND COUNTRY LEVEL  
Aid (and health aid) effectiveness has been approached from different angles; 
however, they share a common ground:  a macro or micro level of aggregation. On 
one hand cross-country analysis takes place, on the other the focus has been on 
measuring impact of specific small projects. The present research takes yet 
another angle. It seeks to unpack aid effectiveness, by disaggregating the analysis 
to a single sector and a single country, what can be called a meso level of analysis. 
This research is motivated on advancing some insight on possible explanations of 
the celebrated micro-macro paradox suggested by Mosley (1987) that questioned 
why aid seems effective at the micro level while showing disappointing results at 
the macro level. Case studies on the roots of aid effectiveness are needed if 
improvements are to be made.  
The focus on the health sector has several purposes: (i) there is the need to 
conduct more research on sector-target aid in a given country, (ii) to understand 
whether the micro-macro paradox - where aid is effective at a micro level but not 
as a macro level – does apply to the case of health aid in a given country and 
because (iii) a better understanding of the results of health-target aid can help to 
evaluate the effects of development assistance in general. 
Mozambique was the natural and immediate choice of case study for evaluating aid 
effectiveness. This country has been receiving aid for 25 years and is considered by 
the international community as a “reliable partner to work with” (Commins et al., 
2009: 149).  Mozambique has lived through decades of crisis caused by war, 
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political instability, economic crisis, conflict situations, natural disasters, etc. 
(African Development Bank, 2006) and therefore international aid has been 
playing an active role in several sectors. Since the Peace Agreement in 1992, 
Mozambique remains a successful example of post-conflict reconstruction with an 
impressive economic growth averaging eight per cent in the past 15 years (DSW, 
2011). However, it is still one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 185 
out of 186 in terms of human development (UN’s Development Index UNDP, 2013) 
allied with a bottom dozen place among all countries in terms of GDP per capita 
per year, with a value of less than 1000 US$ (in 2005 purchasing power parity 
terms) (IMF, World Bank and WHO in DSW, 2011). 
Mozambique is one of the countries that receives more international aid around 
the world, with the health sector in particular accounting for the largest share of 
sectoral assistance (Arndt et al., 2007). According to the last report of the IHME 
(2012) Mozambique is among the 10 top recipients of total DAH from 2008-2010 
placed at number 8 with a value of $1.22 billions (real 2010 US$)5. The huge 
amounts of health aid flows made the health sector a tracer sector in terms of 
coordination mechanisms. However, while showing an active response in 
endorsing the calls for aid effectiveness and advocating for strengthened 
coordination and harmonization, the implementation of those structures suffer 
from some major issues (see Appendix A for a summary of Mozambique’s 
historical context and its impact on health-system related dimensions, in particular 
external aid and coordination). 
Finally, being a Portuguese myself, also enhanced my motivation and interest to 
research this particular country, a former Portuguese colony with which Portugal 
still holds strong economic and diplomatic relations. 
 
 
                                                        
5 This DAH estimation includes all financial and in-kind contributions from aid organizations 
including bilateral and multilateral agencies, private foundations (U.S. based), international NGOs 
(U.S. based) and global health initiatives. 
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1.4 MOZAMBIQUE AND INTERNATIONAL (HEALTH)  AID AT A GLANCE  
Mozambique belongs to a group of countries that has been receiving a 
considerable amount of donor funds. Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of foreign aid 
from 1970 to 2007 demonstrating an increasing trend for official development 
assistance received by Mozambique.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Evolution of the ODA received by Mozambique 1970-2007 (USD billions). 
(Source: OECD-DAC, in MPD, 2011) 
 
According to data from OECD DAC, Mozambique is in 2nd place among the top 
countries for number of aid projects (Table 1.1) 
 
Table 1.1 Top ten countries for number of aid projects, 2007, disbursement data 
Recipient Number of Aid Projects 
Iraq 4162 
Mozambique 2409 
India 2122 
Uganda 2110 
China 2106 
Zambia 2105 
Indonesia 2039 
Ethiopia 1840 
Vietnam 1763 
Tanzania 1601 
World average 601 
 
 (Source: Frot and Santiso (2009), based on OECD-DAC data.) 
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Figure 1.2 demonstrates the composition of the aid portfolio disaggregated by 
group of donors In Mozambique. In 2010, donors disbursed about 27% of funds 
through general budget support (GBS) and 18% through sector budget support 
(SBS). The main bulk of aid is still disbursed through projects that account 54% of 
total ODA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Composition of portfolio by aid modality on 2010 disbursements. 
(Source: MPD, 2011) 
 
 
The two largest common funds (with highest volume of funding) for the sectors are 
for education (11 partners) and health (13 partners) (see Table 1.2)  
 
Table 1.2 Sector Budget Support 2007-2011, commitments, USD millions. 
Programmes 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Number of 
donors 
(2010) 
As % of 
total SBS 
Education (FASE) 55.7 71.6 142.6 111.1 85 466 11 32.7% 
Health 
(PROSAUDE) 
89 70 94.7 85.6 75.3 414.6 13 29.1% 
Agriculture 
(PROAGRI) 
37.7 38.5 43.2 42.6 26.1 188.1 9 13.2% 
Roads (PRISE) 35.8 24 30.6 36.2 10 136.6 5 9.5% 
HIV/AIDS (CNCS)  21.6 19.2 4.2 4.3 49.3 5 3.4% 
Water (ASAS) 5.2 6.3 9.9 11.0 1.4 33.8  2.3% 
Rural Water and 
Sanitation 
(PRONASAR) 
    13.4 13.4 5 0.9% 
Others      122.6  8.6% 
TOTAL      1424   
 
Note: This table summarizes commitments since 2007 of various sector budget support (SBS) 
programmes, also called common funds and the number of donors’ signatories of the specific 
agreement in 2010. 
(Source: MPD, 2011) 
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Although education leads the first place in terms of common funds, PROSAUDE 
only accounts for 11% of the total health budget. The health sector in Mozambique 
is mainly financed by vertical initiatives, projects and private funds (66%). 
Particularly noteworthy is the amount of projects financed by the United States of 
America that were estimated to account for 38% of the total health envelope (see 
Figure 1.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Total financing for the health sector (on and off budget), 2009 
(Source: CIDA (2009), Health Budget 2009) 
 
Table 1.3 shows the individual aid contributions of the various development 
partners in the health sector in Mozambique and reveals that the three largest 
donors to Mozambique from 2006 to 2008 where the United States of America, the 
Global Fund and Ireland.  
 
Table 1.3 Top Ten Donors to the Health Sector in Mozambique, average in USD 
millions, 2006-2008 
Donor Name USD 
Million 
As a share of total aid to health 
for the selected recipient, % 
All Donors 408.2 100 
United States 152.5 37.4 
Global Fund 48.1 11.8 
Ireland 28.1 6.9 
Denmark 24.7 6 
EC 21.6 5.3 
Netherlands 17.7 4.3 
Spain 12.5 3.1 
United Kingdom 12 2.9 
Belgium 9.6 2.4 
Canada 9.6 2.3 
 
 (Source: OECD Health Focus Charts in DSW, 2011) 
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In terms of health subgroups, HIV has been disproportionally funded mainly due to 
the fact that the largest funding agency, the USA, has been systematically 
prioritizing this area (see Figure 1.4 for a chart on health aid by subgroups). 
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Figure 1.4 Health Aid by Subgroups, 2006-2008, USD millions. 
(Source: OECD Health Focus Charts in DSW, 2011) 
 
1.5 RESEARCH OUTLINE  
This research focuses essentially on three main factors/determinants of health aid 
effectiveness6: 
1. Distribution of health aid in-country 
2. Aid agencies’ disbursement decisions and relationship with the recipient 
country 
3. Coordination between aid agencies 
This research is guided by three specific questions linked with the three 
determinants: 
1. Do differential amounts of health aid explain different health outcomes at the 
province-level?  
                                                        
6 Aid effectiveness is here defined as “delivering aid in a way that maximizes its impact on 
development and achieves value for aid money” (OECD, 2010: 1). 
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2. How do aid agencies decide to disburse health aid in-country? 
3. Why do aid agencies have difficulty in coordinating their efforts?   
The research is divided into two main parts. The first one, comprised by Chapter 2 
is framed within the debate of whether aid works or not, thus focusing on the 
quantity of aid. In particular it asks whether the disbursement of health aid in-
country is a factor affecting the effectiveness of aid. The second part includes 
Chapters 3 and 4 and focuses on how aid works, thus referring to the quality of aid. 
Chapter 3 asks: How do aid agencies decide to disburse aid in-country? It considers 
the DAH relationships between aid agencies and the recipient country. It is divided 
into three sub-chapters each one asking: i) how to disburse aid? (section 3.4) ii) 
who should get aid? (section 3.5) and iii) where to disburse aid? (section 3.6). The 
last part of the research comprising Chapter 4 asks: why is it so hard to 
coordinate?  
This thesis comprises of three main papers (Chapters 2, 3 & 4) of independent but 
related research. Chapters 1 and 5 introduce and conclude the thesis, respectively. 
Figure 1.5 illustrates how the different parts and chapters are linked. Part 1 
focuses on understanding if differential amounts of health aid across provinces 
explain different health outcomes. Part 2 is motivated by the unequal distribution 
of health aid in-country and analyses why this heterogeneity occurs by focusing on 
a major determinant of aid effectiveness: aid agencies’ behaviour. Specifically, 
Chapter 3 is dedicated on understanding aid agencies’ decision to disburse aid in-
country taking into account the relationship with the recipient country. Each sub-
section focuses on a different level of the aid chain: Section 3.4 looks at the type of 
provider (public or private); Section 3.5 disaggregates to the channel of delivery; 
Section 3.6 culminates by discussing the choice of locations and health priorities. 
Chapter 4 explores the difficulty in achieving an effective coordination.  
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Figure 1.5 Analytical map of the research. 
Note: Aid agencies/organizations refer to the major development actors including multilateral and 
bilateral organizations, global health partnerships and NGOs. 
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1.6 RESEARCH APPROACH  
This thesis provides an unpacked analysis of aid effectiveness using Mozambique 
and the health sector as a case-study. Each paper is set within a subset of the wider 
aid effectiveness literature while offering new insights from a country and sector-
level perspectives. Chapter 2 starts from the ideological and methodological 
debates on the impact of aid on the recipient country, but escapes from the 
traditional aid-growth analysis in cross-countries to investigate the specific impact 
of health aid on health outcomes. Contextualized by the literature on conditionality 
and selectivity and extended to the aid allocation literature, Chapter 3 provides a 
systematic analysis on the interactions between aid agencies and the recipient 
country to show how they influence aid agencies’ disbursement decisions and 
further outcomes ahead on the ground. Contrarily to the majority of the literature 
the focus here is on the financial flow in-country. This chapter extends the still 
rare, but growing, literature on aid interactions and negotiations while focusing on 
issues around aid modalities and channels of delivery.  The last determinant of aid 
effectiveness covered in this thesis is the coordination of aid agencies (Chapter 4). 
The related literature includes topics on fragmentation and proliferation of 
projects that connects with the discourse on the underlying incentive structure of 
aid agencies while considering at the same time the interactions between different 
aid players. 
The three determinants that are the focus of this research (distribution of aid, 
health aid decisions and coordination) by no means represent all potential factors 
influencing health aid effectiveness. However, they are cited very frequently in the 
literature and have, each of them, raised a considerable range of debates. 
Furthermore they are so wide in their form that they are inevitably and 
intrinsically linked with other areas of the aid effectiveness literature. Specifically 
in this thesis I made sure those links were evident, clear and well-structured. 
Broadly speaking, aid effectiveness factors can be examined under three 
categories: the aid recipient country, the aid donor and the quality of interactions 
between the recipient and donor (Howes, 2011). In this research I focus mainly on 
the last two, though providing occasionally references to the quality of the 
government (in this case the MoH) of Mozambique. 
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This research aims to contribute to opening the black box on aid effectiveness 
(Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007) by asking what, how and why questions. A 
mixed-methods approach was the natural choice for informing such inquires. 
Different methods are used to tackle different questions and a combination of both 
gives more insight than using one in isolation. According to Creswell (2002) 
mixed-methods lead to a more comprehensive research as they enable 
triangulation of research findings and promote complementary research. 
Each paper has its own methodology. Chapter 2 uses quantitative methods only. It 
departs from a general hypothesis: health aid has a positive impact on health 
outcomes and uses multilevel models to test the validity of such statement. This 
chapter follows the typical structure of econometric studies: it starts with the 
literature review, followed by presentation of data and model specifications with 
the results being reported at the end. 
Chapter 3 uses mixed-methods. It provides a systematic analysis of the strategic 
interactions between aid agencies and the recipient country. Qualitative analysis is 
used to conceptualize the identity and motivations of different actors, while game 
theory guided the explanation of their interactions. The theory developed in this 
chapter is grounded on qualitative evidence from fieldwork research in 
Mozambique. In order to properly understand the processes of aid agencies’ 
decisions to disburse aid a concurrent transformative strategy is employed, i.e. in 
the data analysis the theory develops at the same time as the findings take place 
(Creswell, 2002). This means that quantitative and qualitative evidence converge 
in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research problem. In this type 
of strategy the information is integrated in the interpretation of the overall results. 
In addition, it is transformative since the research is guided by a specific theoretical 
framework, in this case game theory (Creswell, 2002).  
The fourth chapter also uses mixed-methods. However, it follows a different 
structure: it first presents the findings from qualitative evidence and uses 
collective action and game theory to help with the interpretation of results. 
Creswell (2002) calls this form of mixed methods approach sequential exploratory. 
The purpose of this strategy is to use quantitative results to assist in the 
interpretation of qualitative findings; the primary aim of this strategy is therefore 
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to explore a phenomenon. This chapter also follows a transformative approach, 
since collective action theory is purposely chosen to explore the research question.  
Even though Chapters 3 and 4 use the same methods, they differ widely in their 
approach, research focus and analytical framework. Both chapters provide 
examples of triangulation: firstly, different qualitative methods are used 
(interviews, observations, documentary analysis); secondly, they show how 
qualitative findings can be put together with theoretical frameworks to explain and 
further elucidate the same phenomenon. Using a mixed-methods approach also 
makes it possible to link and complement research findings. Whereas the 
quantitative evidence from Chapter 2 aims to test a general hypothesis, the 
qualitative findings and theory developed in Chapters 3 and 4 provide insight into 
the processes and mechanisms of health aid flows in the ground and the 
underlying motivations and incentives of different actors. Chapter’s 2 findings 
motivated complementary research on the reasoning behind the underlying 
dynamics of aid effectiveness, i.e., Chapters 3 and 4 can be understood as possible 
explanations for the results on Chapter 2 - i.e. why health aid did not show 
significant impact on health outcomes. Departing from the premise that the 
distribution of aid is unequal across provinces, Chapters 3 and 4 explore some of 
the motives behind that pattern and justify the non-conclusive answer on the 
causal-effect relationship between aid and outcomes. 
When situating the research in broad areas of academic inquiry, this thesis aims to 
complement existing quantitative and theoretical literature of aid effectiveness. 
That said, the use of qualitative evidence on Chapters 3 and 4 has an ultimate 
research purpose of advancing theoretical knowledge on aid agencies’ behaviour, 
using game theory as a model of inquiry. Furthermore, Mozambique and the health 
sector are here presented as a case study for analysing aid effectiveness. Using 
Mozambique´s example contributes to a better understanding of the determinants 
that impact on the effectiveness of health aid, which do not pretend to be only 
relevant and applicable to this specific country but aspire to allow some degree of 
extrapolation for more general and cross-country conclusions. Although I 
acknowledge that each context is unique, the theory developed in this thesis 
focuses essentially on aid actors’ motivations, behaviour and strategy. At a 
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structural level, I would argue that aid actors and recipients everywhere face very 
similar constraints and objectives, which I have sought to elucidate through 
Mozambique’s case study. See Table 1.4 for a summary of the research approach 
and contribution to research of each chapter. 
Table 1.4 Summary of research approach and relevance of research for each 
chapter. 
 Chapter 2:  
Let’s look at the 
ground: Does 
health aid work? A 
multilevel 
analysis. 
Chapter 3:  
Strategy interactions 
in health aid flows. 
Chapter 4:  
Are aid agencies 
really willing to 
coordinate? Reality 
and prescription 
disputed. 
Main research 
inquiry 
What? / If? How? (and why) Why? 
Research question Do differential 
amounts of health aid 
explain different 
health outcomes? 
How do aid agencies 
decide to disburse health 
aid in-country? 
Why is it so hard to 
coordinate?   
Methods, 
Analytical and 
Theoretical 
Framework 
Quantitative 
(multilevel model) 
Mixed-Methods  
 data collection: 
interviews, observations, 
documentary analysis 
 data analysis and 
theoretical framework: 
game theory & grounded 
theory 
Mixed-Methods  
 data collection: 
interviews, observations, 
documentary analysis 
 data analysis and 
theoretical framework: 
game theory - collective 
action (Schelling’s (1973) 
diagrams) & grounded 
theory 
Strategy Quantitative  Concurrent transformative  Sequential exploratory 
and transformative  
Structure of 
chapter 
Literature 
Review>Hypothesis> 
Testing> Results. 
Contextual literature> 
Results, theory and 
literature integrated. 
Contextual literature> 
Results> Theory> 
Interpretation> 
Explanation. 
Related literature Aid impact. Aid 
effectiveness. 
Conditionality. Selectivity. 
Aid modality. Channel of 
Delivery. Aid interactions. 
Aid allocation. Aid 
effectiveness. 
Coordination/Fragmenta
tion. Proliferation. Aid 
interactions. Aid 
agencies’ incentives. Aid 
allocation. Aid 
effectiveness. 
Contribution* Empirical and 
methodological. 
Empirical, methodological 
and theoretical. 
Empirical, 
methodological and 
theoretical. 
 
Note:* This will be discussed in detail in the conclusion of this thesis (Chapter 5). 
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1.7 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS  
This thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 adds to the literature in employing a new model to study the impact of 
health aid on health outcomes. By taking into account the heterogeneity that exists 
in the amount of health aid received between Mozambican provinces, a multilevel 
model is employed which allows to control for both individual and province-level 
variables. After recognizing significant variation of health outcomes between 
provinces I found no statistical evidence that health aid was a cause of those 
variations. However, the use of health services significantly increases the 
probability of child survival. Particularly interesting is the random effect of health 
services’ utilization across provinces which suggest that some locations take more 
advantage of having those services than others. This finding points out that specific 
health interventions should be targeted to those provinces where the effect of 
health care utilization is marginally higher. 
Chapter 3 provides a systematic analysis of donors’ health aid disbursement 
decisions in-country. In this framework donors make sequential decisions at 
different levels of the decision tree model: 1) how to disburse aid, 2) who should 
get their aid, 3) where should aid be disbursed to? Using a game theoretic 
framework and grounded in qualitative evidence from Mozambique, this chapter 
shows that donors have allocation tactics other than state-to-state aid to pursue 
their goals which are translated into opting for alternative channels of delivery. 
Furthermore it recognizes that donors have different objectives and motivations 
which are translated into different decisions along the aid delivery chain. 
Simultaneously this research acknowledges the non-passive role of the recipient 
country, i.e., donors’ decisions of how to allocate aid are mediated by the 
recipient’s response to their actions. This chapter suggests that recipient-donors’ 
strategic interactions are crucial to understand donors’ allocation behaviour and 
have direct consequences for the effectiveness of aid. 
Chapter 4 explores empirically and theoretically the efforts of aid agencies to 
coordinate with each other. Firstly it provides an insight into the implementation 
of coordination in the health sector in Mozambique as perceived by different 
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partners.  Secondly, based on the distinction between public good and private good 
coordination, it explores why different agencies differ in their motivations to 
coordinate. Finally, based on a collective action theory framework and aided by 
Schelling’s (1973) diagrams it illustrates why it is so hard to coordinate. My results 
show that individual incentives to coordinate are neither strong nor stable. The 
theory developed in this chapter suggests that the success of coordination 
depends, inter alia, on the number of agencies that perceive coordination as a 
public versus a private good and the role and involvement of the lead donor.  
Chapter 5 synthesises the main findings of the analysis presented in this thesis 
while drawing the research together. It raises research and policy questions and 
provides lessons and policy recommendations that may be learnt from these 
findings.   
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 PART I: DOES AID WORK? 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 LET’S LOOK AT THE GROUND:  DOES HEALTH AID 
WORK?  A  MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Although aid pessimism or ‘aid fatigue’ has been a persistent feature of debates 
about aid, aid is back on the international agenda in an era when the financial crisis 
is pressuring everywhere around the world. At the same time improvements 
should be made if aid is to be effective with the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) still placing a target in the aid agenda.  
Debates of the effectiveness and impact of aid have been present in the academic 
discourse for a long time and the question of whether aid works or not has been 
approached from different methodological as well as ideological perspectives. 
Specifically, the impact of aid has been evaluated (i) at micro and macro level, (ii) 
through cross-country regressions as well as case studies (iii) through the use of 
quantitative and qualitative methods (Bigsten et al., 2006). At a micro level, the 
impact of aid started to be measured by project evaluations of specific projects 
financed by foreign aid. However, project evaluations were far from representative 
and did not provide any insights on the macroeconomic impacts of aid (ibid). In the 
1990’s, a voluminous literature on the macroeconomic impacts of aid emerged 
measuring the effects of aid on economic growth, savings and investment. This 
literature became very popular due to the use of cross-country panel data 
approach that made possible to control for a variety of variables (see e.g., Levy, 
1988; Burnside and Dollar, 2000 and 2004; Hudson and Mosley, 2001; Easterly, 
2003; inter alia). But while aid seemed to work at the micro level it was not 
necessarily the case at the macro level –the micro-macro paradox (Mosley, 1987).  
When testing the impact of aid on macroeconomics variables, such as savings, 
investment and growth, scholars reached different conclusions. Some found aid to 
have a significant positive effect (Hansen and Tarp, 2000 and 2001; Moreira, 2005; 
Arndt et al., 2010, Clemens et al., 2012); while others did not find any significant 
effect, even in the presence of a sound environment (Boone, 1996; Easterly et al., 
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2004; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). This contradicts Burnside and Dollar’s 
(2000) claim that the effect of aid on growth was dependent on a country’s good 
policies. Different methodological and theoretical perspectives were appointed as 
explanations for the misleading macro results (Moreira, 2005). Attempting to 
explain the diverse effects of the macroeconomic impact of aid, Doucouliagos and 
Paldam (2005) reviewed 97 aid effectiveness studies using a meta-analysis 
technique and found that in aggregate terms, the average effect of aid is at best 
positive, but small and statistically insignificant. 
Other argument for the disappointing results of most macro effectiveness studies 
is that GDP growth is not the right measure of aid effectiveness (Masud and 
Yontcheva, 2005). Boone (1996) referred that aid effectiveness should not be 
measured by its impact on GDP growth but rather on social indicators. Despite the 
poor results of studies on growth-aid relationships, Boone (1996: 317) provides 
evidence that “aid could still reduce poverty through either higher consumption of 
the poor or greater provision of services to the poor”. This point is consistent with 
the advocates’ view that foreign aid is believed to save lives by providing vaccines, 
eradicating deadly diseases and improving health services (Levine, 2004)7 and that 
scaling up health aid will contribute to the accomplishment of the MDGs (Sachs, 
2005). 
However, evidence is scarce at the sector level of aggregation: most literature is 
focused on the effectiveness and impact of specific health interventions at the 
micro level while there is little systematic empirical evidence on how health aid 
affects health outcomes at a more aggregate level. Few studies have presented 
evidence on the effect of health aid on health outcomes and they did it using cross-
country regressions.   
Recently, Mishra and Newhouse (2009) provided the first empirical study to 
examine the effect of health sector aid on a key health outcome - infant mortality, 
suggesting that the ‘micro-macro paradox’ does not apply to the case of health aid, 
i.e., health aid leads to improvements in health outcomes. Mishra and Newhouse 
                                                        
7 See Levine (2004) for a sample of public health programs that prove their impact in saving lives 
and improve millions more. 
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(2009) used a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for cross-country data 
between 1975 and 2004 and found that doubling health aid decreases infant 
mortality by 2 per cent in a subsequent five-year period. Feeny and Ouattara 
(2013) tested the impact of health aid on an input to health (immunization) rather 
than on health outputs (such as mortality rates) and found a positive relationship.  
But on the other hand, Kosack and Tobin (2006), Williamson (2008) and Wilson 
(2011) found that health aid has no effect on mortality. While Williamson (2008) 
uses data from the OECD-CRS (Credit Reporting System) database, Wilson (2011) 
uses data from 96 high-mortality countries from the AIDatabase and provides an 
extensive sensitivity analysis and alternative specifications reaching the 
conclusion that aid effectiveness has not improved over time. Wilson (2011) adds 
an aid allocation analysis suggesting that the ineffectiveness of aid might be linked 
to the allocation process of donors by showing that Development Assistance for 
Health (DAH)8 has been going to states that had the greatest reductions in 
mortality in the past years. 
The few existent studies that analyse the impact of health aid on health outcomes 
take a cross-country approach and therefore the estimated effect of aid on health 
outcomes is an average across a very heterogeneous set of countries. While these 
results are considered as a first step, countries’ case studies on the nature and 
effect of health aid are much needed to provide a proper insight on whether health 
aid is working on the ground (White, 2007). In fact, I wonder if treating countries 
as a homogenous unit of analysis might be explaining the contradictory findings on 
aid impact. Doing so might omit some important links that connect aid with 
outcomes on the ground. After all, what really matters in the end is the effect that 
aid has on improving the living conditions of the individual.  
This research departs from the fact that there is unequal distribution of aid in-
country, i.e., some provinces receive more aid than others. I ask the following: do 
differential amounts of health aid explain different health outcomes? This research 
is the first analysing the impact of foreign aid on an outcome measured at the 
individual-level. In particular, the most innovative aspect of this research is testing 
empirically the impact of province-level characteristics, in which health aid is 
                                                        
8 Development Assistance for Health (DAH) and Health Aid are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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particular relevant here, on individual outcomes proxied by infant and child 
probability of survival. To test this, multilevel models are employed. This research 
provides therefore a meso level of analysis and suggests that looking at this level 
can advance explanations for the micro-macro paradox.   
Mozambique was the natural choice for a case-study as explained in detail in the 
introduction of this thesis. One additional factor for picking Mozambique is that 
this country has created a database that enables to track aid agencies’ projects and 
programs in the country - ODAMOZ - which shows its active response in endorsing 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness9 (2005) and furthermore represents a 
valuable source of information for this research.  
In sum, analysing the specific case study of health aid in Mozambique provides 
ground to reflect on a number of current debates about the impact and 
effectiveness of international aid. Using the Mozambique case will contribute to a 
better understanding of the determinants that impact on the effectiveness of 
health aid which is not only relevant for the specific case study of Mozambique but 
also as it can provide some degree of extrapolation for more general and cross-
country conclusions. Furthermore this research contributes methodologically to 
the literature by employing an original application of multilevel models to debate 
the problem of aid effectiveness, which though being applied to a specific case 
study in this research, can easily be replicated to other countries’ case studies. 
Empirically, a critical contribution of this research is the employment of merged 
data from ODAMOZ and the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), combination 
that was never used before on any aid effectiveness studies. Specifically it 
considers disbursement10 data rather than commitments, which is critical to 
proper assess whether aid made their way to the intended beneficiaries.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the data in particular the 
construction of database and selection of variables. Section 2.3 describes the 
                                                        
9 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness contains 56 partnership commitments aimed at 
improving the effectiveness of aid and it is founded on five core principles: ownership, alignment, 
harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability. For more information see OECD 
(2005/2008). 
10 Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or of goods or 
services (ODAMOZ). 
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analytical and econometric methodology. Section 2.4 discusses the main results. It 
starts by considering a single-level regression analysis on the determinants of 
infant and child survival and then moves to the analysis of multilevel models 
where health aid is included as a province-level regressor. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 DATA AND MEASUREMENT  
2.2.1  AN  ORI GIN AL DAT ABAS E  
In order to assess the impact of health aid on health indicators in Mozambique a 
spatial approach of health aid was chosen. The objective is to take into account the 
heterogeneity that exists between Mozambican provinces11, mainly in terms of the 
different amounts of health aid received. This study wants to test whether 
provinces that receive more health aid have better health outcomes. In other 
words, I want to assess whether the province variation in health outcomes can be 
attributed to health aid differentials. For the purpose of this research data are 
collected through the Official Development Assistance to Mozambique (ODAMOZ) 
website, the only database that provides province aid information in Mozambique. 
Figure 2.1 shows the total amount of health aid going to each province. 
ODAMOZ reports data from bilateral and multilateral donors as well as from the 
Global Fund Against AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria (GFATM) tracking their projects 
and programs in the country:  “where they are operating, who finances them, and 
which organization implements them” (ODAMOZ). See Table B1 for the full list of 
development partners for health registered in the ODAMOZ database, by type of 
aid agency. Data are inputted online by the individual donors/UN Agencies and 
therefore completeness and exactness is subject to own judgment of those 
reporting. In this study, aid data from ODAMOZ database are disaggregated to 
explore the relationship between health-targeted aid and health outcomes. 
Because the data is not automatically disaggregated by province in the ODAMOZ 
database, manual work had to be carried out in order to allocate aid to its 
respective province, according to the information specified for each individual 
project and program. Data at the province-level were then ordered by date (time 
period 1996-2010) and further disaggregated by channel of assistance, on-off 
                                                        
11 Mozambique is divided into eleven provinces. 
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budget and type of project. Disbursements are considered and not commitments as 
the former represent the inflows that really got into the country (see Appendix C 
for more details on the database).  
I tried to contrast ODAMOZ database with other databases usually regarded as the 
main ones for researching aid effectiveness namely OECD (DAC and CRS)12 (used 
by Mishra and Newhouse, 2009; Williamson, 2011 and Feeny and Ouattara, 2013) 
and AidData13 (used by Wilson, 2011); however I found some limitations. Firstly, 
those databases only report aggregate data at a country level and, therefore, do not 
capture the aid differentials between provinces, and secondly there is no proper 
recording on disbursements, i.e. the disbursement data is, in many cases, spotty or 
missing entirely. The OECD-DAC database only reports commitments for the 
period 1995-2001 and not disbursements. For the period 2002-2008 I compared 
totals from OECD-DAC with totals from ODAMOZ and found some differences but 
not hugely significant and wonder if they might also occur due to different 
exchange rates: while OECD-DAC uses 2008 constant US$ millions, ODAMOZ uses 
the average exchange rate from the Mozambique State Budget 2007 (see Table B2 
for a list of exchange rates to US$ used in ODAMOZ and Table B3 for a comparison 
between ODAMOZ and OECD-DAC values). ODAMOZ recognizes this limitation and 
refer the future need to adapt in order to accommodate annual exchange rate 
based on the OECD/DAC. The difference in disbursement values between both 
databases might also derive from a divergence on the number of donors with data 
reported on each database. Finally, I also checked the data from the Institute of 
Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) as this would include private aid as well (aid 
from foundations and other public-private partnerships); however, once again 
data was not reported at the province-level. 
As a result, ODAMOZ represents the database that best fits my needs. 
                                                        
12 OECD data are grouped in two separate databases: the DAC annual aggregate database, which 
provides comprehensive data on the volume, origin and types of aid and other resources flows, and 
the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which provides detailed information on individual aid 
activities, such as sectors, countries, projects descriptions, etc. Available at: 
www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm 
13 AidData was developed by researchers at the College of William and Mary and at the Brigham 
Young University. It was formed in 2009 from the merger of two existing programmes: AiDa 
(Accessible Information on Development Activities) with PLAID (Project-Level Aid) data. Available 
at: http://www.aiddata.org/content/index/about 
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Figure 2.1 Total health aid by province between 1996 and 2010.14 
Note: Health aid includes Technical Assistance and Cooperation, Project Aid, and Sector Wide including the funds 
PROSAUDE, Common Fund for Medicines and Provincial Common Fund, financed by bilateral, multilateral and the 
Global Health Partnerships. Table B1 includes the list of the funding sources. Health aid is composed mainly by 
grants with the exception of two loan entries from the African Development Bank. It is considered the total 
disbursed and not the commitments. The Exchange rates to the US$ used in ODAMOZ are the average exchange 
rates used by the OECD in 2007. See Table B2 in Appendix. 
(Source: author’s calculations, ODAMOZ database.) 
The ODAMOZ dataset is merged with a Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), 
national representative household survey conducted in Mozambique in 2003 for 
the first cross-section and the Aids Indicator Survey (AIS) in 200915 for the second 
cross-section analysis, both representative at the country, province and urban-
rural level.  Permission was obtained to access these surveys through the Measure 
DHS Project. These surveys provide nationally representative data on fertility, 
family planning, maternal and child health, gender, HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
nutrition. Firstly, primary data is collected at the household level through 
questionnaires which are then useful to identify members of the household who 
are eligible for individual interview including women of reproductive age (15-49) 
and men aged 15-5916. The data is cross-sectional.  
                                                        
14 Total health aid by province is used here for contextualizing the unequal distribution of aid in 
Mozambique. Nevertheless, average per capita health aid in US$ millions will be used in the 
econometric specification. 
15 At the time when this paper was written these were the last and more recent available datasets. 
16 In 2003, 12315 households were interviewed followed by the interview of 12418 women and 
2900 men. In 2009, 6097 households were interviewed followed by the interview of 6413 women 
and 4799 men. De facto region of residence is used, which corresponds to the place where the 
respondent was interviewed. 
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One should bear in mind the potential problems associated of using data collected 
at the women level, namely in terms of the variable mortality which could be 
biased by under-reporting or even wrong-reporting by women (DHS, 2005). 
However, collecting data at the level of the individual is less biased than using 
computed mortality rates that depend on particular estimation procedures.  
Additional data on province-level variables comes from the Mozambique Institute 
of National Statistics (INE). The 2003 cross-section is the main dataset used for 
this research which is then followed up by a cross-section for 2009.  
2.2.2   CHOO SIN G THE V ARI AB LES  
2.2.2.1 Impact measured by health outcomes  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of health aid on health 
indicators in Mozambique. Infant mortality is usually the main indicator used as a 
dependent variable in macro-studies for several reasons. Firstly, past research 
suggested that infant mortality depends on the existence of improved health 
services through outputs (such as increase number of health workers, availability 
of medication, number of health units) and outcomes indicators (such as access to 
health services and vaccination coverage) (see, among others, Filmer and Pritchett, 
1999). Infant mortality is therefore a better indicator than life expectancy, for 
instance, as it corresponds quickly to health improvements17 (Mishra and 
Newhouse, 2009).  Secondly, infant mortality can also be a proxy for poverty as it is 
a “flash indicator of improvement in the conditions of the poor” (Boone, 1996: 
293) through higher consumption of health services by the poor. Infant mortality is 
then a good indicator for measuring the relative short-term impact of aid. However 
child mortality rate (or under-five mortality), that represents the probability of a 
child born in a specific year or period dying before reaching the age of five (WHO), 
is also a good indicator for reflecting the impact of aid during a longer period. This 
indicator is in fact used by other researchers who are interested in a longer effect 
of health or want to test for robustness (see e.g. Gebhard et al., 2008; Wilson, 
2011). In this research both child and infant mortality will be taken into account 
and their results compared. 
                                                        
17 This is due to the fact that infant mortality rate is defined as the probability of a child born in a 
specific year or period dying before reaching the age of one (WHO). 
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The DHS database provides the best data available at the level of the individual 
women on their maternity and birth history. Therefore, although not following the 
literature on the use of aggregate mortality rate I will take into account the 
standard ages for infant and child and analyse them separately in this research for 
allowing the comparison with empirical country analysis results.18 
For this research birth recodes are chosen as the primary unit of analysis which is 
common in micro-econometrics models of child health determinants (see, e.g., 
Charmarbagwala et al., 2004). The respondent is the child’s mother and therefore 
the birth recodes datasets from DHS are particular useful for this research as (i) 
they have data from the respondent (the mother), her household and the birth 
history, addressing specific information on fertility, maternity and child health (ii) 
women provide more reliable information on the health of their children as they 
are the ones who give birth and (iii) being most of the time their care-givers makes 
them responsible for managing the child’s health through their decision in 
seeking/not seeking health care (see e.g. Sandiford et al., 1995; Reyes et al., 1997). 
For obtaining the best proxy for infant mortality the data will be first limited to 
women who had a child during the year before the impact is being measured (2002 
for the 2003 cross-section and 2008 for the 2009 cross-section). A dummy variable 
is created with the information of whether that child is alive or not at the time of 
the interview. For computing the best proxy for child mortality, data will be limited 
to women who had children during the five years prior to the interview. The same 
dummy variable is created for the 2003 cross-section. For 2009, a dummy variable 
was created for whether women had all their children alive (independently of the 
number of children) or at least one had died.19 
2.2.2.2 Health aid 
The main explanatory variable at the province-level is average per capita health 
aid in US$ millions constant 2007 exchange rate (see Figure 2.1 under notes, for a 
                                                        
18 Maternity and birth history are recorded for each single child a women has, containing detailed 
information on pre-natal and post-natal assistance, the date of birth, vaccination, weight and height, 
death and age at death (DHS, 2003). 
19 A different dummy is created for the 2009 cross-section. This is due to the fact that the 2009 
database only contains information at the women level and therefore discards all specific 
information relative to each birth history. Different models for 2003 and 2009 are specified. 
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detailed explanation of the components of health aid). Because the health effects of 
aid projects and programs are not immediate, my first approach is to use six year 
aid totals and compare with health indicators for the following year. I have chosen 
to follow Masud and Yontcheva (2005), Gebhard et al. (2008), Mishra and 
Newhouse (2009) and Wilson (2011) who use a one year lag health aid but, as the 
former did, I will also test the results with alternative lag structures (2 to 4 
years20). The six years period is chosen for various reasons: (i) health aid has been 
continuous for a long period and therefore some persistence of the past might still 
influence the contemporaneous impact on health indicators; (ii) using aggregate 
six year data for health aid can account for eventual errors of donors who 
report/input data on the database and finally (iii) the two different years, 2003 
and 2009, that are being analysed and compared, have a six year interval. To 
control for measurement error (Boone, 1996) health aid is averaged over six-year 
intervals and controlled for population using per capita data. The average per 
capita health aid from 1997 to 2002 is then compared with its infant/child survival 
in 2003 and the average per capita health aid from 2003 to 2008 is then compared 
with its infant/child survival in 2009.  
2.2.2.3  Additional controls 
In order to choose appropriate controls, I reviewed both the aid effectiveness and 
child health literature for determinants of infant and child mortality/survival at 
both the individual and aggregate level. 
Determinants of mortality in child health literature include child-specific (or 
biological) characteristics, household characteristics (or socio-economic factors) 
and community characteristics (or service provision). When service provision data 
are not available geographical dummies (urban/rural, province/region or cluster) 
are used to pick those factors. Despite the fact that these dummies are generally 
significant there is the need to understand what is about different areas that 
explain differences in child health (Charmarbagwala et al., 2004). Relating with the 
aid effectiveness literature can provide some insight information on the contextual 
factors in different areas influencing health outcomes of individuals. In particular, 
                                                        
20 There is a debate about which is the best lag aid; however, it is focused on the aid-growth 
literature. For that reason I will follow what the few health aid literature have done so far. 
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this research uses health aid as a potential indicator to explain differences in 
health outcomes across provinces. 
To capture the link between diverse, but in my view, complementary areas of 
research I include both individual and province-level variables. Individual-level 
controls include children characteristics: infant or child’s duration of breastfeeding 
(in months), gender (female, male); mother characteristics: mother’s age (years), 
mother’s education (no education, primary, secondary and higher); household 
characteristics: wealth index (1 to 5), access to water and sanitation (no access, 
access) and health care utilization: prenatal assistance and delivery (no assistance, 
assistance)21. In order to arrive to the choice of these controls an extensive 
analysis was made on the most significant factors that influence mortality (this will 
be discussed in more detail in section 2.4). Additional control variables tested 
separately at the province-level include the number of health units, number of 
doctors, health spending22 and population. A more detailed description of the 
databases and specific information on the construction of variables can be found 
on Appendix C.  
2.3 METHODOLOGY  
2.3.1  A  MULTI LEV EL AP PRO ACH  
To verify the hypothesis of whether the context, in particular health aid, influences 
health outcomes, a multilevel approach, was chosen23. Multilevel models allow 
estimating simultaneously individual and province-level effects and in particular to 
determine the relative impact of each level of the hierarchy on the outcome and to 
identify the factor at each level that is associated with that level impact (Hox, 
                                                        
21 Vaccination and undernourishment are not included as controls as they only have records for 
children that are alive. Province-level variables of institutional environment and democracy would 
be interesting however data was not found at the province-level. 
22 It is expected that health spending is related to health aid since the later funds the former (Feeny 
and Ouattara, 2013). In this sense, health aid also funds health units and doctors, either directly or 
indirectly.  This is tested later on the chapter through pair-wise correlations and was decided not to 
include these variables in the main model due to collinearity and double-counting problems.  
23 This model has been given different names by different disciplines; in economics the model has 
been named as random coefficient model, mixed-effects model and hierarchical model, while in 
statistics it is more widely recognized as the covariance components model (Hox, 2002). 
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2002). In this study the outcome of interest is measured at the individual-level 
(proxy of health outcomes) while the main explanatory variable (health aid) is 
measured at the province-level. Multilevel analysis is appropriate for the analysis 
of datasets when comprising several types of unit of analysis as it assumes a 
hierarchical dataset where individuals are nested or grouped in different contexts, 
in this case provinces.  
In multilevel analysis the dependent variable has to show some amount of residual, 
or unexplained variation associated with the units (Snijders and Bosker, 1999), e.g. 
if the study is about infant mortality (Y) of individuals (level 1) in provinces (level 
2), this means that individuals in some provinces tend to have higher mortality 
than in others, even when controlling for individual-level characteristics (e.g. 
literacy, fertility, wealth, etc.). Equally important in the multilevel analysis is the 
assumption that individuals in the same group are generally more similar than 
individuals from different group (ibid). Mixed effects models are then an 
alternative to simple regression models when a hierarchical structure dataset 
exists. According to Aitkin and Longford (1986) and Burstein et al. (1978) the 
standard single-level approach to hierarchical data gives rise to biased estimates 
and corresponding standard errors while the multilevel approach does not 
(Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Maas and Hox, 2004). This is because single-level 
models assume independence of observations, which is not the case when 
individuals in the same group share similar characteristics, e.g. the outcomes of 
individuals living in the same province can be positively correlated as they share 
several unobserved factors at the institutional level (same infrastructure, same 
amount of health aid, etc.). 
Conflicting advices exist on when to use multilevel models (see, for instance, Searle 
et al., 1992; Gelman and Hill, 2007: 245-246 for a detailed discussion on the topic). 
However, the literature is consistent on using multilevel models when the units are 
randomly drawn from a larger sample but the interest is on the underlying 
population and when the researcher is interested in the group level 2 coefficients 
(see Hox, 1995 and 2002; Snijders and Bosker, 1999). For this research the 
multilevel model is therefore appropriate for the following reasons: (i) both levels 
of analysis are of interest as I am concerned with the effect of a level 2 variable 
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(health aid) on a level 1 outcome (infant mortality), (ii) data from the DHS 
constitute a sample that was randomly selected from the population and because 
of its representativeness statistical inference is unconditional on the observed 
units of the sample and (iii) my interest lies on the province group effect on health 
outcomes.  
By allowing nested sources of variability a multilevel modelling has an empirical 
advantage over standard regression analysis since it does not underestimate 
standard errors. It also has a theoretical advantage: group threat theory is a theory 
of groups and thus we are able to draw conclusions at this level of analysis thus 
avoiding the ecological (interpreting aggregated data on an individual-level) and 
atomistic (interpreting individual data on a higher level) fallacy24 (see, for 
instance, Gelman and Hill, 2007). 
Multilevel models have been more widely used in sociology, epidemiology, 
education, public health, etc. (Hox, 1995). This paper presents an original 
economic/social application of the multilevel approach to the effectiveness of 
health aid measured at the individual-level, combining different level variables that 
are interconnected. 
2.3.2  AN ALYTI CAL FRAMEWO RK  
I begin the analysis by fitting a null or empty two-level model: 
 
                                                                                                                                 (1)                    
where 
ij is the probability that the individual i in province j is alive or not (is alive 
= 1 ) and depends on the average survival in province j j0  plus the effects of 
individual characteristics j1  to nj  (see Table C1 for the full list of individual-
level controls) and an individual error ij .  
                                                        
24 Ecological fallacy occurs when the conceptual model being tested corresponds to the lower level 
(the individual) but the data are collected at a higher level. Atomistic fallacy is the other way 
around: the conceptual model being tested corresponds to the higher level but the data is collected 
at the lower level. In multilevel models data are collected at both levels and therefore these 
problems are avoided (Gelman and Hill, 2007). 
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Because there may also exist an effect that is common to all individuals within the 
same province, it is necessary to add the province-level error. This is done by 
specifying a separate equation for the intercept:  
                                                                                       
jj 0000                                                                                                                                         (2)                                                                   
(random intercept) 
where 00  is the average outcome for the population and j0 is a province-specific 
effect. The difference with the usual regression model is that it is assumed that 
each province has a different intercept coefficient j0 . Since the intercept is a 
random variable that varies across provinces, it is often called as random 
intercept25 (Hox, 1995). The above model contains only an intercept and therefore 
no fixed part explanatory variables are specified. 
Additionally, in order to test if differences in health outcomes between provinces 
might be explained by differences in the amount of health aid received, health aid 
should be included in the previous specification model.  
                                                                                                       
0 00 01 1 0 0...j j m mj jZ Z                                                                                        
(3) 
(random intercept with control variables) 
where 01  to 0m  are the effects of province-level variables on the health outcome. 
Equation 3 predicts the average mortality in province j by the respective health aid 
in that province ( 1 jZ  = health aid by province) and some other province-level 
characteristics (see Table C1 for the full list of province-level controls). For 
simplicity, assume that the effects of individual characteristics do not vary across 
                                                        
25 There are conflicting definitions of random and fixed effects. For this research I will follow the 
generality of multilevel/mixed-effects literature definition with random effects referring to 
coefficients that do vary by group (here province) and fixed effects referring to coefficients that do 
not vary by group (they are fixed across all groups (here provinces)). For a detailed discussion of 
the different definitions used for fixed and random effects see Gelman and Hill (2007: 245-246). 
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provinces and are fixed so that 0101 ... nnjj   .26 Combining equations 1 and 3 
yields the following:  
                                                                                                                                                                      (4) 
   
 
 
2.3.3   ECONO METRI C APP ROACHE S  
2.3.3.1 Cross-section techniques  
Critiques of cross-section versus panel techniques applied to economic problems 
are common and include aspects such as: i) cross-section studies over long period 
time spans eliminate short-run fluctuations or business cycle effects, ii) cross-
section studies are usually based on average values over long time periods of time 
which might result in simultaneity problems, iii) and that cross-section analysis 
may be inefficient since it discards information on within-country variation (see, 
e.g., Greene, 2003). However, all these critiques can be overcome if i) the period of 
analysis can be split to create different cross-sectional databases, ii) by using 
average values over a shorter period of time and iii) if it is possible to catch within-
country variation through the heterogeneity that exists between provinces. As a 
result, I use two different cross-sectional datasets for 2003 and 2009 which will be 
separately analysed and then compared as a way to uncover possible time trends. 
Data on health aid at the province-level will be averaged by 6 years. The use of a 
multilevel analysis goes further than analysing within-country variation to analyse 
within and between province variation and capturing the desired heterogeneity. 
2.3.3.2  Endogeneity  
A main problem identified in the aid effectiveness literature is the potential 
endogeneity of the variable aid. In the case of health aid specifically, aid might be 
endogeneous because the current health status in a country can determine the 
amount of health aid received (Williamson, 2008) possibly leading to an issue of 
reverse causality. Literature on aid effectiveness has been abundant in trying to 
                                                        
26 In the empirical analysis on section 2.4 I will test whether individual characteristics have random 
effects. 
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address the endogeneity problem (Dalgaard et al., 2003 and 2004; Rodrik, 2005; 
Roodman, 2008; among others). Scholars have recurrently used instruments for 
foreign aid such as strategic, military and political variables based on the idea that 
aid is given based on self-interested motives and not necessarily based on need. 
Recently, Bearce and Tirone (2010) suggest that all these self-interest variables are 
highly correlated with ineffective aid in the sense that those are the factors 
responsible for donors not enforcing conditionality. To account for all these 
problems lagged aid is commonly used as an instrument. 
Some researchers might still think that even if aid is lagged, its coefficient might be 
biased by endogeneity or reverse causality. Even if one might expect that mortality 
in the future cannot influence health aid flows today, future mortality might itself 
be correlated with mortality today. Reflecting on this issue Dalgaard et al. (2003 
and 2004) argue that endogeneity of aid might not be much of a problem in 
practice if past levels of mortality are themselves not good predictors of actual 
deaths which would not create a problem in the case aid allocations were based on 
past mortality rates. They continue referring that one should, however, take into 
account the endogeneity of aid once time-averages are employed for both aid and 
growth which would mean they would be jointly endogeneous. Nevertheless, this 
is not the case in my multilevel specification where averaged aid at the province-
level is compared with actual individual deaths in a single year which does not 
happen in a panel. Following Dalgaard’s et al. (2003 and 2004) argument I decided 
to test if past mortality (child mortality in 1997) at the province-level was a good 
predictor of individual deaths in a single year (2003), using the multilevel 
specification referred above and found that the variable is statistically insignificant 
(results not shown for reasons of parsimony).  
In addition, one might think that if aid does not follow need, i.e. aid allocations 
might not be based on past mortality rates, endogeneity might not mask the 
effectiveness of aid. A recent study by Wilson (2011) showed that aid appears to 
follow success, rather than causing it, i.e. aid appears to be going to countries 
where mortality reductions in the past years are higher. This finding is important 
for the issue of endogeneity of aid. If aid is to be endogenous it must be positively 
correlated with unobserved factors that increase mortality, i.e. aid has to go 
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“where it is most likely to do the most good”, where it is more effective (Wilson, 
2011: 2038).  If aid is to be endogenous it should be positively correlated with past 
levels of mortality. If aid is negatively correlated with past levels of mortality, 
endogeneity might not be a threat in explaining the causal effect from aid to 
outcomes, i.e. reverse causality is non-existent. Wilson (2011) explored this issue 
by modelling aid allocation as a function of infant mortality and other variables. 
Here, I simply show a figure that establishes the relationship between the amount 
of aid received by each province and the correspondent child mortality (see Figure 
2.2). In the left-column provinces are ranked according to the highest child 
mortality rates (2003). On the right, provinces are ordered according to the 
cumulative amounts of aid receiving by province between 2005 and 2008. The 
lines connect the provinces, showing the persistent misalignment that exists 
between mortality and health aid. This is true for all regions in Mozambique but is 
particular critical for Niassa and Tete and Zambezia and Maputo City who are not 
receiving correspondent amounts of aid.  
Cabo Delgado 1 1 Zambezia
Nampula 2 2 Cabo Delgado
Niassa 3 3 Sofala
Tete 4 4 Manica 
Sofala 5 5 Nampula
Manica 6 6 Imhambe
Gaza 7 7 Maputo City
Imhambane 8 8 Gaza
Zambezia 9 9 Maputo Province
Maputo Province 10 10 Niassa
Maputo City 11 11 Tete
RANKING BY HIGHEST CHILD 
MORTALITY 2003
RANKING BY CUMULATIVE 
HEALTH AID 2005-2008
 
Figure 2.2 Mortality rates versus health aid by province.27 
Note: Orange rows refer to the Northern provinces, green to the central and blue to the south provinces. 
(Sources: Health Aid: ODAMOZ, Child Mortality: DHS) 
Finally, as Rodrik (2005: 11) wrote about this problem: ‘‘it is genuinely hard to ﬁnd 
credible instruments which satisfy both the exogeneity and exclusion 
requirements’’ because ‘‘it is always possible to find a story about why an 
exogenous variable belongs as a regressor in the second-stage of the estimation 
(therefore making it invalid as an instrument)’’. Roodman (2008) corroborates this 
                                                        
27 Alternative time frames and average per capita aid flows were tested in order to check for 
robustness. 
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idea by referring that different choices of instruments lead to different results on 
aid effectiveness and it is still unclear which are the best variables to be used as 
instruments. Overfitting bias caused by using too many instruments can also take 
place which is equally undesirable. A recent paper by Deaton (2009) discusses in 
some detail the limits of the process of instrumentation in aid-growth 
relationships. 
Finally, the use of lagged aid is particularly justified in this research as a result of 
the specific use of a multilevel model. Multilevel analysis tests for the effect of 
province characteristics on the probability of a single child being alive. By 
accounting this one-way relationship the direction goes from heath aid (a province 
characteristic) to the single child and not the other way around. As a consequence, 
reverse causality might not be such a problem in multilevel models between level 
one and level two variables where the individual is nested in a particular context 
and not the other way around. Finally, multilevel models also reduce omitted 
variable biases: province characteristics-specific effects capture some of the 
omitted variables not previously indentified on the child health literature. 
2.3.3.3 Sample size and standard errors in multilevel analysis 
Some debate exists on the sufficient sample size for multilevel modelling (see e.g. 
Maas and Hox, 2005) since an optimal sample size means minimal standard errors 
for the parameters of interest (Snidjers, 1993). Some criticisms include the fact 
that small sample sizes at level 2 may lead to biased estimates of the second-level 
standard errors because the variability between groups is relatively small. While 
Snijders and Boskers (1999) provide a rule of thumb saying that if N is equal to or 
greater than 10, a mixed-effects model is preferable to a fixed model as a means of 
regression analysis, Gelman and Hill (2007) go further to argue that there is no 
minimum number of groups necessary for doing a multilevel estimation. The latter 
authors emphasize that standard single models are simply multilevel model with 
group variance set to zero or infinity, which would imply that multilevel models 
are always appropriate when we expect some variation in level two. As a result the 
choice of eleven provinces is supported in the literature.  
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2.3.3.4 Software for analysis 
The analysis was conducted in Stata (version 11) using the gllamm (Generalized 
Linear Latent and Mixed Models) program for fitting multilevel models. Although 
the program has an extremely slow performance it allows the use of sampling 
weights which was not possible with other mixed models commands. In the DHS 
surveys it happens that the sample is selected with unequal probability. For this 
reason weights are applied for the empirical analysis in order to adjust for 
differences in probabilities of selection and interview between cases in the sample 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). Nevertheless, the results of gllamm with no 
weights where compared with results from the Stata command for multilevel 
models, xtmelogit and runmlwin (a Stata command to fit multilevel models in 
MLwin from within Stata) and found no significant differences even when gllamm 
and xtmelogit use maximum likelihood estimation to fit the models and runlwin 
uses quasilikelihood estimation. 
Adaptive quadrature method was used for numerical integration and the model 
was refitted with different numbers of quadrature points. Since the parameters’ 
estimates did not vary much, I decided to use Stata’s default number of integration 
points, fixed to seven (used in xtmelogit) for gllamm as well. 
2.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
2.4.1  SETTI NG T HE R ES EAR CH QUESTION  
Since the Peace Agreement in 1992 the World Bank and the IMF agreed that 
Mozambique is a ‘success story’ in Sub-Saharan Africa (Chao and Kostermans, 
2002). Health indicators in Mozambique have generally improved over the last 
decades. Infant mortality rates, for instance, have declined significantly since 1990 
while funding for health aid projects and programs has risen across this same time 
period. But did these projects contribute to significant increases in the health of 
developing country populations? (See Figure 2.3 for trends in health aid and infant 
mortality in Mozambique). Particularly interesting in Figure 2.3 is the sudden rise 
in health aid flows after 2000 that can be attributed to the tremendous amount of 
flows from private foundations and global health initiatives. 
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Figure 2.3 Trends in health aid and infant mortality in Mozambique, 1990-2005. 
Note: Health aid (total) includes all financial and in-kind contributions from aid organizations including bilateral 
and multilateral agencies, private foundations (U.S. based), international NGOs (U.S. based) and global health 
initiatives (real 2007 US$). 
(Sources: Health Aid: IHME 2009, Infant Mortality: WHO) 
2.4.2  S INGLE-LEV EL AN ALY SI S  
2.4.2.1 Determinants of infant and child survival 
Before jumping into the analysis of health aid as a main explanatory variable for 
health outcomes, a single-level logistic regression was estimated so as to choose 
the best controls at the individual-level. Variables were included sequentially by 
group beginning with child-specific characteristics, mother characteristics, 
household characteristics and health care utilization.28 Table 2.1 presents the first 
set of results for the logistic model where sampling weights were applied. A few 
remarks are worth making. The beneficial impact of breastfeeding on infant 
survival is evident. Children that have been breastfeeding for more months have a 
higher chance of survival. Mother’s education also contributes to the outcome of 
both the infant and the child, to the extent that the odds of a child staying alive are 
much higher for women with higher education. However it is interesting to notice 
that when household characteristics and utilization of health care are controlled 
for, education, though still significant, loses some of its power (regressions 4 of 
infant alive and regressions 4 & 5 of child alive in Table 2.1). The exception is in 
regression 5 from infant alive: when prenatal care is added to the regressions, the 
                                                        
28 A great number of model specifications were analysed before choosing the final model presented 
here. For collinearity reasons, some variables that one might think to be of theoretical interest for 
this research were not included in the final model. Some examples of these variables include: child 
age, number of births per women, birth interval and birth order, access to water and sanitation and 
degree of ruralness.  
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effect of mother’s education is insignificant. This result implies that prenatal care is 
extremely relevant for infant survival such that it surpasses the mother’s education 
effect. In terms of delivery assistance, an infant from a mother who received 
medical care, either by a physician or a nurse/midwife is almost twice more likely 
to survive than an infant that did not receive any delivery assistance.  
2.4.2.2 Comparing infant and child results 
When comparing infant and child results it is quite interesting to notice that infant 
survival depends more on factors related to childrearing, such as breastfeeding 
and utilization of prenatal care and delivery services in a medical assisted facility 
whereas the mother’s education is particularly important for child survival. For 
women with education the odds of having their child alive are higher than for 
women with no education. Breastfeeding is still important for child survival, 
however this variable is non-linear and therefore the effect of the duration of 
breastfeeding is more pronounced at the beginning (first ten months) and 
attenuates towards the end as the child gets older.29 Delivery by medical trained 
personnel is still significant however the coefficient is lower if comparing to the 
infants’ regressions. Prenatal assistance does not seem significant when looking at 
the child database which is plausible since I am considering a five-year interval 
and the prenatal effect was eventually smoothed. Finally, my findings are in line 
with the literature in terms of the insignificance of the wealth index as a 
determinant for infant and child survival (see e.g. Charmarbragwala et al., 2004 for 
a review on child health determinants in econometric studies). 
 
 
                                                        
29 A square-root of the variable breastfeeding is used for the analysis of child survival. 
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Table 2.1 Single-level logistic regression, for infant and child survival 
Dependent variable Infant alive Child alive 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
           
           
Child’s characteristics           
Child's sex 0.889 0.899 0.924 0.918 0.836 0.881 0.939 0.939 0.934 1.097 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.25) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.15) 
Months of breastfeeding 1.867*** 1.938*** 1.970*** 1.974*** 1.958***      
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)      
Months of breastfeeding 
square-root 
     
3.915*** 3.951*** 3.951*** 3.947*** 4.306*** 
      (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.32) 
           
Mother’s 
characteristics 
          
Women education level:           
Primary education  0.770 0.781 0.729 0.604  1.793*** 1.794*** 1.747*** 1.758*** 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.19)  (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.25) 
Secondary or Higher 
education 
 
6.935** 7.597** 5.347* 3.906  6.804*** 6.982*** 6.276*** 5.882*** 
  (5.58) (6.25) (4.64) (3.29)  (2.15) (2.24) (2.02) (2.24) 
           
Household’s 
characteristics 
          
Wealth Index:           
poorer   1.602 1.479 1.811   1.034 1.019 1.097 
   (0.69) (0.64) (0.80)   (0.17) (0.17) (0.25) 
middle   1.008 1.014 1.229   1.102 1.097 1.120 
   (0.47) (0.47) (0.59)   (0.17) (0.17) (0.24) 
richer   0.524 0.525 0.700   0.993 0.984 0.937 
   (0.22) (0.22) (0.29)   (0.15) (0.15) (0.20) 
richest   0.587 0.584 0.654   0.871 0.864 0.815 
   (0.28) (0.28) (0.32)   (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) 
Healthcare utilization           
Delivery assistance    1.955*     1.316**  
    (0.69)     (0.18)  
Prenatal care     2.360***     1.207 
     (0.72)     (0.17) 
N 2535 2535 2535 2535 2460 9659 9659 9659 9659 6033 
r2_p 0.696 0.706 0.712 0.714 0.698 0.407 0.419 0.420 0.420 0.413 
chi2 215.525 188.761 204.767 202.012 195.122 801.964 834.149 838.312 846.758 442.762 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: This table shows the results for single-level regressions for both infant and child survival using different control variables entered 
sequentially. Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratio) with standard errors shown in parenthesis. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at 
10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
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2.4.2.3 Post-estimation of the single-level model 
To begin with, we see that the pseudo R-squared has increased throughout 
regressions (1)-(4) for both infant and child regressions indicating an improved 
explanatory power coming from additional inclusion of relevant regressors. It also 
represents a very good value, comparing to usual low-pseudo R2 values in logistic 
regressions. However, as suggested by Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000), the 
pseudo R2 does not properly assess the model goodness-of-fit. Therefore, I used 
the Wald test for assessing the joint significance of the parameters and was able to 
reject the null hypothesis that all parameters are equal to zero.  
A linktest for detecting specification errors was also performed providing evidence 
that the model was properly specified after controlling for the non-linearity of the 
logit in the variable breastfeeding. Using Box and Tidwell's (1962) method I found 
that the best power transformation for the predictor breastfeeding is given by a 
square root transformation. This is used in child regressions only. 
Because multicollinearity could also be a potential problem I examined pair-wise 
correlations and associations between independent variables and found no serious 
cases. However, as pair-wise correlation does not provide an infallible guide to the 
presence of multicollinearity I use multicollinearity diagnostic statistics and found 
very high values for Tolerance and small Variance Inflation Factors30, which 
support the low multivariate correlation between independent variables. Despite 
these results one might wonder whether education can still be highly correlated 
with other variables in particular quintile and delivery assistance. In order to test 
for the robustness of the model I removed education as a control and found no 
major changes in both the estimated value of the remaining coefficients and their 
significance. 
                                                        
30 By definition Tolerance = 1 – Rsq, where Rsq is the coefficient of determination for the regression 
of that variable on all remaining independent variables with low values of Tolerance indicating high 
multivariate correlation. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 1/Tolerance, it is always >= 1 and it 
is the number of times the variance of the corresponding parameter estimate is increased due to 
multicollinearity as compared to as it would be if there were no multicollinearity. Values of VIF 
exceeding 10 are often regarded as indicating multicollinearity, but in weaker models, which is 
often the case in logistic regression, values above 2.5 may be a cause for concern (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow, 2000). 
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In order to detect influential observations, pearson residuals, deviance residuals 
and pregibon leverage were analysed. It was decided to remove the most 
outstanding observations, corresponding to the data points that were three times 
the average of the leverage. The results reported here already take into account the 
removal of leverage points.31 
In sum, all evidence seems to suggest that estimated model is robust. As a 
consequence, the model is going to be used as a baseline for further analysis, 
namely when looking into the role of province context variables, in particular 
health aid, on health outcomes. 
2.4.3  MULTILEV EL ANALYSI S  
2.4.3.1 Province variation: introducing the multilevel model 
I begin this section by showing the benefits of using multilevel analysis for 
capturing province-level variation. For simplicity, the following analysis will only 
consider child (aged 5 or less) regressions.32 In Table 2.2, regression 2, we can see 
that the variance component corresponding to an empty random intercept model 
is statistically significant meaning that there appears to be significant variation in 
provinces for child survival. This finding is also supported by a standard Chi-
square test for association of variables where one is able to reject the null 
hypothesis of no association between province and proportion of child that are 
alive. The estimates of the province effects for a random-intercept only model with 
no controls are displayed in Figure 2.4 and are shown in rank order together with 
95% confidence intervals. It is not surprising that Maputo City (the wealthiest 
province) is the top ranked province, which means that it is the province with the 
highest number of children alive. Additionally, it is interesting to notice that there 
are eight provinces in which the 95% does not overlap the horizontal line at zero, 
indicating that the number of children alive in these provinces is significantly 
above average (above the zero line) or below average (below the zero line). The 
                                                        
31 After running the regressions with and without the outliers, I observed that the estimated 
coefficients were not qualitatively different and therefore as good practice suggests, I decided to 
remove the outliers. 
32 Some results for infant survival are reported later in this chapter under robustness checks 
(section 2.4.4.1)  
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likelihood ratio statistics for testing the null hypothesis that 2
0u =0 (province 
variance equal to zero) has a very small p-value, hence there is strong evidence 
that the between-province variance is non-zero and multilevel model is 
appropriate. 
Table 2.2 Comparison between single-level model, random intercept model with 
and without control variables and random slope, for child survival 
Dependent variable:  
Child alive 
(1) 
mlsinglelogit 
(2) 
mlsingle 
(3) 
mlcontrol1 
(4) 
mlrslope 
 
Fixed Effects     
Child's characteristics     
Child's sex 0.934  0.975 0.974 
 (0.09)  (0.28) (0.29) 
Duration of breastfeeding 
(square-root) 
3.947***  4.389*** 4.404*** 
(0.19)  (0.41) (0.42) 
     
Mothers’ characteristics     
Women education level:     
Primary education 1.747***  1.695** 1.681** 
 (0.17)  (0.40) (0.38) 
Secondary or Higher 
education 
6.276***  8.609*** 8.676*** 
(2.02)  (5.45) (5.33) 
     
Household’s 
characteristics 
    
Wealth Index:     
poorer 1.019  0.990 0.983 
 (0.17)  (0.16) (0.15) 
middle 1.097  1.076 1.064 
 (0.17)  (0.19) (0.19) 
richer 0.984  0.963 0.950 
 (0.15)  (0.09) (0.09) 
richest 0.864  0.843 0.834 
 (0.14)  (0.13) (0.13) 
Healthcare utilization     
Delivery assistance 1.316**  1.475* 1.356 
 (0.18)  (0.33) (0.28) 
Random Effects     
Intercept  0.179*** 0.313*** 0.451*** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.133) 
Delivery assistance     0.372*** 
    (0.16) 
     
N 9659 9659 9659 9659 
Note: Regression 1 is a single-level logistic regression. Regression 2 represents a multilevel model with an 
empty random-intercept only. Regression 3 is a multilevel model with control variables at the individual level. 
Regression 4 is similar to regression 3 but assumes random effects to the variable delivery assistance. 
Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratio) with standard errors shown in parenthesis. *, **, *** stand for statistical 
significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 2.4 Caterpillar plot of estimated residuals for all provinces, for child survival. 
 
2.4.3.2 Including control variables  
After recognizing the existence of significant province variation in an empty 
random intercept model I introduced control variables that were already found to 
be significant in the single-level model at the individual-level and noticed that the 
estimate of the between-province variance increases (0.179 to 0.313) suggesting 
that the distribution of one or more variables varies across provinces (see 
regression 3 Table 2.2). This could happen for instance if some provinces would 
have a higher proportion of educated women, wealthier households or higher 
utilization of medical care. Taking a closer look at delivery assistance specifically, 
Figure 2.5 shows us the uneven distribution of this variable with provinces such as 
Maputo City and Maputo Province having the highest number of women who had 
medical delivery assistance. Tete records the highest number of women who did 
not use delivery assistance. 
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Figure 2.5 Utilization of delivery assistance by province, for child survival. 
Note: Delivery assistance is coded as: 0-No utilization of delivery assistance, 1-Utilization of delivery assistance. 
2.4.3.3 Comparing a single and multilevel model 
Regressions 1 and 3 from Table 2.2 show exactly the same control variables but in 
regression 3 a random effect at the province-level is added. Comparing the two 
sets of results we see that the coefficients for delivery assistance, higher education 
and duration of breastfeeding in particular increase which is something I would 
expect ex-ante. This is due to the fact that the coefficient for a random intercept 
model has a cluster-specific interpretation (Gelman and Hill, 2007). For example, 
the coefficient on assistance represents a comparison between women who had 
medical delivery assistance or not in the same province. Since there is a positive 
association between province and both delivery assistance and the probability of a 
child being alive, an increase in the coefficient of delivery assistance was expected 
(regressions 1 and 3). In the single-level model, the coefficient of utilization of 
delivery assistance compares having utilization or not before taking account of 
province effects (not controlling for province) so it represents a comparison that is 
averaged across all provinces.  
The intraclass correlation approximation for binominal denoted as variation 
partition coefficient for a random intercept model with control variables is 0.09 
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which means that 9% of the residual variation in the propensity for a child being 
alive (y*) is attributed to unobserved province characteristics33.  
2.4.3.4 Random slope for delivery assistance 
Because I am particularly interested in the effect of health care utilization on the 
odds of a child being alive I tested for a random effect of the variable delivery 
assistance:  
jj 1101                                          (5)        
 (random coefficient on delivery assistance)  
where 
j1 is the coefficient of delivery assistance and is composed by a fixed 
10 and a random j1 coefficient. In this case the province-level variance has been 
replaced by a matrix of two new parameters, 2
1u  and 01u , that represents the 
variance of delivery assistance and the covariance between assistance and 
province, respectively. The province-level residuals 0 j (intercept only) and 
1 j are assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution with mean vector 0 and 
variance-covariance matrix 
u : 







2
101
01
2
0
uu
uu
u


        (6) 
I found that there is significant evidence that the effect of utilization of delivery 
assistance varies across provinces34. The negative intercept-slope covariance 
estimate (-0.30)35 implies that provinces with a number of children alive above 
average tend to have a below-average effect of delivery assistance. In other words: 
there is less of a delivery assistance effect in the probability of a new child being 
alive in provinces with a high number of children alive. In Figure 2.6 we observe 
                                                        
33 This value is computed using the command xtmrho after running the multilevel regression in 
Stata. 
34 Preliminary random coefficients models (not shown) indicated that child-specific variables, 
mother’s variables and household’s variables did not vary and were therefore fixed. 
35 Value computed using estat recov command in Stata. 
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that provinces at the top left up quadrant have the largest negative intercept and 
positive slope residuals meaning that they have the lowest proportion of children 
alive after controlling for utilization of health care, and the strongest relationship 
between children alive and utilization of health care. This conclusion is relevant as 
it points out that efforts to improve maternal health services, in particular health 
care delivery assistance, should be targeted towards the provinces at the top left 
quadrant, namely Sofala, Maputo Province and Niassa. However, with the 
exception of Maputo Province we see that during the period 1997-2002 the 
majority of health aid went to Maputo City, followed by Inhambane and Zambezia 
(Figure 2.7) which are provinces located exactly in the bottom-right quadrant, i.e., 
provinces where the utilization of delivery assistance does not have such a steep 
gradient. This means, when comparing to other provinces they would need less 
“financial” attention than other provinces. A higher impact of health services’ 
utilization on health outcomes would be expected if left-up quadrant provinces 
would be tackled. These findings have a parallel with Wilson’s (2011: 2039) 
discussion on aid allocation across countries. He shows that aid has been going to 
states that already experienced greatest reduction of mortality in the past and once 
there, the “money has no added benefit in terms of mortality”. As a consequence 
aid is not being as effective as it should had been if it had been directed to other 
states with higher mortality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6  Plot of the intercept and slope residuals for provinces, for child survival. 
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Figure 2.7 Average health aid per capita 1997-2002, in US$ dollars (real 2007) by 
province. 
(Source: ODAMOZ, author’s calculations) 
When plotting the prediction lines for each province we can see the expected 
positive association and recognize that the lines are more spread out for children 
who did not have delivery assistance (assistance= 0), meaning that the variability 
in the log-odds of a child being alive decreases as women  use medical delivery 
care (see Figure 2.8). In sum, fitting a random slope for the variable utilization of 
delivery assistance implies that the between-province variation is a function of 
utilization of assistance, rather than constant as in the random intercept only 
model. See Table 2.2 regression 4 for a random slope model for delivery assistance. 
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Figure 2.8 Provinces’ prediction lines for delivery assistance, for child survival. 
Note: Delivery assistance is coded as: 0-No utilization of delivery assistance, 1-Utilization of delivery assistance. 
2.4.3.5 Health aid and health outcomes 
So far I have been considering only explanatory variables at the level of the 
individual. However, after recognizing the substantial variation at the province-
level, the objective is to explore the effects of province-level predictors, in 
particular, health aid. Results reported in Table 2.3 suggest a positive relationship 
between health aid and outcomes; however, the relationship is not statistically 
significant.36  
That said, the intercept variance representing the between-province variance has 
decreased slightly from 0.313 to 0.239 with the introduction of health aid (Table 
2.3, regressions 1 and 2). This means that even if not statistically significant at 
usual levels, the inclusion of health aid changed the dynamics of the regression. 
Not content with the standard view that “aid is not significant therefore it does not 
work and, as so, no more aid should be given” I inquire possible factors that might 
be masking aid effectiveness. Could health aid explain some province-level 
variation in child survival through differentiated use of health services? 
In order to understand the differential effect of health aid for children that had 
medical delivery assistance versus the ones that did not, I carried out a 
                                                        
36 Due to the high correlation between health aid and other controls at the province-level (see 
Appendix D for highly significant pairwise correlations between health aid, number of doctors by 
inhabitants, health units and health spending) no additional province controls were accounted for 
in the main model. However, I tested for different specifications where each province-level variable 
was entered one at a time, excluding health aid. These were found to be statistically insignificant, 
except for the number of doctors by inhabitants. 
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comparative statics exercise by contrasting the random slope model on delivery 
assistance with and without health aid.37 The between-province variance for 
women who did not have delivery assistance decreased from 0.451 to 0.345 (Table 
2.3 regressions 3 and 4) with the introduction of health aid.  The between-province 
variance for women who received medical care is given by: 
2 2 2
0 1 1 0 01 1 1 1var( ) 2j j ij u u ij u iju u X X X            (7) 
where 1ijX  represents the variable utilization of delivery assistance and takes the 
value 1 if the child has received delivery medical care for his/her birth. For ease of 
comparison the between-province estimates from models with random 
coefficients for delivery care are given in Table 2.4. 
 
                                                        
37 I first checked the existence of a statistically significant pairwise correlation between health aid 
and health care utilization. 
68 
 
Table 2.3 Introducing health aid on the multilevel model, for child survival 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:  
Child alive  
(1) 
mlcontrol1 
(2) 
aid8complete  
(3) 
mlrslope 
(4) 
aid8random 
    
Fixed Effects     
Child's characteristics     
Child's sex 0.975 0.628** 0.974 0.617** 
 (0.28) (0.14) (0.29) (0.14) 
Duration of breastfeeding 
(square-root) 
4.389*** 4.515*** 4.404*** 4.560*** 
 (0.41) (0.45) (0.42) (0.45) 
Mothers’ characteristics     
Women education level:     
Primary education 1.695** 1.735*** 1.681** 1.762*** 
 (0.40) (0.25) (0.38) (0.24) 
Secondary or Higher 
education 
8.609*** 5.297*** 8.676*** 5.504*** 
 (5.45) (2.72) (5.33) (2.75) 
Household’s 
characteristics 
    
Wealth Index:     
poorer 0.990 1.027 0.983 1.016 
 (0.16) (0.23) (0.15) (0.23) 
middle  1.076 1.307 1.064 1.301 
 (0.19) (0.24) (0.19) (0.24) 
richer 0.963 0.928 0.950 0.919 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) 
richest 0.843 0.873 0.834 0.869 
 (0.13) (0.19) (0.13) (0.18) 
Healthcare utilization     
Delivery assistance 1.475*  1.255 1.356 1.171 
 (0.33) (0.38) (0.28) (0.33) 
Province characteristics     
Av. health aid per capita 
(97-02) 
 4.232  4.309 
  (5.96)  (6.99) 
Random Effects      
Intercept 0.313*** 0.239*** 0.451*** 0.345*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) 
Delivery assistance (=1)   0.372*** 0.329*** 
   (0.16) (0.21) 
N 9659 6423 9659 6423 
Note: Only 8 provinces were considered for the analysis. Aid is included in regressions 2 and 4. This 
table only includes multilevel regressions. Regression 1 has a random intercept with control variables at 
the individual level. Regression 2 is similar to 1 but includes health aid as a province-level variable. 
Regression 3 is similar to regression 1 but assumes random effects for the variable delivery assistance. 
Regression 4 is similar to 2 but assumes random effects for delivery assistance. Exponentiated 
coefficients (odds ratio) with standard errors shown in parenthesis. *, **, *** stand for statistical 
significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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 Table 2.4 Estimates of between-province variance for models with random 
coefficients for delivery assistance 
 
Utilization of 
medical delivery 
Random coefficient 
model without health aid 
Random coefficient 
model with health aid 
No utilization  0.45 0.35 
Utilizat ion 0.22 0.35 
 
Note: The results reported for “utilization” derive from formula 7. The covariance between 
province and delivery assistance without health aid is -0.3. The covariance between province 
and delivery assistance with health aid is -0.162 (not reported).  
 
Table 2.4 depicts the following reasoning. Health aid differentials might be 
explaining some province-level variation in the odds of a child being alive for 
children that did not have delivery care. Notwithstanding for children that did have 
medical care the reverse applies (the between-province variation increased from 
0.223 to 0.35 with the introduction of health aid). A possible explanation for this 
might be that children who had medical care would take it independently of 
whether health aid exists or not. The effect of health aid would then be higher in 
provinces where people do not make use of medical services. One reason behind 
the coefficient of aid not being statistically significant might come from the fact 
that, at the aggregate level, aid is going to places where utilization of health 
services is already stable rather than going to other places where people need to 
use health services in order to improve their health outcomes, i.e., where the 
marginal impact would be greater. In that case aid might not prove significant 
anytime soon.  
This line of thought follows Wilson (2011)’s discussion of DAH going to better-off 
places (states with greater reductions on mortality levels). However I go further in 
considering more than causality between health aid and mortality and explore the 
role of utilization of health services as a mediator of the relationship under 
scrutiny. Additionally, in this research I look at utilization of services rather than 
simply looking at the existence of those services. In a nutshell: utilization of 
delivery assistance services significantly increases child survival with its effect 
varying by province. There is a relationship between utilization of health services 
and health aid.  Understanding how that relationship works and acknowledging 
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the differentiated effect between provinces might be the missing link for advancing 
the knowledge on aid effectiveness.  
2.4.4  ROBUS TN ES S  CHECK S  
2.4.4.1 Results for infant regressions 
Up until now, I have been referring to children who are five years of age or below. 
However, in order to follow the macro effectiveness literature that uses infant 
mortality (infant up to one year of age) as the main development indicator a 
comparison was made between infant and child results. The first aspect one would 
expect is the potential low variance explained at the province-level, once the 
pseudo-R2  for a single-level model is very high (above 70%) which would leave 
less space for province effects to be significant (see Table 2.5, regressions 1 & 2). 
Nevertheless, as we can see from Figure 2.9 there is still variation at the province-
level even if the confidence intervals for random effects for provinces tend to be 
less dispersed or closer to the yline=0 than the confidence intervals for child 
survival.  The confidence intervals are wider for the infant survival database as the 
number of observations is much smaller (2435 vs 9720 in child mortality) leading 
to larger standard errors for the estimated province residuals.  
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Figure 2.9 Caterpillar plot of estimated residuals for all provinces for an empty 
random intercept model, for infant survival. 
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From Table 2.5 (regressions 2 and 4) we notice that for a random intercept model 
with individual controls, the variance at the province-level is only significant at 
10% and when delivery assistance is included (as opposite to when prenatal care 
is included). This might be justified by the fact that prenatal care has higher 
statistically significance than delivery on the infant regression and therefore when 
controlling for prenatal care assistance there is less to be explained by province 
variation.  
Looking at the regression 2 from Table 2.5 where delivery assistance is controlled 
for it is interesting to see that when province variation is included the coefficient 
on secondary or higher education loses its significance which goes in line with the 
argument that for infants the mother’s education is not as relevant as biological 
and health care factors as it is for children.  
Since there is no substantial province variation, the inclusion of health aid as an 
explanatory variable at the province-level is not appropriate. Even so, its inclusion 
was tested and no significant results were found. 
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Table 2.5 Multilevel regressions for infant survival 
Dependent variable:  
Infant alive 
(1) 
iinfsinglogitnoc
on 
(2) 
infcontrol1 
(3) 
iinfsinglogitnoc
onprenat 
(4) 
infcontrol1prena
tal  
 
Fixed effects     
Child's characteristics     
Child's sex 0.918 0.977 0.836 0.842 
 (0.27) (0.42) (0.25) (0.40) 
Duration of breastfeeding 1.974*** 1.992*** 1.958*** 1.962*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
Mother’s characteristics     
Women education level:     
Primary education 0.729 0.632 0.604 0.588 
 (0.22) (0.35) (0.19) (0.30) 
Secondary or Higher education 5.347* 3.203 3.906 3.482 
 (4.64) (4.17) (3.29) (4.58) 
Household’s characteristics     
Wealth Index:     
poorer 1.479 1.486 1.811 1.807 
 (0.64) (0.56) (0.80) (0.74) 
middle 1.014 1.051 1.229 1.234 
 (0.47) (0.56) (0.59) (0.66) 
richer 0.525 0.558* 0.700 0.713 
 (0.22) (0.19) (0.29) (0.25) 
richest 0.584 0.589 0.654 0.659 
 (0.28) (0.21) (0.32) (0.25) 
Healthcare utilization     
Delivery assistance 1.955* 2.033*   
 (0.69) (0.85)   
Prenatal care   2.360*** 2.350** 
   (0.72) (0.83) 
Random effects     
Intercept   0.278*  0.054 
  (0.30)  (0.142) 
N 2535 2535 2460 2460 
r2_p 0.714  0.698  
chi2 202.012  195.122  
P 0.000  0.000  
Note: Regressions 1 and 3 are single-level logistic regressions (reg. 1 includes delivery assistance and reg.3 includes 
prenatal care). Regressions 2 and 4 are multilevel regressions (reg. 2 includes delivery assistance and reg.4 includes 
prenatal care). Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratio) with standard errors shown in parenthesis. *, **, *** stand for 
statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
2.4.4.2 Alternative lags in health aid 
Table 2.6 reports the results of the different specifications where the odds of a 
child being alive are regressed on lagged average aid per capita (97-02) 
(regression 1), two-period lagged average aid per capita (97-01) (regression 2), 
average aid per capita including contemporaneous aid (97-03) (regression 3). I 
find that health aid remains statistically insignificant when using alternative time 
periods and lags. 
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Table 2.6 Estimated effect of health aid on the odds of a child being alive using 
different lag structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4.4.3 Alternative dependent variables 
So far I have been measuring the effect at the individual-level represented by the 
health outcome: mortality/survival. However, alternative health indicators might 
refer to the utilization of services. Since one could wonder whether the effect of 
health aid would be easier to recognize if using health utilization indicators as the 
main dependent variable, I decided to test for the case of immunization of children 
Dependent variable: 
Child alive 
(1) 
aid8complete 
(2) 
aid59701 
(3) 
aid9703 
 
Fixed Effects    
Child's characteristics    
Child's sex 0.628** 0.488* 0.723 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.17) 
Duration of breastfeeding 
(square-root) 
4.515*** 4.300*** 4.651*** 
 (0.45) (0.91) (0.46) 
Mothers’ characteristics    
Women education level:    
Primary education 1.735*** 1.361 1.508** 
 (0.25) (0.33) (0.31) 
Secondary or Higher education 5.297*** 3.473* 5.077*** 
 (2.72) (2.23) (2.17) 
Household’s characteristics    
Wealth Index:    
poorer 1.027 1.162 1.028 
 (0.23) (0.34) (0.20) 
middle 1.307 1.418 1.160 
 (0.24) (0.47) (0.23) 
richer 0.928 0.871 0.965 
 (0.12) (0.19) (0.11) 
richest 0.873 0.859 0.883 
 (0.19) (0.32) (0.16) 
Healthcare utilization    
Delivery assistance 1.255 1.255 1.225 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.32) 
Province characteristics    
Av. health aid per capita(97-02) 4.232   
 (5.96)   
Av. health aid per capita (97-01)  4.151  
  (5.14)  
Av. health aid per capita (97-03)   3.656 
   (3.81) 
    
Random Effects    
Intercept 0.239*** 0.1636*** 0.218*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
N 6423 4059 7634 
Number of provinces 8 5 9 
Note: Health aid is included in all multilevel regressions using different lag structures. 
Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratio) with standard errors shown in parenthesis. *, **, *** stand 
for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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as previously done by Feeny and Ouattara (2013). This is because immunizations 
are more straightforward to administer than other health projects and a great 
majority of programs have been established especially for this purpose and 
therefore one might expect that health aid should increase the percentage of 
immunizations.  
The variable on immunization refers to all children (aged 4 year or less38) that are 
alive and were classified as fully immunized or not fully immunized. The first thing 
to notice in Table 2.7 is the substantial variation at the province-level when a 
baseline empty random intercept model is specified. This means that individual 
variance is not enough to explain differences in the use of vaccination and that the 
variation in health utilization substantially depends on the province the child lives 
in. One would then enquire if health aid would be explaining differences in 
provinces’ immunization uptake, however we see from Table 2.7, regression 3 that 
this is not the case as the coefficient of aid, although having the right sign, is not 
significant at usual levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
38 Although one might think children should be fully vaccinated by the age of one year, many 
children especially in rural areas do not receive their final immunization until as late as 2 years or 
older (DHS). Therefore I include all children aged 4 or less. 
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Table 2.7 Estimates for vaccination, for child survival 
Dependent variable: 
Vaccination 
(1) 
vaccchildempty 
(2) 
vaccnoaidchild 
(3) 
vaccaidchild 
 
Fixed effects    
Mother’s characteristics    
Women education level:    
Primary education  1.712*** 1.693*** 
  (0.21) (0.22) 
Secondary or Higher education  3.505*** 3.348*** 
  (0.79) (0.92) 
Household’s characteristics    
Access to improved water source  2.376*** 2.589*** 
  (0.38) (0.59) 
Access to improved sanitation  1.509*** 1.494*** 
  (0.178) (0.21) 
Province characteristics    
Av. health aid per capita 97-02   1.301 
   (0.44) 
    
    
Random effects    
Intercept  0.524*** 0.66*** 0.678*** 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) 
N 8766 5831 5831 
Note: Access to improved water source and sanitation at the household level are used as proxies 
for wealth. Regression 1 is an empty random intercept only model. Regression 2 is a multilevel 
model with control variables at the individual level. Regression 3 is similar to 2 but includes 
health aid. Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratio) with standard errors shown in parenthesis. *, 
**, *** stand for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
2.4.4.4 Alternative samples 
Results of the present analysis using children as the unit of analysis at level one, 
were triangulated with results obtained from the same specification but using 
women as the main unit of analysis and no significant differences were found, 
which means that data and variables were properly framed (results available upon 
request). A cross-sectional for 2009 was also performed and no significant 
difference in the results was obtained (see section on moving to 2009). 
2.4.4.5 Moving to 2009 
Because 2003 might not represent exactly today’s trends in child survival and 
health aid, I tested for another specification where the odds (for a women) of 
having all children alive (=1) versus having at least one child that died are 
regressed on a number of individual control variables and health aid specifically. 
An additional advantage of using the 2009 cross-section is the increased accuracy 
of health aid data as it refers to a closest point in time and the fact that all 
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provinces have information on health aid, which contrasts with the 2003 cross-
sectional where only eight groups had complete information.  
As we can observe from Table 2.8 there is considerable variation at the province-
level however the individual factors still carry the strongest power with education 
remaining significantly important for the odds of having all women’s children alive. 
However, in this occasion the wealth index seems to explain the variation between 
women’s outcomes. This might be due to the fact that now the variable of interest 
is slightly different as it refers to all under-five children per women in contrast 
with the 2003 cross-section where children entered individually. Mother age 
enters in quadratic form and it is statistically significant, meaning that younger 
women’s odds of having all their children alive are lower compared to older 
women. Despite having significant variation at the province-level it seems that this 
variation is once again not explained by health aid differentials (regressions 3-5). 
As a robustness test I used average health aid total (96-08) and contemporary 
health aid only (2009) and also found no significant results39. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
39 In addition I tested for health aid as reported by the ODAMOZ report (instead of using the 
database directly) for all the alternative lags structured specified above plus one year lagged per 
capita aid (2008) and averaged per capita 2005-2008 and found the same insignificant results for 
aid. Post estimation tests were conducted and the models were found to be properly specified. 
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Table 2.8 Estimates for number of children alive per women, 2009 
Dependent variable: 
All children alive, per 
women 
(1) 
singlechildrenaliv
edum0309noaid 
(2) 
glchildren
alivedum0
309noaid 
(3) 
glchildrenali
vedummy03
09aid 
(4) 
glchildrenali
vedummy96
08aid 
(5) 
glchildrenal
ivedumr09a
id 
 
Fixed effects      
Mother’s characteristics      
Current age 0.834*** 0.826*** 0.826*** 0.825*** 0.826*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age squared 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Women education level:      
Primary education 1.266** 1.427** 1.427** 1.426** 1.427** 
 (0.12) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Secondary or Higher 
education 
2.789*** 3.518*** 3.518*** 3.514*** 3.519*** 
 (0.42) (0.85) (0.85) (0.85) (0.84) 
Household’s characteristics      
Wealth Index: 1.335** 1.193* 1.193* 1.194* 1.194* 
poorer (0.17) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
 2.037*** 1.403* 1.403* 1.404* 1.403* 
middle (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
 2.231*** 1.487*** 1.487*** 1.489*** 1.488*** 
richer (0.28) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
 3.485*** 2.034*** 2.035*** 2.039*** 2.038*** 
richest (0.46) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
      
Province characteristics      
Av.health aid capita (03-08)   0.969   
   (0.18)   
      
Av.health aid capita (96-08)    1.005  
    (0.03)  
      
Health aid capita (09)     1.024 
(0.20) 
     
Random effects      
Intercept   0.276*** 0.2761*** 0.283*** 0.323*** 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.127) 
N 5841 5841 5841 5841 5841 
r2_p 0.170     
chi2 667.783     
p 0.000     
Note: Regression 1 is a single level logistic regression. Regression 2 is a multilevel regression. Regressions 3-5 are 
multilevel regressions that use different lag structures. Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratio) with standard errors shown 
in parenthesis. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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2.5 CONCLUSION  
This paper revisited the debate on aid effectiveness, more precisely the question of 
whether aid works or not. This research adds to the literature by employing a new 
model to study aid effectiveness where both individual and context factors are 
taken into account.  
I constructed a multilevel model of aid effectiveness for the case of Mozambique, in 
order to assess the potential link between health aid and health outcomes. More 
specifically, I recognized the variation at the province-level in terms of health 
outcomes and queried if health aid was a significant cause of those variations.  
My results can be summarized as follows. First, one should not discard the 
importance of individual factors in determining the odds of health outcomes. 
However, it is clear that there is significant variation at the province-level and 
therefore the odds of positive health outcomes differ according to the province the 
individual lives in. Particularly relevant for this research are the effects of 
individuals’ actual utilization of health services on improving the odds of child 
survival. My results suggest that provinces that have below-average utilization of 
health services could more strongly benefit from more targeted interventions in 
comparison to other provinces where the effect of health services’ utilizations is 
not as strong. This finding is based on the fact that resources are being disbursed 
to provinces where utilization of services is already at reasonable standards which 
might mask the true impact of improved health services. 
Secondly, despite a positive sign of the health aid coefficient, I did not find a 
statistically significant effect of health aid in improving health outcomes, results 
that are in line with Kosack and Tobin (2006), Williamsom (2008) and Wilson 
(2011). Finally, after considering an association between health aid and utilization 
of health services, I explored a potential reason that might be masking aid 
significance: when controlling for random effects on health care utilization 
coefficient (e.g. delivery assistance), aid could eventually play a role for individuals 
that were not using health services, which is not the case for those who already use 
delivery care.  My findings corroborate Wilson’s (2011) discussion on aid chasing 
after development has already occurred, rather than causing it as the money is not 
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having the expected added benefit in terms of mortality because it is being 
directed to places less in need. This research adds to Wilson’s (2011) discussion by 
acknowledging the differentiated effect of utilization of health services in 
mediating the causal relationship between health aid and outcomes.  
Failing to attribute a causal effect between health aid and health outcomes, this 
research has more to it than a call to increase or decrease aid flows. In sum, it 
provides us three main findings: i) the effect of health services’ utilization on child 
survival varies across provinces ii) that effect is higher in provinces with a number 
of children alive below average iii) the insignificance of health aid might be 
justified by aid being directed to provinces where the impact of health services’ 
utilization on health outcomes is small.  
These findings deserve more attention in the future: a possible extension of this 
model would be to explore other moderators of health aid, such as utilization of 
target services (e.g. HIV, family planning, general medicine, emergency, etc.). 
Another interesting extension would be to analyse the impact of different types of 
aid, such as aid that comes from the Ministry of Health (MoH) versus private aid 
disbursed directly by NGOs and/or delving deeper on the disbursement from 
major players, such the U.S. Finally, taking into account the interesting finding on 
the constant and coherent significance of female education on health outcomes, an 
exploration of the effect of education aid on health outcomes would make an 
attractive story. This would raise the question whether female education should be 
prioritized over the health sector. 
This research provides ground to reflect if the main question is not whether aid 
works or not, but how it works. It suggests further exploration on uncovering the 
roots of aid effectiveness since it appears to be strikingly masked by factors other 
than health aid differentials. It therefore redirects us to the quality of aid strand of 
literature and policy arena, where questions are made about why aid is working or 
not and how can it be improved. As stated by Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007: 
316) “making further progress on aid effectiveness requires opening the black 
box”. And here is when the third chapter starts… 
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CHAPTER 3 
3 STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS IN HEALTH AID FLOWS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The motives behind aid allocation have been studied with debate starting broadly 
on whether donors have self-interested or altruistic motives (Burnside and Dollar, 
2000; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that donors are 
considerably motivated by political and strategic considerations, such as a 
recipient’s40 history of colonization, commercial and strategic interests. They 
stressed however, that not all donors behave the same and some countries allocate 
aid based on good policies in recipient countries. 
Literature on aid allocation has then become more interested on the influence of 
domestic factors on donors’ behaviour and not only on donors’ self-interested 
foreign policy goals. The report Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998) already 
advocated a selectivity approach in which aid allocation should be targeted 
towards recipients with good policies which was also defended later by Collier and 
Dollar (2002).  However, some subsequent studies have shown that reality is 
different from the prescription. Alesina and Weder (2002) found no evidence that 
corruption discourages aid.  Neumayer (2003), when studying multilateral aid 
agencies, found that good governance was not a strong motive for allocation as 
other measures of recipient need or donor interest which was shared by Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith (2007, 2009).  
Although Burnside and Dollar (2000) found aid to be more effective in countries 
with a good policy structure, soon these claims were contested (Hansen and Tarp, 
2001; Dalgaard et al., 2004) while others found aid to reduce poverty 
independently of recipient policies (Mosley et al., 2004; Gomanee et al., 2005). In 
what concerns aid as a lever for good governance, Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
pointed out some case studies that show positive effects of conditionalities on 
policy reform. However, literature started questioning the effectiveness of political 
                                                        
40 Throughout this thesis the “recipient” refers to the recipient country, sometimes also called the 
“main recipient”.  
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conditionalities (e.g., Crawford, 1997; Collier et al., 1997; Killick, 1997; Gibson et 
al., 2005). A key insight drawn from this literature refer that state-to-state 
contracts might not offer the sufficient incentives for recipients to align (Killick, 
1997) and that conditions are not credible as donors are unable to punish 
recipients who do not comply with them (Svensson, 2000).   
In the meantime, the old ex-ante conditionality deemed ineffective by literature in 
general gave rise to a new style of conditionality, called ‘consensual 
conditionalities’ which pushed for a negotiated approach with the recipient 
governments (Killick, 1997; Mosley et al., 2004; Mosley and Abrar, 2006) and have 
consequences on the type of aid provided (Clist et al., 2011). The principles 
underlying a new aid architecture (post 2000 endorsed by the Paris Declaration in 
2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action 2008) reports a donor-recipient 
relationship based on principles of ownership, donor coordination efforts and 
coherent packages of conditionalities. But how effective are these new political 
conditionalities?  
All of the past studies have focused on understanding state-to-state relationships 
taking a global macro view into account. However, selectivity is just one aspect of 
aid quality (Amprou et al., 2006) and it is usually part of the allocation process that 
is centralized (Svensson, 2003). The actual disbursement decision is decentralized 
and occurs in-country (ibid). The decisions about the amount of aid to be allocated 
and the country to select are just the beginning of a more complex set of de-
centralized decisions ahead about how to actually disburse aid namely the choice 
of delivery channel or aid modality. At the same time, understanding the failure or 
success of conditionalities can only be done at a country level while recognizing 
that what might work for a country might not work for others.  
As Radelet (2004: 12) advocates: 
“Aid should be delivered to countries with better governance very 
differently than to countries with poor governance. To date, the move 
towards greater country selectivity has been conceived primarily as 
allocating more Official Development Assistance to countries with better 
policies and stronger institutions. However, the idea that aid is likely to be 
more effective in well-governed countries should influence more than just 
the amount of aid that donors provide -it should change the way that 
donors administer aid”. 
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Most donor allocation literature looks at a two stage model when donors first 
decide which country to disburse aid followed by a choice on the quantity of aid. 
Limited theoretical literature began elaborating an extension of a two stage model 
where donors make an additional decisions of how to actually disburse aid. Recent 
literature began analysing the relative effectiveness of different aid instruments, in 
particular conditional budget support and project aid (Cordella and Dell’Ariccia, 
2007; Clist et al., 2011).  The literature on the advantages or disadvantages of 
those two instruments was already abundant by then; however no formal 
comparison had been modelled taking a particular look at the incentive structure 
underlying principal and agent contracts. While Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2007) 
assume that donors have to choose between modalities, Jelovac and Vandeninden 
(2008) extend the model by allowing donors to also have a mix set of modalities, 
which is naturally more adapted to the reality of aid. Clist et al. (2011) using a 
contract theory approach, argue that donors exercise selectivity over the aid 
modality, focusing on the decision of two multilateral donors to provide budget 
support. 
Other literature has focused instead on the channel of delivery or type of aid 
provider. Van de Walle (1999) drawing on a political economy analysis reviews 
four proposals for increasing aid effectiveness including aid being selective, aid 
following a needs-based allocation, promoting government ownership and 
focusing aid on non-state actors. The author concludes that although the proposals 
are desirable they might not be compatible; selectivity is contrary to needs based 
allocation and calling for more aid to the private sector cannot be pursed at the 
same time as there is a call for public ownership and involvement, i.e. donors do 
face tradeoffs. 
Dietrich (2011) shows empirical evidence that donors have allocation tactics to 
ensure that aid is implemented effectively and would decide to bypass the 
government and contract private actors if they are disbursing to poorly governed 
countries. This literature argues that the conventional perception that aid is driven 
by donors’ self-interest changes when accounting for the different channels of aid 
delivery. By extending the state-to-state relationships to include non-state actors 
active in the aid delivery business, donors’ real concern is how aid is actually 
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implemented in a way that maximizes its intended purpose. Hawkins and Jones 
(2011) take a similar approach to Dietrich (2011) but assume that donors do not 
only analyse the quality of the governance systems but also look at the quality of 
the NGO sector. Some NGOs might have lower capacity than others, which is 
generally the idea when comparing local NGOs to international ones. Will a donor 
still decide channelling its aid to a NGO that has low capacity?  
But when does this game end? This research goes even further to analyse the full 
five stage game of when donors actually look into each country and decide who 
should get their aid (in the public sector: the central or provincial directorates, and 
at the private level: international or local NGOs) and where (to which locations, to 
which areas and priorities), adding therefore, through an original piece of 
research, a new piece in the aid puzzle. 
This research can be integrated into the small, but growing literature that looks 
upon donors and recipients’ strategic interactions. In particular, it shows that 
donors have allocation tactics other than state-to-state aid to pursue their goals 
which take into account the recipient’s behaviour. It uses a game theoretic 
framework to look at the negotiation dynamics between donors and recipients 
which influences the choice of aid delivery channel. This research can also lead 
back to the broader macro level literature on aid allocation, selectivity, 
conditionality and aid effectiveness while at the same time entering into new terra 
incognita.  Firstly, it focuses on donors’ motivations and preferences at the country 
level. Secondly, it analyses selectivity on the delivery channel accounting for the 
existence of alternative providers while looking at the entire aid flows’ decisions 
in-country. Thirdly, it explores how a new consensual conditionality takes place at 
the country level and whether it is effective when accounting for different forms of 
aid delivery. Finally, it falls within the aid effectiveness field by acknowledging that 
different donors and recipient’s behaviour do impact on the effectiveness of aid. 
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3.2 METHODS ,  THEORETICAL AND ANAL YTICAL FRAMEWORK  
3.2.1  MET HODS  AND A N ALYT ICAL FR AMEWO RK  
The results reported in this paper form part of a larger study that was set up to 
shed light on aid agencies’ dynamics and strategic interactions with each other and 
with the recipient country. The findings presented in this paper represent the sub-
set of the data collected, concerning health aid agencies’ disbursements decisions 
in Mozambique. A qualitative case study approach was first adopted to properly 
explore how aid agencies decide to disburse aid. Specifically, fieldwork research 
aimed to elicit: i) which factors influence aid agencies’ motivation to disburse aid 
ii) to what extent does the recipient’s behaviour influences aid agencies’ choices of 
channel of delivery iii) why do aid agencies behave differently and iv) how it is 
reflected on diverse disbursements patterns and v) how different disbursement 
decisions culminate on different outcomes on the ground.  Data collection took 
place in Maputo from February 2012 to June 2012. The research included the 
following methods: 
a) fifty in-depth interviews were carried out with key stakeholders active in the 
health sector in particular representatives from: NGOs (international and local), 
bilateral and multilateral organizations, global health initiatives, MoH, Ministry of 
Planning and Development and other groups (consultancy organizations, research 
institutes and former MoH and aid workers). The selection of interviewees was 
purposive at first combined with snowball techniques (Patton, 2002)41. An ad-hoc 
quota was established to ensure that a considerable number of representative and 
relevant respondents from different types of organizations were addressed. More 
than 60% of relevant partners active on health were interviewed. Relevant 
partners represent those whose budget and involvement in the health sector is 
considerably high. Interviews took place in Maputo since this is the place where all 
development agencies’ main office is based and where the most important 
development decisions are taken. Although the data collection was mainly at the 
national level, province and district views were captured through discussions on 
specific level questions and involvement of informants in the field. All interviews 
                                                        
41 Purposive/purposeful sampling aims at selecting information-rich cases strategically and 
purposefully. Snowball or chain sampling involves the identification of cases of interest from 
sampling people who recommend key informants that should take part of the study (Patton, 2002). 
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were tape-recorded and transcribed. Interviews were conducted using both a 
semi-structured approach as well as informal unstructured conversations (see 
Appendix E for the semi-structured interviews’ questions). All interviews were 
conducted by the author, most of them at the respondent’s place of work and for an 
average of one hour each. Interviews were conducted in Portuguese or English 
depending on the nationality of the informants. 
b) Policy documents were collected and analysed which included both published 
and unpublished documents. Documents relevant to the research topic included 
health sector plans and reviews, sector and budget performances, memorandum of 
understanding between partners, minutes of meetings, agencies’ reports, etc. 
Documents and reports were accessed through: email list from the Health Partners 
Group (HPG) and Pre Partners Forum (PPF), access to the HPG’s intranet webpage, 
participation in meetings and information from interviewees.  
c) six different meetings were observed. These included a HPG monthly meeting, a 
HPG full-day retreat, a PROSAUDE meeting, a PPF meeting, a National Aids Council 
(CNCS) communication group meeting and a NAIMA (standing for Network of 
Organizations working in Health and HIV/AIDS) meeting42. Observation helped in 
mapping the organizations involved in the field, provide insight to which actors 
actually participate in the meetings and what were the main issues discussed, 
observe the dynamics of interactions between different stakeholders and their 
behaviour and views on specific topics, network and gain access to inside 
information, inform the choice of key informants, triangulate agencies’ behaviour 
with information provided through interviews. The observations were non-
participatory and therefore the researcher did not actively participate nor attempt 
to influence the discussions. 
In addition to the above methods, field scope visits took place in 8 out of 11 
provinces. During these visits a number of health facilities were observed and 
some informal interviews took place. These visits were crucial to have a clearer 
understanding of the country’s reality and a taste of the different contexts that 
characterize each province. 
                                                        
42 Detailed information of these groups will be given in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
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Respondent validation was sought by presenting my findings to some of the 
interviewees. To balance the scope for errors and bias and assure reliability, 
triangulation of different sources was used (interviews, observations and 
documentary analysis) and was complemented by cross-checking the data with 
literature on the topic. Data was consistent and no correction resulted from the 
triangulation process. In addition a comprehensive record of the data collected 
was maintained. This includes 303 pages of transcribed interviews and notes from 
the meetings and policy documents. Interviewees gave their consent first by email, 
by agreeing to participate in the research and then by signing a consent form while 
on the interview. Confidentiality of data was maintained throughout the research 
process and no names of individuals interviewed nor the organizations they work 
for were disclosed. Ethical approval was given by the University of East Anglia. 
The analytical process followed a thematic content approach (Ritchie and Spencer, 
1994; Patton, 2002) and involved first familiarization with the data collected 
(including data cleaning and checking for consistency), development of a coding 
scheme based on the identification of a thematic framework, mapping, charting 
and interpretation. Qualitative analysis is used to conceptualize the identity and 
motivations of different actors, while game theory guided the explanation of their 
interactions. The theory developed in this chapter is grounded on qualitative 
evidence from fieldwork research in Mozambique. In order to properly understand 
the processes of aid agencies’ decisions to disburse aid a concurrent 
transformative strategy is employed, i.e. in the data analysis the theory develops at 
the same time as the findings take place (Creswell, 2002). This means that 
quantitative and qualitative evidence converge in order to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the research problem. In this type of strategy the 
information is integrated in the interpretation of the overall results. In addition, it 
is transformative as the research is guided by a specific theoretical framework, in 
this case game theory (Creswell, 2002). 
3.2.2  THEO R ETI CAL FR AMEW ORK :  GAME T HEOR Y  
Recipient-donors interactions are crucial to understand the aid negotiation 
process, to analyse donors’ allocation behaviour and the consequences for aid 
effectiveness. Traditional aid literature focuses on donors’ behaviour on one hand 
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or recipient’s characteristics on other, thus assuming a somehow passive role of 
the recipient on the allocation of aid. However, reality shows that recipient’s 
behaviour has not only a direct impact on the effectiveness of aid but also an 
indirect effect on donors’ decision to allocate aid. Like donors, recipients are 
rational actors who want to utilize external funds to maximize their welfare whilst 
facing budgetary constraints (Mosley et al., 1987). Game theory is used to best 
account for these strategic interactions. Game theory is a theory of interaction 
between rational actors which presumes that each actor’s pursuit of their goals 
depends on the behaviour of the other actor. When pursuing their goals, actors are 
maximizing their utility.  
More specifically, a principal agent framework is used. This model has been used 
for some scholars when researching the incentive structure affecting agent’s 
behaviour in the aid delivery process (see, among others, Killick, 1997; Svensson, 
2000; Martens et al., 2002). In the standard aid literature, donors are the principals 
and the recipient countries are the agents. However, in this research framework 
consisting of a five-stage game with different actors, complex categorizations arise. 
A principal (e.g. donor) might transfer its power and role as a principal to a 
recipient (e.g. recipient country), by choosing to provide budget support which 
assumes recipient’s total responsibility for managing the funds. As a consequence 
throughout this thesis, the principal represents the entity that holds responsibility 
for deciding the disbursement of resources.  
Donors’ decision on how to allocate aid is therefore mediated by the recipients’ 
response to their actions. More precisely donors’ decision in terms of aid providers 
is a function of both their interests and the recipients’ behaviour. Donors can 
choose to disburse their aid to different types of agents. To get a formal sense of 
the problem I consider a game with two players: a representative donor (player 
one) and a main recipient (player two). The alternative recipient (e.g., a NGO) acts 
in the background, i.e., a donor who chooses not to deliver aid to the main recipient 
(player two) opts for delivering aid to the alternative one.  Throughout this 
analysis the donor has two main strategies: 
(1) {to disburse to the main recipient } = {d} 
(2) {not to disburse to the main recipient but disburse to the alternative one} = {n} 
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I acknowledge that different donors have different objectives and motivations 
which are translated into different decision options along the aid delivery chain. As 
a consequence, I modulate different games using different types of donors that I 
categorized through evidence gathered from fieldwork research (e.g., a public 
sector donor versus a private sector donor). For this research I abstain from 
modelling problems arising from coordination issues since coordination could not 
be controlled for in a theoretical model with such a complexity of players and 
interactions between them. Dynamics of coordination between aid organizations 
will be analysed separately in the fourth chapter of this thesis.  
Payoffs represent a measure of ordinal utility and capture the player’s ordering of 
preferences; however they do not provide a measure of the intensity of a player’s 
preference nor can be compared across players (Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 
2004).  
3.2.3  DECI SION S  IN  HEALT H AID FLOW S  
This framework looks at the decisions donors make at different levels of the 
decision tree model. In the first stage decision donors, at a global level (head 
offices), decide who gets aid. In a second stage they choose the amount of aid to 
allocate to the selected country. So far this is where most literature focuses on –the 
quantitative aspect of aid - which involves the discussion around the concepts of 
selectivity and conditionality already discussed in the previous section. It is also 
within these stages that donors decide how much to allocate to the health sector as 
opposed to other sectors. While some donors, like multilateral organizations and 
global health initiatives might decide for the sector beforehand (stage 0) since they 
have ex-ante money designated for specific purposes, bilateral donors’ decision on 
the sector might occur after the amount of aid has been specified. Nevertheless, the 
choice of sector happens before the third stage decision. 
In the third stage donors43 decide how to disburse aid in-country – the form of aid 
which will determine its quality. While some recent literature on this topic focuses 
                                                        
43 Throughout the text I do not differentiate between head-office donors and in-country donors. 
This is because in some cases head- offices hold power for this level of decision while in others that 
is a responsibility of in-country donors or they can influence decisions to a certain extent. For 
simplicity reasons I refer them generally as donors. 
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on the modality of aid, usually budget support or project aid (see e.g., Cordella and 
Dell’Ariccia, 2007; Clist et al., 2011), other authors focus on the type of provider or 
channel of delivery, usually distinguishing between the public and the private 
sector (see e.g., Van de Walle, 1999; Dietrich, 2011). I will follow the latter as my 
main goal is to understand the interactions between different players in the aid 
delivery process. However, naturally, different players encompass different aid 
modalities so at the end both approaches will be taken into account. Donors can 
then decide: i) to give to the private sector and bypass government/state/public 
institutions, ii) to encourage more integration of programs into the public sector or 
iii) to have a combination of both approaches.  
My extension to the existing model brings on a fourth stage where donors decide 
who should spend their aid in-country. In case of public sector donors they can 
deliver aid centrally or directly to the province-level. In this research I am focusing 
on the health sector and therefore the central decision body is the Ministry of 
Health (MoH) and the provincial decision bodies are the Provincial Directorates of 
Health (DPS)44. Donors can provide sector budget support or fund vertical 
alternatives. If choosing the private sector45 donors can decide between 
international and local NGOS46 to channel their funds.  
Finally, the fifth decision concerns where to disburse aid to. Where is aid disbursed 
at a country level? Which province gets more aid and why? Which are the main 
health priorities? This is a stage where the decisions of both the public and private 
sector culminate no matter the path that they follow in between, i.e. different 
principals end with the same options (e.g., to choose between provinces, to choose 
which priority areas, etc.). A second group of questions arise about who makes this 
decision? Is the public sector recipient acting as a principal responsible for 
managing and directing its budget? Can NGOs act as principal at this stage or do 
they remain agents?  
                                                        
44 In Mozambique the health sector is defined as the heath system (Ministry of Health, Provincial 
Directorates and Hospitals) and the HIV/AIDS system (National AIDS Council) (UNICEF/FDC, 
2012). 
45 In general, private sector actors might include private corporations, charities, NGOs. For this 
research I am just considering non-profit organizations, local and international who receive funding 
from donor agencies. 
46 Local NGOs are sometimes called civil society organizations.  
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This research focuses on the quality of aid therefore starting on the third stage of 
the decision ladder, looking specifically at the health sector in Mozambique (see 
Figure 3.1 for a framework of the five-stage model). Only donors who finance for 
health in Mozambique are taken into account. When using quotations, informers 
are coded according to the type of organization they belong and further assigned a 
specific number47. Quotations used are from the following types of agencies: 
bilateral (BIL) and multilateral (MUL) organizations, global health initiatives 
(GHI), international (iNGO) and local (lNGO) NGOs and networks (NET). 
Information shared by consultants (CONS), former aid workers and captured while 
observing the meetings is also taken into account.  Although a reference is made on 
in-kind contributions such as technical assistance and capacity building whenever 
relevant, the focus of this paper rests mainly on financial contributions. This is 
because unlike in-kind support, financial support entitles an accountability 
relationship between donors and recipients. 
 
 
                                                        
47 Quotations are widely used in this chapter. However no attempt was made to include quotations 
from all the 50 interviewees. Rather, quotations were purposely chosen to elucidate and emphasize 
specific points considered essential for supporting the theory developed in this research.  
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Figure 3.1 Decisions in health aid flows: a five-stage game. 
Note: This research focuses on the quality of aid therefore starting on the third stage of the decision ladder. This is a stage where donors have already decided how much aid to 
allocate to the health sector as opposed to others sectors.  
(Source: author’s illustration) 
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3.3 INTRODUCING TRUST  
Although trust is a concept that is always intrinsic to literature on aid, specifically 
in the fields of conditionality and selectivity, the way this concept is formed and 
sustained as modulating the relationships between donors and recipients is rarely 
formalized in the literature. In an original approach to this topic Mosley and Abrar 
(2006) explain the modelling of relationships in which trust, used in the sense of 
social capital48, is the key variable. They build on previous work from Mosley et al. 
(2004) who argue that as long as trust remains about the fundamentals a poor 
performance of recipient countries is tolerated up to some level and a new form of 
conditionality could prosper. Mosley and Abrar (2006) argue that trust games 
could substitute the traditional non-cooperative games if there is sufficient trust 
between parties who would reach a collaborative equilibrium.  
Conditionality failure occurs when the partner government, who agreed to 
undergo certain policy measures as a condition of the aid disbursed by the donor, 
fails to implement them. Failure to meet conditionality could result in a reduction 
of the agreed commitment amount and to a decision on not to disburse the next 
instalment or more drastically to withdraw the entire funding. This last scenario of 
conditionality failure is however atypical since the donor and recipient have no 
real interest on breaking down their relationship (Mosley and Abrar, 2006). 
A more typical scenario of failure of conditionality occurs when disbursing 
continues but the donor fails to induce policy change. To illustrate this Mosley and 
Abrar (2006) model conditional program lending under an asymmetric one-sided 
game where the donor has a trusting behaviour and therefore disburses but the 
recipient is untrustworthy (see Table 3.1). In this case the donor has a payoff of 1 
due to the fact that it continues lending and does not break the relationship. The 
game is asymmetric because it is not clear what the donor would gain from not 
disbursing to a trustworthy recipient and therefore the payoff in that case is zero 
but the recipient gains from being able to get the disbursement without being 
trustworthy (payoff of 3). The Nash equilibrium is Trusting-Untrustworthy. 
                                                        
48 This concept will be explained in section 3.3.1.  
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Table 3.1 One-sided assymetric Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Payoffs are given in order (player 1, player 2). Payoffs represent a measure of ordinal utility. Nash 
equilibrium is Trusting-Untrustworthy.  
(Source: Mosley and Abrar, 2006) 
3.3.1  TR US T MADE RATION AL :  A  COOR DIN ATIO N GAME  
By disbursing to an untrustworthy recipient the donor lacks credibility and the 
recipient does not comply with conditions. As described before, with this picture in 
place some scholars and policy practitioners, would vote for abandoning 
conditionality and use “selectivity” instead, i.e. give aid to countries which already 
have satisfactory policies. However Mosley and Abrar (2006) remember the 
problems associated with favouring selectivity, in particular the moral hazard, 
based on which after receiving aid the recipient is insured against poor 
performance and therefore does not have incentives to perform well.  Based on 
numerous success stories of conditional aid Mosley and Abrar (2006) advocate 
that the old conditionality game should be transformed in what they call a new-
trust or quasi-trust game so that when trust is made rational the optimal payoff is a 
trusting behaviour by the donor and a trustworthy recipient’s response (see Table 
3.2). This would be the payoff dominant Nash equilibrium (3,3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Player 1  
(Donor behaviours) 
Trusting 
(e.g. 
disburse) 
Not 
disburse 
Player 2  
(Recipient responses) 
Trustworthy 
(e.g. comply with 
conditions) 
2,2 0,-1 
Untrustworthy 
(e.g. not comply 
with conditions) 
1,3 0,0 
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Table 3.2 A coordination game:  trust made rational 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Payoffs are given in order (player 1, player 2). Payoffs represent a measure of ordinal utility. Nash 
equilibrium is Trusting-Trustworthy and Not disburse-Untrustworthy.  
(Source: Mosley and Abrar, 2006) 
Mosley and Abrar (2006: 314) use trust in the context of social capital referring to 
the “formation of linkages within a specific network, consequent on the reduction 
of perceived risks within the network”.  Those perceived risks come from the 
interaction between the backward looking (affective) and forward looking 
(predictive) components of trust.  Affective drivers of trust are based on 
experience of past behaviour such recipient’s compliance and donor’s aid stability. 
Predictive trust is based on incentives for trusting behaviour and can include 
actions (e.g., program initiation), signals (e.g., corruption, military spending) and 
procedures (e.g., frequency of contacts).  
To “insure” the donor is protected if trust disappears, Mosley and Abrar (2006) 
consider the use of alternative channels of delivery, like NGOs, that would replace 
the government and would act as the substitute agent in case the recipient is 
untrustworthy49. This leads to a second Nash equilibrium where the donor does 
not disburse to an untrustworthy recipient (0,0) (see Table 3.2). This is usually 
called a coordination game (also known as assurance game or trust dilemma) and 
basically reflects a situation where there is a conflict between cooperating 
(disbursing) and defecting (not disbursing) (see Table 3.2). 
NGOs, as external agencies, can act as an incentive for the recipient countries to be 
trustworthy (the predictive driver of trust (Mosley and Abrar, 2006)). However, it 
                                                        
49 Naturally, Mosley and Abrar (2006) assume that the alternative agent, e.g., NGOs are intrinsically 
trustworthy. This issue will be discussed latter. 
 
Player 1  
(Donor behaviours) 
Trusting 
(e.g. 
disburse) 
Not 
disburse 
Player 2  
(Recipient responses) 
Trustworthy 
(e.g. comply with 
conditions) 
3,3 2,-2 
Untrustworthy 
(e.g. not comply 
with conditions) 
-2,2 0,0 
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might as well happen that instead of aiming for an increase of trust in one 
recipient, the donor can search for substitutes recipients which leads to 
vulnerability associated with the concept of trust. On one hand agencies might 
compete in terms of trust-relationships with the donor; on the other hand donors 
might want to look for a relative trust rather than an absolute one, i.e., they might 
want to disburse to the agent they trust the most. This is what the authors called 
quasi-trust games and it is where my research departs from.  However unlike 
Mosley and Abrar (2006) I prefer not to call this parameter by “insurance” which is 
a concept that gives rise to the idea that the donor is protected ex-post in case trust 
is misplaced and therefore risk is compensated. Alternatively, I argue that 
nowadays donors have information ex-ante, as they have been operating in-
country for some time which contrasts with Mosley and Abrar’s (2006) scenario 
where donors are still deciding: 1) who gets aid (the selectivity) and 2) the 
quantity of aid (allocation) at a global level (first and second stage decisions). 
Donors have already played a simultaneous game in the majority of countries and 
have now to choose whether to disburse, and if so how based on trust from past 
relationships –the third stage.  Donors are expected to have a more affective –
backward looking than predictive-forward looking - behaviour based on past 
recipient’s behaviour. As a result aid decisions today might be understood within a 
sequential/dynamic game rather than a simultaneous game, as the player who 
chooses at the end has knowledge about the first player’s moves, due to continuing 
aid trust-relationship in the past. In this particular scenario, recipients have 
information about donors’ earlier decisions and operations/financing in-country. 
In addition, donors make a decision based on recipients’ response: either they 
disburse or they do not. Therefore unlike Mosley and Abrar’s (2006) I prefer to call 
player one actions as “donor’s choices” rather than “donor’s behaviours”.  
In this research I am concerned with the way donors make their decisions about 
how to channel health aid. As a consequence, I consider a framework where 
donors move first as they are the budget holders responsible for deciding where to 
disburse their funds. However, as stressed before, donors’ decision today is based 
on past experiences and relationships with the recipients, i.e., donors have 
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gathered information on how the recipient is likely to perform and will choose 
accordingly. 
3.3.2  QUASI-TR US T  IN  A  DYN AMIC GA ME  
Let’s start by analyzing Mosley and Abrar’s (2006) game (Table 3.2) now using a 
sequential/dynamic form. For this game I use backwards induction to calculate the 
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPE)50 which takes into account what would 
be the best response of player two (the public sector), taking into account player 
one (the donor’s moves) (see Figure 3.2). In case the donor disburses to the public 
sector, the latter would prefer to be trustworthy as it will receive a higher payoff 
(3>2). However, if the donor chooses not to disburse to the public sector, the latter 
would prefer to be untrustworthy (0>-2). Knowing this, the donor would definitely 
choose to disburse and therefore receive a payoff of 3 rather than not to disburse 
and receive 0; this is the SPE. The Not disburse-Untrustworthy payoff that was a 
Nash Equilibrium in the Mosley and Abrar’s (2006) game, when presented in a 
dynamic form represents a non-credible threat, i.e., the donor threatens that it will 
not disburse if the recipient is untrustworthy but at the end it fails to act 
accordingly to its plan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Quasi-trust game, sequential/dynamic form (based on Mosley and 
Abrar’s, 2006) 
Note: Payoffs are given in order (player 1, player 2). Payoffs represent a measure of ordinal utility. Subgame 
perfect equilibrium (SPE) is Disburse-Trustworthy. Not disburse-Untrustworthy is not a credible threat.  
(Source: author’s illustration) 
                                                        
50 In game theory a Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium used 
in dynamic games (Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 2004).  
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My argument is however that a Not disburse-Untrustworthy situation might in fact 
be a credible threat in a dynamic game if we consider that the donor has other 
options, such as disbursing to the private sector and it actually goes for it. This is 
how reality looks like for some donors when accounting for the private sector as 
an optimal alternative recipient of aid. The alternative player acts in the 
background of the donor-recipient game.  
Using Mozambique and in particular the health sector as a case study my goal is to 
exemplify that over time a simultaneous game might have changed into a 
sequential game and this has implications on the choice of the provider. 
Particularly, donors’ decision to disburse aid is influenced by the quasi-trust they 
have in different providers and not the complete trust. This acknowledges that 
some parameters act as substitutes of trust and impact directly on donors’ decision 
to disburse aid and consequently on the choice of provider and aid modality. The 
theory developed in this research is grounded in qualitative evidence from 
interviews and observations of key meetings with the development partners for 
health in Mozambique. 
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3.4 THE THIRD STAGE DECISION:  HOW TO DISBURSE AID? 
       THE RISE AND FALL OF TRUST 
 
Figure 3.3 The third stage decision: how to disburse aid? 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
 
3.4.1  GAMES  PLAY ED IN  T HE H IS TOR Y O F HEALT H AI D  I N MO ZAMBIQUE  
3.4.1.1 The beginning of aid 
The history of aid in Mozambique started during the civil war (1990-92) when 
emergency-oriented projects increased and with them the number of agencies that 
started operating in the country (Pavignani and Durão, 1999). 
This was a situation where trust was not really taken into account in the sense that 
players were still getting to know each other. Initially player one, the donor, did 
not prefer to disburse to the public sector, i.e., it preferred disbursing to NGOs. The 
recipient, on the other hand, would prefer to get the money directly than through 
NGOs and would prefer not to comply with the conditions. As a consequence the 
equilibrium was a Not disburse-Untrustworthy situation since donors were 
naturally bypassing weak government structures and channelling aid through 
NGOs, who were implicitly trusted, to ensure that aid was getting fast to the ones 
needing it the most. Naturally this game was also driven by global development 
thinking, in a time where the discredit on state institutions was big and therefore 
aid agencies were more in favour of projects delivered by NGOs than state and 
budget support. At this time both donors and recipients did not have much 
information about each others’ behaviours or motivations and therefore this was a 
simultaneous game (Table 3.3) . The game was symmetric. 
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Table 3.3 The NGO boom, 1990-1992 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Payoffs are given in order (player 1, player 2). Payoffs represent a measure of ordinal utility. Nash 
equilibrium is Not disburse-Untrustworthy.  
(Source: author’s illustration) 
3.4.1.2 The formation of trust and move to a sequential game 
Although external aid was essential to rebuild the social infrastructure, in 
particular the health system, many scholars started criticizing the flood of 
uncoordinated agencies that delivered inefficient work (Pavignani and Durão, 
1999) and more importantly the increase of donors’ economic power (Cliff, 1993) 
who were given total control. Frequently, the government did not have any 
knowledge about external funding coming to Mozambique or any investment 
decision by the agencies (Cliff, 1993). The government legitimacy was questioned 
while NGOs were acting independently launching their own projects with their 
own staff, supplies, budget and logistics. NGOs’ funding was largely financed by 
bilateral and multilateral organizations which channelled their activities following 
their own political interests instead of actual population needs. “NGOs went where 
the donors wanted them to, not where the needs were greatest” refer Pavignani 
and Colombo (2001: 61). This was the time when the Not disburse-Untrustworthy 
equilibrium started being questioned in Mozambique and other aid-dependent 
countries, specifically when debating the role of the state in delivering services. 
The health sector was characterized by fragmented, donor-assisted projects.  
“The war destroyed a lot of the infrastructure but after we had two things: 
we had lots of foreign agencies that came to help the MoH and that wasn’t 
in a systematic way and we also had a MoH that still had a very socialist 
mentality trying to centralize everything. And I think those two things 
caused problems because what happened was that: 1) different agencies 
adopted different provinces but also 2) the way the MoH was headed was 
that everything had to be managed from Maputo which was very difficult 
 
Player 1 
(Donor choices) 
Disburse Not 
disburse 
Player 2  
(Recipient responses) 
Trustworthy 
(e.g. comply with 
conditions) 
1,2 3,-2 
Untrustworthy 
(e.g. not comply 
with conditions) 
-2,3 2,1 
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because it was not responsive from what was happening in the field”  
[BIL/1] 
The efforts to improve donor coordination and effectiveness started during the 
Normalization period (1994-1999) when original tools to manage external 
resources were introduced (e.g., sub-sectoral common basket funds) and elements 
of deregulation emerged. These changes did not just reflect changing 
circumstances in Mozambique but they also reflected changing global models of 
aid allocation. The policy dialogue between donors and the MoH gained strength, 
development aid agencies redirected their action to the new context of 
development, bilateral agencies were gaining more recognition than multilaterals 
and more qualified staff was contracted (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001). In 2000 it 
was signed the ‘Kaya Kwanga Conduction Code’ which established the central role 
of the MoH in the definition of health priorities and politics (Pfeiffer, 2003). Since 
then, a variety of coordination mechanisms (pool funding) have been developed 
(Ferrinho and Omar, 2005) (see Appendix A). 
In 2001 Mozambique started reinforcing the health sector coordination and 
strengthening the national capacity. As a result it carried out a reform of health 
sector financing based on a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) which brought together 
twenty six donors in a partnership with the MoH committed to overcome the 
bottlenecks that limited aid effectiveness (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001). Donors 
considered Mozambique to be a “good, reliable partner to work with” (Commins et 
al., 2009: 149), a “weak but willing state” (Patrick, 2006), defining it as an “easy 
partnership country” or a “stable low income country” where progress could be 
achieved if governments were willing to cooperate (Hog, 2008). When analysing 
Sub-Saharan Africa indicators, Mozambique was showing an overall better 
performance in all governance indicators (though still away from reaching the 
levels of OECD) (Figure 3.4).  
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Figure 3.4 Governance indicators for Mozambique, OECD and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
2006. 
Note: * arithmetic average   
Source: data from Kaufman et al. (2008).  
At this stage, trust was starting to build up based on experiences from players’ 
behaviour. The recipient was showing willingness to engage and comply with 
conditions and by providing stable aid donors were being trusted as well. A new 
equilibrium was emerging with donors disbursing to a recipient they would 
consider (relatively) trustworthy. Coordination between donors and recipient 
started taking place, communication increased; both the government and the 
donors started signalizing they wanted to play a coordinated game, like the one 
previously illustrated in Table 3.2.  
In 2005 Mozambique showed an active response in endorsing the Paris 
Declaration of Aid Effectiveness. At the macro level general budget support (GBS) 
was also gaining strength with an increase from 3% of total Official Development 
Aid (ODA) to Mozambique in 2000 to 21% in 2006 and 31% in 2008 (Visser-
Valfrey and Umarji, 2010). Until 2008, three common funds (CF) were in place in 
the Health Sector (the Provincial CF, the CF for Drugs, and the PROSAUDE I). In 
2008, the first two were merged into PROSAUDE II which became the only joint 
funding mechanism to the sector (Visser-Valfrey and Umarji, 2010). Donors and 
the MoH had a specific Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) where all the 
planning, budgeting and reporting cycle was settled. This modality helped 
reducing transactions costs and better link up sector processes with GBS (ibid). 
Nowadays around 30% of external funding to the sector is channelled through 
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PROSAUDE (ibid). As one informant described, in Mozambique donors and 
recipient were very Paris-friendly [BIL/2], which was not the same in other African 
countries like Tanzania or Ghana, for instance.  
At this time a simultaneous game was changing into a sequential game where 
donors and recipient had some information about each others’ behaviours and had 
already built a trust relationship. As one informant said 
“We used 20 years of building up trust with the system” [BIL/3]  
For some time donors and recipient were playing a coordination game reaching a 
Disburse-Trustworthy equilibrium. However this equilibrium was not the only one 
for some donors. Some donors would still disburse to NGOs making the Not 
disburse-Untrustworthy situation equally optimal, as they would prefer to play 
safer. The United States (U.S.), for instance, who became the largest contributor to 
the health sector, was not disbursing money to the government systems (they 
were off-treasury and off-budget51). In recent years vertical off-budget funding has 
increased and projects remained numerous. Some donors opted only for NGOs 
while others split between the public and private sector. The target of 50% of 
funds to be channelled through PROSAUDE has not yet been reached [BIL/2]. Why 
is that the case? Is it just about trust? 
3.4.1.3 A Quasi-Trust game: control as a substitute of trust 
“The whole idea is that we have sufficient trust and confidence in the 
functioning of the MoH realizing that the MoH knows a lot better than we 
do how to achieve its objectives. So if you fund someone else you are saying: 
I know better what to do (which I doubt very much from a practical point 
of view) or I do not trust the systems sufficiently.” [BIL/4] 
Based on data collected on the ground and analysis of the literature I categorized 
three types of donors: a public sector donor, a private sector donor and a public-
private donor.  
The public sector donor either: i) believes that the best way to deliver aid is 
through the state or ii) seeks power to participate, to be involved and to influence 
domestic affairs. Based on this ideology, the public sector donor promotes trust 
                                                        
51 Off-budget refers to foreign funds that are not recorded in the approved budget or in the 
government accounts. Off-treasury happens when external financing is executed outside the 
governmental systems (Visser-Valfrey and Umarji, 2010). 
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and tries to ensure that donor-recipient’s relationship is stable and strong. 
Particularly, for this type of donor there is more tolerance on what the 
fundamentals of trust are about. This is the donor that makes serious attempts to 
involve the public sector and therefore promotes greater ownership. As a 
consequence public sector donors advocate for sector budget support and a solid 
policy dialogue between donors and recipients’ countries. In Mozambique these 
are the donors that contribute to PROSAUDE and are currently fourteen.  
“(…) it is a little like: if we have a business and we are buying shares in that 
business, these shares are the political leverages and dialogue we have 
with the government.” [BIL/3]  
These donors also condemn an aid delivery model that is dominated by NGOs.  
“It is worrying... NGOs are saying that they are here to help providing 
services on behalf of the ministry but I think you should think about the 
future of Mozambique where you reduce the capacity of your ministry and 
you have to rely on international NGOs to provide services...where is the 
sustainability of such a system? And I think it is a consideration that each 
agency has to make - what is acceptable and what is not acceptable. And 
where do you serve your own interests and where it is beneficial to the 
ministry.” [MUL/1] 
Literature had already recognized the drawbacks of using NGOs as a channel of 
delivery as their projects tend to lack sustainability (Edwards and Hulme, 1996), 
have high transaction costs (Quartey, 2005) and can hamper partner country’s 
ownership (Marshall and Ofei-Aboagye, 2004). 
However, NGOs can be fast and quicker implementers, which are important factors 
for outcome-oriented donors, here defined as private sector donors. They seek a 
relative and not absolute trust, i.e., they disburse the money to the agent they trust 
the most, usually a private sector agent. These donors maximize their utility 
namely in terms of control and more efficient implementation of projects. They 
want their projects to be implemented quickly and in order to achieve that they 
need a targeted intervention delivered by NGOs [BIL/4]. NGOs deliver projects 
which are the most earmarked type of aid; projects are delivered through parallel 
systems that bypass the government and the donors’ control is obtained by 
substantial involvement in the contract with the agent, i.e. by deciding over the 
design, monitoring, disbursement, accountability and implementation (Foster and 
Leavy, 2001). 
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In some way donors face a trade-off:  
“With the PROSAUDE donors have more power but lose some control. It is a 
decision of power versus control.” [former MoH worker] 
Some donors do not want to choose between disbursing to the public or to the 
private sector. In ideological terms, these are the donors that believe there is place 
for everyone: public and private sector acting together in a coordinated way. A 
public-private donor spreads the risk over both sectors while securing at the same 
time control and influence. Global Health Initiatives are examples of these types of 
donors. 
3.4.1.4 The solution  
From Figure 3.5 we can see that a donor can choose among two possible strategies 
or a combination of them: 
(1) {disburse} = {d} 
(2) {not disburse, and disburse to the private sector } = {n}52 
The recipient can have two behaviours once the money is disbursed: 
(1) {trustworthy}  = {t} 
(2) {untrustworthy} = {n} 
In a coordination game the recipient is willing to cooperate and have a trustworthy 
behaviour. Being so, when the donor (player 1) disburses to the public sector {d}, 
the recipient (player 2) prefers to be trustworthy 
2 2
dt dn
P P  (3>2).  However, if the 
donor disburses to another agent {n}, the recipient has no incentive in performing 
as expected, i.e., to have a trustworthy behaviour 
2 2
nt nn
P P  (-2<1).  Unlike Mosley 
and Abrar (2006) that assume a (0,0) payoff for a {n,n} strategy I consider that the 
public sector has a positive payoff, even if the money is not directly disbursed to 
them, since alternative agents  are also working on behalf of the country - this 
means that the money is not lost but simple channelled differently (Figure 3.5). 
Knowing this, the public sector donor would prefer to disburse to the public sector, 
such that 
1
3
dt
P   and the players reach a SPE: Disburse-Trustworthy {d,t}.  
                                                        
52 Throughout this chapter not disbursing to the main recipient implies disbursing to the 
alternative one. 
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The scenario is not the same for a private sector donor. This donor has in general 
less tolerance for untrustworthy behaviour, searches for trust in other agents, 
focuses on having control over their money and/or wants to ensure their 
programmes have real and measurable impact. In a game theory wording this 
means that disbursing to alternative agents represents credible threats. As a 
consequence a private sector donor prefers first to disburse to the private sector 
{n} since its trust on the recipient is limited and less subject to tolerance. In this 
case 
1
0 1
dt
P   and the SPE is Not Disburse-Untrustworthy. 
In the case of a public-private donor 
1
1
dt
P  , which means that donors might 
choose disbursing to both the public and the private sector.  There are two SPEs: 
Disburse-Trustworthy {d,t} and Not disburse-Untrustworthy {n,n}. Both donor and 
recipient cooperate or both defect.  
This last scenario frames a standard picture of donors and recipient’s interactions 
in Mozambique. Different donors have different motivations, goals and behaviours. 
However the recipient has to have an overall strategy to respond to all types of 
donors. As illustrated above different donors have different strategies but the 
recipient keeps its strategy constant. What differs is the equilibrium. Taking into 
account that the recipient has to deal with different donors having two SPE 
represents the most typical scenario.   
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Figure 3.5 Quasi-trust game, sequential/dynamic form. 
Note: Payoffs are given in order (player 1, player 2). SPE is Disburse-Trustworthy if 
1
3
dt
P  ; Not disburse-
Untrustworthy if  
1
0 1
dt
P  or both if 
1
1
dt
P   .  
(Source: author’s illustration) 
3.4.2  MOZAMBIQ UE TO DAY  
3.4.2.1 Looking at the recipient:  capacity as a substitute of trust 
Analytical and empirical work has been done on the effectiveness of donors’ aid 
implementation. The finding is that aid disbursements to recipient governments 
are at great risk of being mismanaged. Mismanagement of aid by the recipient 
government can either occur by diversion of aid through corrupt 
authorities/bureaucrats, what  Svensson (2000) and Winters (2010) call aid 
capture, or by wasting aid due to lack of absorptive capacity of the recipient. On 
the other hand recipients with greater capacity might have better knowledge than 
the donor about what is best for the country and have a more cost-effective 
implementation. Donors thus want to increase the probability that their money 
will be used for the intended outcomes and to reduce the incentive of recipient 
governments to engage in corruption and rent-seeking.  
So even if donors trust the public sector, lack of capacity can act as a substitute of 
trust. In particular, Dietrich (2011: 9-11) argues that donors are more likely to 
channel aid away from recipient governments and towards other aid implementers 
when the quality of governance in the recipient country is low. 
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Although recognizing that some private sector agents, in this case NGOs, might lack 
capacity as well, the scenario for a private sector game offers a much wider choice. 
Contrarily to the monopoly of the public sector, the private sector consists of a 
variety of NGOs, local and international, that in a fierce competition for funding 
increase the capacity standards of that market. In addition, donors can choose 
between different NGOs and assess which one is the most effective channel of 
delivery. 
But do all donors behave the same way? For a public sector donor there is more 
tolerance in what the “fundamentals” of trust are about. On the other hand, donors 
which are outcome-oriented seek to improve their immediate aid impact and as a 
consequence they respond tactically to the capacity of the government by 
conditioning their delivery choices (Dietrich, 2011). 
3.4.2.2 Are capacity and control threatening trust? 
Independently of whether Mozambique’s MoH mismanagement also includes aid 
capture, there is definitely a problem of absorptive capacity that donors did not 
anticipate. In other words, public sector donors believed that a common fund for 
health, like PROSAUDE, would be an optimal situation given the recipient’s 
trustworthiness and expectation on its capacity.  
Nowadays, it was noticed that donors are very concerned about the low absorptive 
capacity of the MoH which is causing mismanagement problems and it is also 
making them question their trust on the MoH, i.e., until when they will allow 
slippages of a given performance criteria defined by themselves. 
“The SWAp suggests that you have sufficient trust/confidence in national 
systems in order for them to do the planning and budgeting and 
implementation and reporting to the extent that you satisfactorily can 
monitor that. BUT THAT IS NOT THE REALITY!!!(talks effusively). The MoH 
is struggling with a basic capacity in this.” [BIL/4]   
Simultaneously, some donors are questioning the appropriateness of a common 
fund modality for a country like Mozambique. Sector budget support modality was 
in vogue in the past but for some donors it is becoming old-fashion. 
“In PROSAUDE we have a MoU that was designed in 2008 when we thought 
that capacity would be there; now we are realizing that capacity is no 
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longer there. It has taken us two years of trying and some donors are 
actually questioning the MoU and questioning if the modality is 
appropriate because it is not working as well as we thought.” [BIL/1]  
Thus, the new question for the donor community is: 
“What can we do for the SWAp, instead of what can the SWAp for us.” 
[HPG meeting]  
At the moment donors feel they are pushing for the SWAp to work while the 
fundaments of SWAp defend non-push behaviour. So if SWAp is about trust, are 
donors pushing for trust? Donors feel they are pressuring for accountability53 
when the associated modality is not supposed to provide it.  As referred in the 
literature (e.g., Hutton and Tanner, 2004) the SWAp mechanism involves a reform 
in the way aid is given and in the relationship between donors and the 
government, which means it will take time for the impact to be seen. In other 
words 
“We try to make sure that the money disbursed to MoH is spent wisely so 
we want to know how it is spent.” [HPG meeting] 
“According to OECD, sector budget support is about whether you focus 
your policy dialogue as oppose to whether you focus your resources.” 
[BIL/2] 
But why are donors pressuring for accountability? Time-inconsistencies54 are 
challenging donors’ behaviour; due to the financial crisis, head offices are 
pressuring for quick results, now more than ever. Donors are forced to have more 
control over their money and ensure accountability. Building trust relationships is 
being overcome by a desire to measure and provide results that are short-term. In 
the end, trust is under threat because of lack of recipient’s capacity or change in 
donors’ behaviour.  
“Growing demand for donors to be accountable to their own tax payers has 
increased focus on results chains (input-output-outcome-impact), results-
based management and reporting, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
                                                        
53 Accountability here refers to the institutional arrangement through which the recipient reports 
the use of public funds, in this case externally financed, for public programmes and public service 
delivery (Bernasconi and Tediosi, 2007). 
54 Also called dynamic inconsistencies, time inconsistencies refer to situations when a player’s 
preference changes over time in such a way that a preference, at one point in time, 
is inconsistent with a preference at another point in time. In game theory it means that a player’s 
best plan for a future might not be optimal when the future comes (Hargreaves-Heap and 
Varoufakis, 2004).  
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systems. One of the paradoxes here is that in order to demonstrate good 
practice, donors may consider that they need to by-pass the central 
element of the aid effectiveness agenda –i.e. national ownership.” (OECD, 
2011a: 3) 
Shifts in global fashions are affecting donor behaviour just as much as donors 
perceive trustworthiness of recipient countries. This suggests that donors need to 
make extra efforts to demonstrate trust when the global climate is less conducive 
to working with governments. 
 “To me the principles of Paris are “nice” but they don’t really work. You 
cannot take a country-a government with such low capacity, and have the 
kind of flexible financing agreement that we have and still satisfy our 
political and economic realities. I think there are good intentions and 2005 
was a different point in time but right now every country is under extreme 
economic pressure: there are a number of very right-wing, increasingly 
right-wing, political governments around the world. And a tax-paying 
population that is educated and is asking us some questions and so when 
you have tax payers asking/challenging their governments in what they 
are doing, and those questions are driven by self-interest, not by concern 
about people in Mozambique- I think it changes things.” [BIL/3]  
“The problem is that the context has changed a lot, there is more scrutiny, 
more emphasis on corruption and public financial management 
particularly because of the financial crisis in countries, but also because 
the MoH does not have the capacity to actually deliver on those things, to 
be more accountable and transparent. So we have the capacity issue on the 
recipient side and the crisis on the donor side.” [BIL/1]  
Increasingly, donors refer to the concept of fiduciary risk, a jargon borrowed from 
the financial sector referring to the risk that funds entrusted to an agent are not 
properly managed. In the case of PROSAUDE, “fiduciary risk can be defined as the 
risk that funds: (i) are not used for the intended purposes; (ii) are not properly 
recorded and accounted for; and (iii) do not achieve the value-for-money55 
objectives of the programmes they finance. A high fiduciary risk does not 
necessarily mean high corruption, but may simply result from organizational 
inefficiencies or capacity weaknesses.” Fiduciary risk covers both management 
systems and accountability mechanisms (Bernasconi and Tediosi, 2007: 4). 
Communication which was part of the cooperative game, seems to be lacking at the 
moment when donors are failing to explain to the MoH the reasons why they are 
now pressuring for a non-accountable modality to be accountable.  
                                                        
55 “Value for money refers to the 3 e’s: economy (procuring inputs at a reasonable price), efficiency 
(link between input and output, i.e., service provision) and effectiveness (achieving development 
outcomes of the service provision).”(Bernasconi and Tediosi, 2007: 4) 
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“I don’t think we are communicating well enough that because of what is 
happening in Europe we have to explain better what is happening with our 
money. The idea of Paris was great on paper, I mean: give them the money 
let them manage-it is fantastic! And the minister was bought into that; into 
getting money without really being very accountable to how it is spent and 
we have changed the way we want the money to be reported on and we 
haven’t really told them.” [BIL/1]  
But does this mean that the recipient is not trustworthy anymore? While some 
donors think so, others do not agree. The question then is: will trust still remain 
about the fundamentals as proposed by Mosley et al. (2004)?  
3.4.2.3 Trust under threat, a new game for Mozambique 
As we have seen before, different donors have different degrees of tolerance for 
slippages of performance and consequently trust. While some donors have not lost 
trust completely, for others trust is obsolete.  If we substitute trust by SWAp, as 
suggested by the informants, this means that while for some donors SWAp might 
still work for others it means that SWAp is out of date. As a consequence, in the 
new game I simplify the recipient’s response as being either “comply with 
conditions {c} or not comply with conditions {n}”, therefore removing the “trust” 
concept. 
Mozambique’s trust game is therefore moving from the scenario depicted on 
Figure 3.5 to that on Figure 3.6. The recipient does not comply with the conditions 
in any scenario, i.e., independently of whether the donor disburses {d} or not the 
money {n}, 2 2 2 2
dn dc nn ncP P P P     (4>3 & 1>-2). The recipient’s response seems to 
be unaffected by donor’s allocation patterns which might also be a reaction from 
having to confront with different donors’ motivations (see Figure 3.6). Donors in 
Mozambique now face a dilemma: is it still better to disburse the money to the 
public sector or to go privately56. Currently there are two new SPEs: a Disburse-Not 
comply {d,n} and a Not disburse-Not comply {n,n} (see Figure 3.6). While the first 
SPE gives donors influence but no control or accountability the second gives them 
control and effective implementation. What will donors do? Are donors willing to 
take the risk and disburse to the public sector while still gaining influence and 
knowing in the background this should be ideally the best way to deliver aid?  Are 
                                                        
56 In addition, increasingly there is a third option: private-for-profit organizations and health care 
providers that although not being taking into account in this research are worth remembering.  
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donors going to be rational, pressured by the financial crisis and lack of recipient’s 
capacity, and disburse money to the private sector? Are donors ready to give away 
influence to obtain control and fast short-term results? Insight to these questions 
will be given in the section 3.5 of this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Trust under threat, a new game for Mozambique. 
Note: Payoffs are given in order (player 1, player 2). SPE is Disburse-Not comply {d,n} and Not disburse-Not 
comply {n,n}. Blue arrows point the direction of the equilibrium decisions.  
(Source: author’s illustration) 
 
3.4.3  CON CLUSION  
This section only focused on the third stage decision: how to disburse aid? In this 
section I depart from debates around selectivity, conditionality and allocation of 
aid to arrive to the analysis of strategic interactions between donors and recipients 
in-country. Using game theory I acknowledge that donors and recipients respond 
tactically to each other’s behaviour which is translated into opting for different 
strategies for disbursing aid. Based on work by Mosley and Abrar (2006) I shown 
how a trust-relationship between a donor and a recipient can be under threat 
when acknowledging the existence of alternative agents to whom aid can be 
disbursed. In particular I have shown that the history of health aid in Mozambique 
was modulated by an evolution in the concept of trust. Trust started to be built up 
after recognizing the need to coordinate the flood of foreign agencies operating in 
country, culminating in a coordination game when a SWAp was introduced. This 
game started to be threatened by substitutes of trust which included donors’ 
desire for control and accountability together with a weak capacity of the recipient. 
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Nevertheless, not all the donors behave the same: public sector donors have more 
tolerance for what the fundamentals of trust are about. On the other hand, private 
sector donors are more outcome-driven. At the same time, a simultaneous game 
evolved into a sequential game when donors could opt for more informed 
strategies taking into account the recipient’s behaviour in the past. Having all the 
information in hands the donor has to choose whether to still disburse to the 
public sector or not.  
Time for a new game 
Fortunately for donors there are not only two options where if they decide for the 
public sector they have to disburse to the MoH and if they go for the private sector 
they have to go for a one-type NGO. Donors have another stage of decision where if 
they opt to channel aid to the public sector they can still do it in two ways: either 
they disburse centrally to the MoH or decentralize aid to the province-level 
through the Provincial Directorates of Health (DPS). Furthermore, if donors opt for 
the private sector they also face a dilemma: should they disburse to international 
or local NGOs? 
These new possibilities provide alternatives for donors thinking that a SWAp 
approach is not the most effective way to deliver aid without them needing to 
necessarily bypass the government systems but simply choosing a different route - 
a straighter one that goes directly to the provinces. So how do donors choose to 
whom they should disburse aid? 
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3.5 THE FOURTH STAGE  DECISION:  WHO SHOULD GET AID? 
      REVEALING PLAYERS’ IDENTITY 
 
 
Figure 3.7 The fourth stage decision: who should get aid? 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
From the previous game we know that the recipient did not comply with 
conditions either because of its lack of capacity or due to donors’ change of 
behaviour. The donor has the option to still choose disbursing to the public sector 
or not. If it disburses to the public sector it can disburse centrally, to the MoH, or to 
the provinces, to the Provincial Directorates of Health (DPS). If it disburses to the 
private sector the donor can choose to channel aid through international or local 
NGOs.  
Donors’ choice on the channel of delivery, more precisely on who should spend 
their aid in-country is influenced by the recipient’s (MoH) behaviour, in particular 
whether it follows their preferences or not. As we have seen, different donors have 
different motivations, goals and objectives which are translated into different 
preferences on the ground. But is the degree of attachment for a given set of 
preferences equal across donors? In this paper I am focusing on two types of 
donors’ preferences: health priorities and choice of locations (in particular choice 
of provinces). The public sector and the private sector game are analysed 
separately. In the public sector game, player two is the central MoH whereas the 
DPS acts in the background.  In the private sector game, player two is now an 
international NGO, with a local NGO acting in the background.  
3.5.1  GAME ON E :  THE P UBLI C S ECTO R  GAME  
A first differentiation between public sector donors and private sector donors was 
made in the previous section. Interestingly, I found that within those categories 
donors still differ from each other. To better illustrate what actually happens on 
the ground I further disaggregate public sector donors into two illustrative types of 
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donors.   Donors who decide to continue disbursing to the public sector despite its 
lack of compliance with conditions can be divided into two main categories:  
 the centralist donor is the one that: i) considers that the best way to deliver aid is 
through the central level and/or ii) seeks power to participate and be involved in 
the domestic affairs. 
 the local donor is the one that acknowledges the role of the state to deliver 
services but is concerned about the long term impact of their actions and ways to 
address a system with serious capacity issues. This donor favours disbursing aid 
locally to provinces since they can have more control over their money, accelerate 
some processes and be closer to the service delivery. 
3.5.1.1 The centralist donor 
These donors are the ones trying to completely engage with the Paris Declaration 
of Aid Effectiveness contributing to the promotion of the government ownership, 
alignment and harmonization of aid. They believe that changing aid modality, i.e. 
discouraging PROSAUDE, is not going to alter things but changing the way they do 
things can lead to better outcomes [BIL/2]. Naturally, these donors tend to favour 
a longer-run approach that contrasts with the instant-results mode of the 
outcome-oriented donors. They consider that potential costs to the donor are 
compensated by centralizing aid. 
“In budget support and sector budget support we are paying for the policy 
dialogue and for political leverage.” [BIL/2] 
For this type of donor it does not make sense to fund a common fund like 
PROSAUDE and at the same time to fund a province or a project within the public 
sector [BIL/4]. According to these donors, allocating aid directly to the provinces 
diverts them from interacting with the central level where they think the main 
long-term development focus should be, allowing them to intervene in the way 
national systems should work.  
These donors are the ones who also doubt of the capacity at the provincial level 
referring that decentralization, although appealing, is not appropriate in a country 
like Mozambique. In other words they often refer that “If they don’t have capacity 
at the central level, they certainly don’t have it at the provincial level.” For these 
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donors money that is disbursed to the provincial level adds another layer of 
complication in terms of financial accountability and weaker management [BIL/4]. 
Most of these donors give also aid to general budget support (GBS). Some of them 
advocate that this modality is ideally even better than sector-budget support. It has 
been noted that some donors may decrease their participation or even quit 
PROSAUDE as a result of their increased participation in GBS (Visser-Valfrey and 
Umarji, 2010). 
A few donors, like some multilaterals, do not give financial contributions but 
instead provide in-kind donations, technical assistance to the MoH with a focus on 
strengthening the health system. 
3.5.1.2 The local donor  
The local donor is a donor that also recognizes the importance of the state to 
deliver basic health services. This ideology is reflected by the type of aid modality, 
where disbursing to the central level through a common fund approach is the 
preferred choice.  
“Where is this going? I just keep my fingers crossed that they will not go 
back to projects and programs support...and I do hope they continue to 
fund PROSAUDE...it is very difficult to argue that this is not the right way-
that’s development aid - that is the direction we should move to. But I can 
understand if Mozambique or the MoH is not ready yet...” [BIL/1] 
However, these donors distinguish themselves from the centralist donors as they 
are aware of the current capacity issues threatening budget support. As one 
informant referred: “we have to be realistic about the relationship we have with the 
MoH and align with the reality.” [HPG meeting] 
“So the more we contribute to centralization (in weak systems), the more 
we contribute to corruption if you don’t have democratic systems…” 
[BIL/3] 
As a consequence, while some donors will opt for reducing their contributions to 
the central MoH others have risk distribution strategies, namely decentralizing aid 
to the provincial level. For some donors this decentralization process not only acts 
as insurance, but it is also part of their ideology on getting aid closer to the 
beneficiaries at a faster rate. These donors are aware that inefficiencies in financial 
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management systems at the central level create huge problems in the timely 
disbursement of aid and the quantity of aid that is somehow “lost”. What is 
happening with PROSAUDE right now, as donors have informed, is that the 
headquarters decide what is allocated into provinces and then provinces decide 
what goes into districts. At this moment there is no PROSAUDE money that reaches 
the districts at all. Although the government has begun engaging in a 
decentralization process, this process takes time. Donors recognize that 
improvement in budget allocation is not yet to take place and therefore they think 
they can help in the short-term by giving additional resources to the DPSs. By 
decentralizing funds, aid money is transferred on time and faster, a practice not 
commonly seen within the government, and this allows the DPSs to scale up their 
activities. However, these donors believe that if the system would strengthen 
enough enabling equitable and timely distribution of resources, than their 
contribution to the provincial level would diminish and eventually disappear with 
their role becoming a more technical/advisory one.  
Donors disbursing to the provincial level are aware of the risks associated with the 
low capacity of DPSs but are prepared to work on building that capacity. Even 
though disbursing to the province directly still takes away donors’ power as 
budget holders, donors can at least have better control over their money than if 
they would disburse it centrally. Firstly, there are very few people working for the 
DPSs which facilitates tracing individuals that are untrustworthy. Secondly, donors 
have already built a trust relationship with some DPSs so they hold more direct 
accountability to each other than at a central level. Decentralization to provinces is 
not new in Mozambique; it dates back to the 90’s. For some time disbursing to the 
province-level was the preferred modality which ended up placing different 
donors in different provinces. Soon after, enforcement was made towards adopting 
the SWAp and disbursing to the provincial level decreased considerably with some 
provinces ending up not receiving more direct funds. Interestingly enough, it was 
noticed that the disappointment towards the SWAp is making this decentralization 
model flourish again [MUL/3]. Nowadays most of the donors still hold special 
connections with particular provinces due to their long-term relationship.  Finally, 
there are fewer, or no other donors at the provincial level which enables a single 
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donor or a few of them to better engage and coordinate with the local system while 
at the same time being able to influence local decisions.  
3.5.1.3 The solution 
A public sector donor can choose among two possible strategies or a combination 
of them: 
(1) {disburse, central} = {d} 
(2) {not disburse, and disburse to the provincial level (DPS)} = {n} 
The aid implementation agency, in this case the central MoH has two options once 
the money is disbursed and is under its management: 
(1) {follow donor’s preferences}  = {f} 
(2) {ignore donor’s preferences} = {i} 
For a centralist donor who chooses the strategy {d} the recipient, at the central 
level, can either follow donor’s preferences or not. We might think that following 
donor’s preference would be the wisest thing to do: first of all the recipient has not 
been complying with conditions (as we have seen in the previous section) and 
therefore aligning with the donor now would show a desire to cooperate and keep 
receiving funds. However this might not work for three reasons. Firstly, even if the 
recipient wants to consider donor’s preferences it might not end up doing it:  
“The resources’ allocation is not clear. In theory it works, but you don’t see 
it applied in practice. Everything is written but at the end it does not 
work.” [MUL/2] 
Some donors attribute the recipient’s response to lack of capacity while others are 
more convinced that it is lack of will. Secondly, ideologically, the recipient might 
argue it knows better than the donors which are the country’s priorities and might 
not want to follow donors’ preferences. This was what happened in 2005 when the 
MoH in a very nationalistic fashion tried to get rid of all foreigners working at the 
MoH while at the same time tried to centralize everything, even what had already 
been decentralized. This recipient’s behaviour ended up creating a lot of tension 
with the cooperation partners. The leadership of the MoH has changed and the 
new one engages much more with the health partners. Nevertheless, the new 
MoH’s ideology still impacts on the way aid is delivered.  
119 
 
“Mozambique is still a communist country with a communist ideology and 
communist way of thinking. They say they have broken out and are now 
socialist, democratic, whatever, but the whole line of thinking is so 
centralistic. For example, in the Ministry of Health national directors 
cannot make any decision, whatever small it might be, without asking the 
minister for permission.” [BIL/3] 
Finally, although we are here abstracting from coordination issues, which is the 
topic of Chapter 4, at this stage we have to consider that recipient countries do 
interact with a variety of donors who have different preferences, strategies and 
budgets. As a consequence, the recipient is not able to consider all donors’ 
preferences, i.e., it has to harm some donors’ preferences in detriment of others.  
So if the donor chooses {d} the recipient will prefer ignoring the preferences
2
di
P , 
such as 
2 2
di df
P P  (Figure 3.8). In case the donor decides to go for strategy {n} the 
recipient might have two reactions: either it follows donor’s preferences {f} or 
ignores them {i}. Acknowledging that there is a power struggle between the central 
and the provincial level in Mozambique, the recipient’s reaction to the donor’s 
choice of disbursing to the DPS is to ignore donor’s preferences and disburse aid 
according to its own criteria (
2 2
ni nf
P P ). The recipient does not have any 
incentive to follow donor’s preferences. This attitude signals that the recipient 
dislikes the fact that aid is disbursed locally and not centrally, and in case the 
donor continues to do so, the recipient would keep on not following donor’s 
preferences. The recipient’s utility can be ordered such as 
2 2 2 2
di df ni nf
P P P P    
(Figure 3.8).  
The main difference between a centralist donor and a local donor is that the 
former will always prefer to disburse to the central level even if the recipient 
ignores its preferences such that  
1 1 1 1
df di nf ni
P P P P    (see Figure 3.8).  Some 
donors in Mozambique, even aware of all the capacity issues threatening the 
effectiveness of a common fund managed by the MoH, still considered it to be the 
best way to deliver aid and decided to maintain or even increase their 
contributions to this modality. Knowing that their best options are 
1 2
( , )
di di
P P  or 
1 2
( , )
ni ni
P P  the centralist donor would choose 
1 2
( , )
di di
P P . The SPE is then Disburse-
Ignore {d,i}. 
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On the other hand, a local donor would prefer to spread the risk and disburse both 
to the central {d} and provincial level {n}. This donor does not have any incentives 
for disbursing only to the provincial level as it would lose all its influence and 
chance of a policy dialogue with the central level. Knowing all the facts and 
acknowledging that the recipient might ignore its preferences, the donor cannot do 
more than spreading the risk over two different providers. In that case there are 
two SPEs: Disburse-Ignore 
1 2
( , )
di di
P P  and Not disburse-Ignore, 
1 2
( , )
ni ni
P P  taking into 
account that
1 1
di ni
P P . This does not change however the assumption that in an 
ideal world the local donor would still prefer {d}, and therefore 
1 1 1 1 1
:
df nf di di ni
P P P P P   .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 The Public Sector Game. 
Note: Payoffs are given in order (player 1, player 2). Payoffs represent a measure of ordinal utility.  For a 
centralist donor the SPE is
1 2
( , )
di di
P P . For the local donor there are two SPE 
1 2
( , )
di di
P P  and 
1 2
( , )
ni ni
P P  taken 
into account that 
1 1
di ni
P P . 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
 
3.5.2  GAME TWO :  T HE PRIV ATE SECTOR  GA ME  
The private sector donor tends to limit the scope of state activity in untrusting 
environments. They advocate for disbursing aid to the private sector through 
international and local NGOs, multilateral organizations and private contractors. 
For these donors the main goal is to improve health indicators effectively and 
efficiently and if that means going through NGOs because the government lacks 
capacity, that should be the way of doing it [BIL/5]. In addition, disbursing to the 
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public sector has the problem of lack of attribution of results and therefore aid 
agencies cannot observe the direct link that goes from their money to the impact 
on the ground. 
NGOs, on the other hand, have to make sure donors know them, know their know-
how, their strengths, so that whenever any project crosses their minds they think 
about them [iNGO/1]. Local NGOs are important for donors as they are the closest 
point to the beneficiary. However not all local NGOs have the desired capacity to 
implement donors’ projects. As informants mentioned 
“We want to give more to local NGOs, but first there are not many and 
second they lack capacity.” [BIL/9]  
“If giving to local partners does not help to improve health indicators that 
means we have to rethink it…” [BIL/5] 
As a consequence, donors who are outcome-driven and seek short-term priority 
indicators tend to disburse their funds to international NGOs who can then channel 
some funds to local NGOs. Sometimes donors also fund multilateral organizations 
that work on the ground. According to the informants, organizations such UNICEF 
or UNFPA57 are important implementing partners. One informant noted that 
“multilaterals have three important characteristics: they are effective, work on 
multi-level operations and have the capacity to quickly mount interventions and 
sustainably ensure long-term development programs.” [MUL/3] 
3.5.2.1 Do NGOs anticipate donors’ preferences and expectations? An ex-ante game to 
disbursement 
In addition to analysing the capacity of potential aid implementers, donors have a 
set of different preferences, such as disbursing aid to particular provinces or to 
tackle specific diseases. Do NGOs take into account donors’ preferences when 
applying to funds?   
“Donors announce they are going to put out a request for proposals. 
However they have their restrictions, e.g., it has to be focused on newborn 
or maternity or only NGOs that begin with S can apply or whatever they 
want - it is their money! And we need to pick that up and say: OK fine let’s 
respond to that and see if it fits in our profile, if it fits in what we want to 
do and what we think is needed.” [iNGO/1] 
                                                        
57 UNICEF stands for United Nations Children’s Fund and UNFPA stands for United Nations 
Population Fund. 
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By considering donors’ preferences NGOs are taking into account the type of 
project that is preferred, the donors’ expectations in relation to health indicators, 
the location of projects, the area of specialization, etc. Some NGOs anticipate 
donors’ preferences and try fitting them with their goals. In this case, NGOs bear 
the cost of having to adapt their strategy but help guaranteeing future funding and 
securing the existence of the organizations. This situation is particularly critical for 
small or local NGOs. Small NGOs or NGOs that only rely on donors’ funding for their 
survival tend to be more dependent of donors’ preferences and expectations. Local 
NGOs are an example of a small type of NGO that cannot compete with 
international ones. These organizations cannot afford to deviate from aligning with 
donors’ preferences otherwise they cannot even sustain themselves. In short, 
donors propose a highly conditional donation. 
“Donors come to us and say: I have the money for this project. Either you 
align or you don’t. Honestly speaking we end up compromising ourselves 
because we are in a context of lack of resources.” [lNGO/1] 
If the NGO ignores donors’ preferences, it is signalling that it is reluctant to accept 
preconditions on receiving such funding. By doing so, the NGO should look for 
alternative sources of funding. 
“We are an independent organization only financed by individual 
donations. This is core in our mission/vision. We do not feel “pressured” by 
the donors and we feel free to talk and act as we think. If we were “non-
independent” we would have to make the donors feel pleased about our 
behaviour in order to get funding for the next project and therefore we 
would not express “whatever we would like to” but would act strategically 
in order to capture donor’s attention and guarantee the next funding.” 
[iNGO/2]  
For the donor, this expectation of compliance and alignment with their activities 
acts as a predictive driver for trust. Private sector donors want to disburse their 
money to potential trustworthy agents, i.e., to agents that will follow their 
preferences. Trust relationships are as important in the private sector game as in 
the public sector game. Donors in Mozambique have now a very good 
understanding of which NGOs they are willing to work with and which ones they 
trust the most. In some way they have created a kind of path dependent 
relationship with some NGOs. New incomers or local NGOs face some barriers to 
enter in this market. They need to create a good reputation from scratch in order 
to attract donors’ attention while they compete with incumbents, usually large-
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scale NGOs, most of them operating in the country for a long time. More on NGOs’ 
competition will be discussed on Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
3.5.2.2 The ex-post game of disbursement:  large versus small-scale donors 
NGOs’ strategic behaviour depends on the type of donor they are dealing with. 
Donors can be divided into large-scale or small-scale donors according to their 
donation volume. 
A large-scale donor has more leverage on the disbursement than a small-scale 
donor. A large-scale donor is very goal oriented and gives less flexibility for the 
agent to independently perform its choices. The NGO has to keep a regular 
communication with the donor informing of each project’s current progress. The 
donor’s donation is attached with conditions on obtaining specific results such as 
improvements in specific health indicators. A large-scale donor wants to ensure 
the money is spent on projects that are its priority and in locations of its choice. 
For the NGO it is important to be trustworthy while showing strong capacity so as 
to successfully implement the project according to the donor’s expectation but also 
to keep a good reputation in order to secure future funding. A NGO working with a 
large-scale donor will always want to comply with the expectations and follow 
donor’s preferences. Not complying means not receiving more funding from that 
donor and damaging its reputation.  
“If it is not in the proposal we can’t do it. Everything has to be agreed 
before the projects starts.” [iNGO/3] 
Some donors like the U.S., are extremely demanding and want NGOs to report 
every single action that is taken under their project. One informant referred that 
“As an employee you are a stamp of the U.S. government. They want to 
know everything-when someone travels you have to have their permission, 
when you buy computer you have to have their permission, and so on.” 
[iNGO/1] 
On the other hand, a small-scale donor lacks the power to pressure the NGO. The 
monitoring of information is less frequent and the NGO has more flexibility and 
autonomy in designing and implementing its projects. The incentives of following 
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donors’ preferences depend on the size of the NGO they are dealing with.  Large-
scale NGOs have more leverage than small-scale NGOs58. 
3.5.2.3 The solution 
The private sector donor has two options:  
(1) {disburse, international NGO } = {d} 
(2) {not disburse, and disburse to local NGO} = {n} 
Once a NGO has secured funding it has two options: 
(1) {follow donor’s preferences}  = {f} 
(2) {ignore donor’s preferences} = {i} 
A large-scale donor will always prefer its agent to follow its preferences such 
that
1 1 1 1
df nf di ni
P P P P    (see Figure 3.9). In the case of a large-scale donor, the 
international NGO would prefer to follow donor’s preferences after the money had 
been disbursed
2 2
df di
P P . The international NGO maintains its behaviour if, for 
some reason, the donor decides to disburse to local NGOs (
2 2
nf ni
P P ). This is 
because NGOs want large-scale donors to recognize their work, so the closer they 
work to donors’ preferences the better. A donor knowing this would then opt for 
disbursing to international NGOs {d,f}, reaching a SPE where they disburse to NGOs 
who follow their preferences ( dfP =3,3) (Figure 3.9). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
58 Actual examples of how these relationships play out namely in terms of what is the money 
disbursed towards and where to, will be discussed in the fifth stage decision, particularly in section 
3.6.2 of this chapter. 
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Figure 3.9 Private Sector Game with a large-scale donor. 
Note: Payoffs are given in order (player 1, player 2). Payoffs represent a measure of ordinal utility. SPE is 
Disburse-Follow {d,f} 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
In the case of a small-scale donor, the NGO’s response depends on its size. As we 
have seen before, small NGOs tend to consider donors’ preferences and 
expectations in order to attract funding. Likewise, if they are being granted money 
by a donor they do not have any incentive not to follow its preferences. The game 
of a small-scale donor with a small NGO is pretty much like the game depicted in 
Figure 3.9 where both donor and NGO’s utility order remains, i.e., 
1 1 1 1
df nf di ni
P P P P    and
2 2 2 2
df di nf ni
P P P P   .  
On the other hand, if the small donor disburses to a larger NGO (which holds 
increased leverage) the later would prefer to ignore donor’s preferences or at least 
hold more flexible arrangements (see Figure 3.10). Facing this reality the donor 
would still prefer to disburse to international NGOs than to local NGOs who cannot 
compete in terms of capacity (
1 1
di ni
P P ). By doing so, donor and NGO sign a softer 
contract where more flexibility from the donor is required and more autonomy 
from the NGOs is agreed upon. The SPE is Disburse-Ignore {d,i}, with ignore actually 
corresponding to negotiated and flexible approaches (Figure 3.10). 
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Figure 3.10 Private Sector Game with a small-scale donor and a large NGO. 
Note: Payoffs are given in order (player 1, player 2). Payoffs represent a measure of ordinal utility. SPE is 
Disburse-Ignore. 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
Donors in Mozambique now want to disburse to local NGOs. However due to 
capacity issues of these organizations it is not clear if they would ever get to an 
equilibrium, i.e. if donors would prefer to disburse to local NGOs given their lack of 
capacity. That is why at the moment donors prefer either to contract international 
NGOs, who would then sub-contract local NGOs, or to disburse small amounts of 
money to local NGOs that would not imply large risks, while at the same time 
disbursing to international NGOs.  
3.5.3  GAME T HR EE :  THE P UBLI C-PRIV AT E GAME  
I consider two types of public-private donors: 
 Horizontal public-private donor (HPPD) 
 Vertical public-private donor (VPPD) 
3.5.3.1 The horizontal public-private donor 
A HPPD focuses on strengthening the health system as a whole. These donors 
advocate for horizontal health programmes that address a broad range of needs or 
try to coordinate related disease programmes. They are ideological closer to the 
public sector donors, more specifically to the local donors. However they consider 
that the private sector has a role to play and both games can co-exist in a 
coordinated way.  
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HPPD donors do not see NGOs’ support as a sustainable and major alternative for a 
low-capacity public sector. Most of these donors tend not to provide large amounts 
of project support to NGOs or when they do so, it represents a very targeted, 
focused and small section of their budget, i.e. it does not change their ideology but 
simply complement their work. As a result, giving private contributions is usually 
additional or complementary to their standard budget. Additional means that 
donors’ support to some small NGOs, is not in detriment of their preferred 
contributions to the public sector. Complementary refers to situations when donors 
require NGOs’ assistance to help them accomplish a certain goal in a given 
province or project they are supporting. 
As part of the “going local” slogan, so much pronounced by some, these donors 
would  prefer supporting local NGOs, rather than big international NGOs, although 
as we have seen it has not been a common practice at the moment.   
Without necessarily funding for governance, these donors believe that funding for 
health at the local level by providing health budget support at the province-level 
and disbursing to local NGOs which are closer points of service delivery, acts as a 
means of supporting decentralized democracy and good governance. 
3.5.3.2 The vertical public-private donor 
A VPPD focuses on target medical interventions and disease-specific programmes. 
A VPPD often has business aptitude and strives for timely and quantitative results.  
VPPDs revise the grants provided to agents based on performance indicators, i.e., 
they favour a special type of conditionality -performance-based funding- where 
disbursing is subject to good performance and attainment of results as previously 
agreed.  These donors can either fund the public or the private sector. For instance, 
the Global Fund to Fight for Malaria and AIDS (GFATM) when disbursing grants 
nominates one or two organizations to serve as a principal recipient, responsible 
for the local implementation of the grant which might include oversight of sub-
grants given to sub-recipients. Principal recipients can be governmental, non-
governmental or private organizations (national or international). If sub-recipients 
are appointed these are responsible for implementing a portion of a grant, 
reporting directly to the principal recipient. A huge difference between a VPPD 
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donor like the GFATM and a public sector or a private sector donor is that the 
VPPD is mainly understood as a financing mechanism to which individual 
countries have to apply for grants. This is different from other types of donors who 
choose to get into a given country with no pre-application from that country. 
VPPDs might also provide technical assistance in support to their vertical 
initiatives in order to strengthen the management and capacity building and 
increase the success of their programmes.   
3.5.3.3 The solution 
A public-private donor can choose between four different strategies or a 
combination between them: 
(1)  {disburse, central} = {d} 
(2)  {not disburse, and disburse to provincial level (DPS)} = {n} 
(3)  {disburse, international NGO} = {d} 
(4)  {not disburse, and disburse to local NGO} = {n} 
The recipient can either: 
(1) {follow donor’s preferences}  = {f} 
(2) {ignore donor’s preferences} = {i} 
For the HPPD the SPE is the same that was reached in both the public and private 
sector games. In the public sector game the donor has a behaviour that is closer to 
the local donor and therefore the SPE is either Disburse- Ignore 
1 2
( , )
di di
P P  and Not 
disburse-Ignore, 
1 2
( , )
ni ni
P P  taking into account that 
1 1
di ni
P P , i.e. the HPPD will 
disburse both to the central and provincial level. This donor can find two other 
SPEs that complement the public sector game with the private sector game: {d,f} or 
{d,i} depending on the scale of the donor. The choice between public or private 
strategies depends on a variety of factors such as the balance between influence 
and control, the capacity at the central level, the capacity and needs of NGOs, the 
strategy of the donor and the wider economic and political context. This donor has 
therefore flexibility in terms of whom to choose to implement their programmes. 
Let’s now consider a situation where the MoH at the central level is the principal 
recipient of a vertical fund by a VPPD. In that case, the MoH is under a rigid 
contract and a constant monitoring process, which differs from the case when 
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donors provide funds to a common fund that is managed by the MoH. In this case, 
the MoH is obliged to follow the VPPD’s indications in particular the disbursement 
of aid to specific purposes, diseases or programmes, i.e., the recipient has to strictly 
follow the donor’s preferences. If the recipient ignores those, the VPPD will cancel 
the next disbursements and in the future it would choose to play a private sector 
game instead. The recipient will therefore always want to follow the donor’s 
preferences. In case the VPPD decides to go for an alternative recipient (DPS), the 
MoH does not have any incentive to follow donor’s vertical preferences. The SPE is 
then disbursing to the MoH who then follows donor’s preferences. One could argue 
that due to fiduciary risks, performance-based indicators might be compromised in 
Mozambique right now. That is true. The GFATM, for instance was not pleased with 
the MoH’s performance last year. However, I do not consider it to impact on this 
SPE since I am considering the recipient’s response of following donor’s 
preferences in terms of disbursing to preferred locations and health priorities, i.e. 
“qualitative dimensions” of performance represented by an ordinal and not 
cardinal utility.  
In the case that the VPPD plays a private sector game it would reach the 
equilibrium of disbursing to international NGOs which follow donor’s preferences. 
Taken into account that a VPPD is always a large-scale donor the recipient will 
always follow donor’s preferences. 
3.5.4  CON CLUSION  
This section departed from the third stage decision when donors decided how to 
disburse aid, choosing between the public and the private sector. In the fourth 
stage decision: who should get aid?, it is recognized that donors’ options are not 
limited and vary greatly which are translated into different possible strategies. The 
recipient’s response is about deciding to follow donors’ preferences or not, with 
preferences referring to the ordinal utility given to certain locations and health 
priorities. Three types of games were analysed: a public sector game, a private 
sector game and a public-private game. In each game different categories of donors 
arose which had implications on both the way donors chose and on the recipient’s 
reaction to those choices. In public sector games, where aid is disbursed to 
government systems, the recipient does not follow donors’ preferences. While 
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centralist donors would still prefer to disburse to the MoH, local donors prefer 
spreading the risk and decentralize to the provincial level. In the private sector 
game large-scale donors can pressure for NGOs to follow their preferences 
however the scenario is not the same for a small-scale donor where the NGO’s 
response depends on its size, i.e., large NGOs tend to have more leverage than 
small NGOs. In a public-private game donors can opt between four strategies or a 
combination of them. There are two types of public-private donors: HPPD and 
VPPD. The VPPD by providing vertical funds, focus on having timely and fast 
results and therefore the recipients are under rigid contracts that have to be 
followed and applied. The SPEs are a combination of those found in the public and 
the private sector games. 
The implications of following or ignoring donors’ preferences 
Donors’ strategic paths have strong implications on where is aid actually disbursed 
on the ground, to which locations and to which health priorities. A recipient that 
follows donors’ preferences has few or no input in the decision of where aid should 
go. Contrarily, a recipient who opts for ignoring donors’ preferences is signalling 
its will to exercise authority on the definition of priorities. How is this translated 
into practice? Which areas and locations get more funding? Why is it so important 
for some donors to define their priorities and what are the implications of different 
principals’ behaviours? How flexible are contract arrangements with the agents 
and how is ownership manifested in practice? These are some questions that will 
be addressed in the next section.  
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3.6 THE FIFTH STAGE DECISION:  WHERE TO DISBURSE AID? 
      DECISIONS ON THE GROUND 
 
 
Figure 3.11 The fifth stage decision: where to disburse aid? 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
Whose decision now? 
After disbursing to the public and/or the private providers, principals have to 
decide where to disburse aid. I focus on two main decisions regarding aid 
disbursement: health priorities and locations’ preferences (proxied by provinces). 
According to the game theoretic model, it would now be the turn of the donor to 
decide – and by this I mean “play” - again. However, this conceptualization of a 
donor as the principal and the recipient as an agent suffers some changes in 
practice. For instance, if the recipient (MoH) is dealing with a vertical donor it has 
to follow its preferences, acting predominantly as an agent obliged to a given 
contract.  However, if a common fund is entitled to the MoH, it starts a new role as 
a principal holding power for deciding where and how to disburse the funding. 
This is particularly true if the recipient does not follow donors’ preferences.  
A similar logic applies to the private sector game. NGOs which are not granted 
money by donors or have flexible agreements can exert some degree of autonomy 
when deciding the direction of their activities, acting as principals of their own 
budget. However, this does not hold for the most typical case where NGOs are 
“acting as the arms and legs of a given donor” [iNGO/1 & CONS/1], i.e., the agent is 
under a contract or rigid cooperative agreement (see Figure 3.12). 
This section will discuss the consequences on budget disbursement decisions 
when donors and recipients act as principals or agents. This is the stage where the 
final disbursement decisions are made. In particular this is where principals 
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exercise their power and are responsible for the final decisions of the five-stage 
donor-recipient game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 Whose decision now? 
Note: The public sector donor has two options: to disburse or not to disburse to the central level (MoH). The MoH 
can then follow or ignore donor’s preferences; if it follows it acts as an agent and the donor is in charge of the 
disbursement decisions. By ignoring donor’s preferences the recipient (MoH) acts as a new principal. The same 
logic applies to the private sector donor. 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
3.6.1  THE P UBLI C S ECTOR  GAM E  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13 The public sector game: whose decision now? 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
3.6.1.1 Recipients as agents: the implications of following donors’ preferences 
Recipients act as agents when donors decide where they want their money to go 
to. Vertical donors, including those who disburse to the public sector, have 
earmarked money designated for different purposes. Although recipients might 
have to sub-contract other sub-recipients or implementing agencies, they are 
under the guidance of vertical donors who have strict and concrete goals. The 
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Global Fund and PEPFAR (U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) are 
some of the major donors in Mozambique. While the former focuses on three 
diseases: Tuberculosis (TB), malaria and HIV, the latter works exclusively with 
HIV.  For these donors focusing their aid on one area is the key to achieving best 
results. Not surprisingly, there has been a disproportional funding for these 
diseases. These donors tend to focus on provinces where the prevalence of these 
diseases, in particular HIV, is higher. Although they tend to cover a vast geographic 
area of the country, their main focus is on the Southern provinces, known for 
having worse HIV-related outcomes.  
One of the main criticisms appointed to these donors by some informants is that 
they discourage a horizontal approach to the health system.  Even though some 
donors now started integrating health systems’ strengthening in their strategies; 
their focus is primarily on specific diseases with the health systems being 
improved as a consequence. For instance, some donors built a number of health 
centres, labs and trained medical staff however these were always HIV-related. 
These donors acknowledge that ultimately they are looking towards HIV outcomes 
and those are what they measure; however they also have a secondary impact on 
other areas such as building infrastructure, human capital, etc.  
 “At the end our funding ends up covering wider parts of the system than 
just HIV; however the focus remains specifically on the disease and not on 
the system.” [GHI/1] 
By following donors’ preferences the recipient’s role becomes passive. This is 
reflected on the compromise to fund specific areas. At the moment HIV is totally 
externally funded and the MoH does not seem to be doing anything to contradict it, 
i.e. to start providing internal resources to HIV. Nowadays, donors are becoming 
more critical about the lack of government ownership in HIV programmes. An 
immediate consequence of this dissatisfaction was translated into major donors 
withdrawing their funding from the National Aids Council. 
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3.6.1.2 Recipients as principals: the implications of ignoring donors’ preferences 
 
Defining health priorities 
As soon as the recipient (MoH) receives sector budget support (PROSAUDE) it is its 
responsibility to manage and disburse it accordingly. While until now the recipient 
was only negotiating at a higher macro level from this moment on, the recipient 
changes its level of action to the ground level. As a principal now accountable to 
the country beneficiaries, the MoH has to decide to which DPSs to disburse aid, to 
which health facilities and eventually to which civil society organizations or local 
NGOs.  At this moment the MoH is not anymore an agent who is acting in 
conformity with donors’ preferences but exercising the right of ownership in its 
own country. Ownership, a well known jargon in aid effectiveness, in its simplest 
form is referred as the degree of commitment to a chosen policy direction, strategy 
and priority of the country (Visser-Valfrey and Umarji, 2010).  
However, the way money is managed and prioritized by the MoH is not always 
very well appreciated by the donors’ community. Even acknowledging that it is not 
the donors’ role to define the funding allocation in-country anymore, donors 
expect some accountability, especially when priorities were set together ex-ante 
the disbursement and a MoU was signed. But that does not always happen; as we 
saw the MoH prefers not to follow donors’ preferences (SPE: Disburse-Ignore). For 
instance, according to the informants, community involvement has been the 
number one priority for two or three years now, human resources have also been a 
top priority and public financial management is going up in the agenda. Both 
donors and recipient seem to agree on this and a MoU was signed; however when 
the end of the year came the budget did not reflect those priorities and the 
priorities’ plan for the following year had changed. As one informant refers 
 “In that case we have a problem! The priorities are reflected by something 
else. You see the money going somewhere else and wonder why, because 
those are not the priorities.” [BIL/1] 
Donors recognize that there are many areas that donors and recipient are not in 
compliance, which does not mean that the MoU is wrong, but is not applied in 
practice [BIL/3]. There seems to be an increasing fight between a global donor 
agenda and a political agenda in country [BIL/3]. What donors would like was to 
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see the MoH to actually appropriate their projects and put their money into what 
they say are the top priorities. “But a great deal of political will would be needed to 
actually change things” [MUL/3]. Donors are convinced that if they would decide 
to pull out overnight there would be no more internal funding to previously agreed 
priority programmes, such as community involvement which is completely 
dominated by external funding [BIL/1].  
This situation reflects a particular case of fungibility, where the recipient’s 
spending on a particular purpose decreases with increases in donors’ spending, i.e. 
aid substitutes rather than complements local spending (Foster and Leavy, 2001). 
Here the degree of fungibility is exercised at the level of the health priorities within 
the health sector. Fungibility, usually highlighted as a case of aid ineffectiveness 
has been described in different ways: while some consider it synonymous of 
corruption (Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller, 2004) others consider it a rational 
response from the recipient due to a conflict of interests between donors and 
recipients’ priorities (McGillivray and Morrisey, 2000), which ends up with the 
recipient reallocating the available resources according to its priorities 
(Waddington, 2004).  
Choosing locations 
Not surprisingly, there has been an unequal distribution of health resources across 
provinces. According to the informants there is no clear criteria for per capita 
allocation in the health sector, which ends up benefiting the country’s southern 
provinces. For instance, Zambezia and Nampula (in the north) are the most 
populated provinces, but have the lowest per capita budget, US$15 and US$16, 
respectively which contrast with Maputo City of US$30, the highest in the country 
and where infant and child mortality rate are the lowest (see Figure 3.14).  
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Figure 3.14 Per capita provincial health expenditure (2012) and Infant Mortality 
Rate per Province (2008). 
(Source: UNICEF/FDC, 2012: Health Sector Budget Brief) 
We have seen that being aware of this some donors (the local donors) try to 
compensate the unequal distribution of health resources and give money directly 
to the DPSs. However donors acknowledge that the overall situation is quite 
complex and not as clear as it seems. The recipient which does not have incentives 
to follow donors’ preferences (
2 2
ni nf
P P ), takes into account the disbursement 
made individually by each donor to a given province and discounts that when 
deciding for the allocation of resources to that province, i.e. donors’ money to 
provinces might end up being substitute rather than additional. Simultaneously, 
the recipient does not have a complete picture of all the operations of the private 
sector donors in different provinces. So at the end of the day it is hard to calculate 
exactly the most equitable formula for resources’ allocation. 
3.6.2  THE P RIV AT E S ECTO R GA ME  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.15 The private sector game: whose decision now? 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
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3.6.2.1 NGOs as agents: the implications of following donors’ preferences 
Being recipients of donors’ money means, most of the times, that NGOs act as 
agents under a co-operative or contract agreement. This contract affects NGOs’ 
incentives and limits their locations’ choices. In fact, a NGO that follows donors’ 
expectations is exchanging its autonomy and a role as a principal for reputation 
and security of funding. In this case donors remain the principals of the 
relationship having leverage for deciding where they want their projects to be 
implemented. As Edwards and Hulme (1996: 970) argued: “NGOs become the 
implementer of the policy agendas of governments”. The main difference between 
the public and private sector game is that in the latter donors’ priorities are fixed 
and established before starting the game. Donors that go privately have a specific 
agenda they want to achieve which is known in advance before actually entering 
the country. The question is then: what are these donors’ priorities?  
It is known that NGOs that compete in the market for funding and are dependent 
on it for their survival, have little leverage on the choice of service they provide, 
especially if they are small-scale NGOs. Naturally they have to specialize in one 
area or other, but even that can be adapted. For instance, knowing that the 
majority of funding goes to HIV, NGOs do adapt their strategy to include something 
HIV-related [iNGO/1]. An informant had even revealed that his NGO’s struggle for 
funding has to do with the fact that the NGO decided to reduce substantially its 
activities on HIV [iNGO/4].  
Donors that provide vertical funds have money designated for specific purposes. 
For instance, the U.S. has specific types of funding they get from the U.S. Congress; 
within the sector they have money exclusively for HIV, maternal-child health, 
family planning, TB or malaria. As a consequence, when donors target some 
provinces they vertically fund according to what they have money for, and not 
necessarily what the provinces need the most. Naturally, donors try to go where 
the burden of a specific disease is higher; however it is not really clear how they 
assess the relative need of one province or district versus the other. Surprisingly 
enough, when I asked to a major donor: “are the provinces that receive more 
money the ones better off?; the answer was: “ I don’t know...it is a good question: if 
it correlates necessarily to need. I don’t know…”[BIL/6] 
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Informants tend to refer to the northern provinces as the most disfavoured part of 
the country. As we can see from Figure 3.16 the northern provinces have 33 iNGOs 
for health which contrasts with the southern and central provinces that have 80 
and 60 iNGOs, respectively59. Why is that? The U.S. is the major funding agency in 
Mozambique with around 80% of its funding going to HIV [BIL/6]. Apparently, 
northern provinces are the ones where traditionally the HIV prevalence is lower, 
which therefore attracts fewer attention from donors like the U.S. However, having 
lower HIV rates does not mean that these provinces are better off in terms of 
general health indicators; in fact the opposite happens. Northern provinces have 
the highest level of poverty, the worst health services, the highest rates of malaria 
and highest levels of child and infant mortality. 
NGOs who act as the arms of a vertical donor have to go to the provinces they are 
directed to go independently of their preferences. This situation stands for a long 
time now, so NGOs have been placing themselves in those provinces that tend to 
attract more funding. It might not be that they suddenly change their location 
completely but have been doing so for the past years. 
 
Figure 3.16 Number of health NGOs per province. 
(Source: author’s illustration based on NAIMA, 2011) 
 
                                                        
59 There are more iNGOs for health operating in Mozambique. This data only refers to NGOs which 
are part of NAIMA (Network for International Organizations). Nevertheless, all the large-scale and 
more outspoken iNGOs are registered in this network. 
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The difference in locations’ preferences of a large-scale versus a small-scale donor 
has to do with different donors’ priorities in the country. Usually a large-scale 
donor wants to promote a wider program, sometimes national, and therefore it 
tends to cover the maximum possible number of provinces. On the other hand a 
small-scale donor does not intend to have a wider impact but its main concern is 
on the local support to a specific province, that for some reasons, maybe historical, 
it has been supporting. A small-scale donor would tend to target its aid to one or 
limited number of provinces. 
3.6.2.2 NGOs as principals: the implications of ignoring donors’ preferences 
Sometimes NGOs can also act as principals themselves when: i) autonomy and 
flexibility is given by the funding agency once the funds have been disbursed or ii) 
they were not given funding by a donor (and are self-financed). In both situations 
NGOs, as new principals, decide where to disburse aid and eventually whether to 
contract other agencies (such as community based organizations) to implement 
their projects.  
But does it mean that by having more flexibility NGOs are more grassroots 
oriented and acknowledge geographic inequities when deciding their location? In 
other words, when the donor gives the NGO flexibility for deciding their location or 
NGOs do not depend on donors’ funding do they go to the provinces that need the 
most? Although some perceived NGOs as flexible, innovative and efficient vehicles 
for delivery basic services that reach poor communities and remotes areas and 
identify local needs (Vivian, 1994); others report that there is evidence that NGO’s 
effectiveness remains week and they are not as grassroots oriented as expected 
(Edwards and Hulme, 1995). According to Gauri and Fruttero (2003: 4) “in 
addition to the existence of donor pressures, perceptions about NGOs vary because 
of ideas of what NGOs are not like to.”  As they say: “unlike government, NGOs are 
supposed to be innovative and to respond flexibly to their clients; unlike firms, 
NGOs are supposed to prioritize the poor and to serve public, rather than private 
purposes. The problem with these negative definitions is that the same economic, 
social, and political pressures that influence public sector and firm behaviour 
eventually affect NGOs.”  
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As a consequence, the motives behind NGOs locations’ choice might not be as 
altruistic as one would expect (Gauri and Fruttero, 2003).  Interestingly, the 
majority of iNGOs’ informants went blank when I asked the simple question: “what 
are your criteria for allocating aid to different provinces?” A few would not simply 
know the answer to this question. Others start thinking of some potential 
explanations. The first one was historical, as one informant referred: “basically we 
just kept the same provinces” [iNGO/4]. “If you look back in history”, one 
informant explained, “you would see that there are provinces that received a larger 
percentage of aid after the war as they were particularly affected, like Zambezia, 
for instance, and today the same NGOs are still operating there” [CONS/2]. In some 
cases it happened that NGOs would come into the country during the post-war 
period and the government would allocate them a given province [iNGO/1]. For 
the NGO it was better to have the chance to operate in the country independently 
of the province they were designated than having nothing. NGOs would then start 
implementing according to their mandates in a given province and most of them 
remain in their original locations. At the end of the day it did not really matter if 
the main priority in that province was aligned with NGOs’ mission. So NGOs would 
implement their projects not necessarily on provinces that would need the most. 
Most NGOs lacked resources and they could not afford to go further way. 
“Nowadays it might seem non-logical that NGOs are operating in certain locations 
as time has moved on and these provinces’ main needs have changed”. [iNGO/1]  
Naturally, historical reasons are attached to having established facilities and 
infrastructures in one site which has advantages such networking and knowing the 
place, costs saving, concentrating activities and eventually maximizing the impact 
of their actuation.  iNGOs referred that it is very difficult to suddenly decide to 
open a new field site where they do not have anything: where they do not have 
office, infrastructure, people and where they do not know the place. Occasionally 
NGOs decide which districts and communities they go to, but even that can be 
restricted by organizational pressures; NGOs like any private firm feel the pressure 
to deliver results and to be cost-effective.  
It seems that NGOs face a trade-off: either they comply with donors’ preferences, 
secure funding and act as agents or have full autonomy and fight strongly to ensure 
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the effectiveness of their organization. By saying this I do not mean that NGOs do 
not have altruistic motives, which I am certain they do. However NGOs do want to 
maximize the success of their operations and therefore comparing the relative 
need of one location versus another is not as important as selecting a location 
where they have already competitive advantage.  
To demonstrate success NGOs are not willing to face the risks associated with 
operating in an unknown zone. As a consequence NGOs tend not to go to difficult 
environments (Koch et al., 2009). 90% of the iNGOs’ informants acknowledged that 
Niassa, one of the northern provinces, was disproportionally resourced by the 
international community and was clearly one of the provinces that needed most 
aid. However as informants pointed out: 
“Niassa is far away and partners tend to concentrate in bigger urban 
centres for obvious reasons: aid workers want to be closer to a health post, 
they want to have easy access to other services. In Niassa the roads are 
terrible; communication is hard which ends up disfavouring this place. And 
not only Niassa but all those environments that difficult NGOs’ operations 
will tend to have less partners.” [iNGO/5]  
“Niassa is a forgotten province with very few NGOs. Anyway what would 
you expect? The roads are so bad...” [iNGO/6]   
Cultural contexts seem to impact as well on location decisions of NGOs. An 
interesting story was told by an informant who referred that in Niassa a large 
percentage of the population is nomad, which implies that from time to time a 
whole village migrates to another location. For an impact-driven NGO this means 
no ability to monitor and evaluate the impact of their projects. No NGO would 
decide to establish a project in a place where they could have sunk costs, no 
continuity and inability to measure impact [iNGO/5]. 
Working as principals means that NGOs have authority to contract partners, 
usually community based organizations (CBO) to whom they generally provide 
capacity building or delegate minor activities. Increasingly in Mozambique, 
subcontracting local NGOs has been taken into consideration. Informants referred 
however that CBOs have some fundamental problems. The major one is that they 
might arise for a specific project announced by an iNGO but in the following project 
they might not have staff anymore or not even exist. This situation creates not only 
a problem of institutional memory but also implies costs for the iNGOs and has 
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direct consequences on the effectiveness and impact of their programmes. As a 
consequence CBOs are also determinants of iNGOs’ decisions about whether to 
disperse or concentrate geographically. In general, NGOs have lack of trust in CBOs 
which implies that the big share of time is firstly spent on training in order to build 
their capacity. By concentrating geographically NGOs have more control of CBOs’ 
work and ensure that a better training is provided. 
3.6.3  CON CLUSION  
In this section, the fifth stage decision: where to disburse aid?, I discussed how a 
change in recipient’s behaviour, specifically whether it decides to follow donors’ 
preferences or not, has implications on its role and on health outcomes ahead. 
When the recipient follows donors’ preferences it continues acting as an agent 
under a rigid contract that is determined by the donor which has a specific health 
agenda. On the other hand, if the recipient decides not to follow donors’ 
preferences it starts acting as a new principal now more accountable to the 
population with autonomy and flexibility for deciding where to disburse aid. 
In practice what we see in Mozambique is that both decisions have their own 
drawbacks. In the case of vertical initiatives, present in both the public and the 
private game, southern provinces are preferred and specific diseases such as HIV, 
TB and malaria attract the majority of funding. There is lack of systemic approach 
to the health sector and some geographical areas and health problems are 
neglected.  However, when the recipient is in charge, the scenario is not necessarily 
better. In the case of a public sector game there is unequal distribution of health 
resources, also concentrated on the southern provinces and a lack of commitment 
to health priorities. We would therefore expect that NGOs, when acting as new 
principals, would somehow address these challenges. Nevertheless, that is not 
necessarily the case: like any other organization they have the pressure for results 
and cost-effective interventions. As a consequence, they have preferences towards 
some areas and provinces and do not assess necessarily the relative need of one 
location versus the other (see Figure 3.17 and Figure 3.18 for a summary of 
findings from this chapter). 
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Figure 3.17 Summary of findings for a public sector game. 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
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>Vertical programmes are 100% financed by donors 
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Figure 3.18 Summary of findings for a private sector game. 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
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3.7 DISCUSSION  
Donors have been channelling aid through the public or private sector. Despite the 
role played by both sectors there is no systematic analysis that accounts for this 
aid structure as a founding motivation for donors’ allocation behaviour. This is an 
aid structure that is not only defined by the participant actors in isolation but by 
the way they interact with each other. As a consequence, recipients are not passive 
and influence the way donors behave. Donors respond tactically and account for 
the wider aid structure in their decisions.  The allocation of aid is thus a result of a 
bargaining process that involves different stages and different maximization 
actors.  
This chapter provides a systematic analysis on how aid negotiations are developed 
at a country level through different stages and how they culminate on actual 
outcomes on the ground. Despite the focus on in-country disbursements this paper 
provides a reflection on aid effectiveness in a global context. Furthermore, this 
paper does not pretend to assess which type of aid organization (and consequently 
aid modality) or recipient works better.  Instead, it attempts to show how and why 
actors behave in different ways while looking to the wider effects of those 
behaviours. By choosing different paths, donors are building their own identities 
which has an effect on recipients’ behaviour and ultimately on the effectiveness 
and impact of aid.  
This paper delivers three main theoretical insights: i) findings from primary 
research in Mozambique conform with existing literature but are extended by my 
analysis, ii) a theoretical framework that covers all stages of the aid delivery 
system not discussed in previous literature and iii) new insights on the links 
between different types of aid organizations, their strategies and outcomes on the 
ground.    
From a policy perspective, understanding in depth donors and recipients’ 
motivation offers a more informed picture on the effectiveness of aid. Traditional 
aid effectiveness studies deposit the failure of aid to donors’ motivations on one 
side and recipients’ characteristics on the other. By accounting the dynamics of 
interaction between actors, a more comprehensive and pragmatic vision on aid 
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effectiveness is obtained. This paper offers an important stepping stone for 
expanding this theoretical and practical line of inquiry by explaining patterns of 
health aid flows with regards to aid delivery strategies. Recognizing donors’ 
identity and their implications in practice is crucial for establishing the links 
between aid and results. Underlying the effectiveness of aid are differences in the 
nature and strategies of the development partners for health. The question of 
“which type of aid, if any, is desirable” might never be answered. Instead, 
acknowledging the relevant role of different actors and the country context is 
crucial if improvements on health outcomes are to be achieved. How much donors 
are aware of this issue remains a challenge both in theory and practice. With a 
picture like the one shown in Figure 3.19, are donors willing to coordinate?  
This paper also invites future research in several dimensions. In establishing the 
relationship between donors and a second player, I have ignored interesting 
responses from third players that act in the background, such as DPSs and local 
NGOs. Despite the realistic vision of such theoretical insight, i.e., donors’ main 
focus is definitely not on the relationship with those third players, it would be 
interesting to delve into the role and direct responses of those background actors.  
Most importantly, it remains open to answer whether and to which extent do 
development aid partners take into account coordination when choosing their 
strategies. An insight on the relationship between different actors that is not 
bounded with financial ties is fundamental to uncover the bottlenecks of aid 
effectiveness.  This is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Figure 3.19 Identity of different international aid organizations. 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
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CHAPTER 4 
4 ARE AID AGENCIES REALLY WILLING TO COORDINATE?  
REALITY AND PRESCRIPTION DISPUTED  
4.1  INTRODUCTION  
The number of donors has substantially increased in the past years with jargons 
such as fragmentation and proliferation of donors and projects becoming main 
topics of research and policy on aid effectiveness. Research shows that 
fragmentation can hamper aid effectiveness (Djankov et al., 2009) and 
proliferation of projects was considered a “sin” of aid delivery (Morss, 1984; 
Birsdall, 2005). A wide range of literature has identified the main consequences 
and problems of aid fragmentation including, inter alia, high transaction costs for 
the recipient (Acharya et al., 2006) and donors (Anderson, 2011) and 
administrative burden (Kanbur, 2006; Roodman, 2006; Knack and Rahman, 2007; 
Lawson, 2009; Djankov et al., 2009).  
The negative effects of fragmentation have led to increased rhetoric aiming at 
improving donor coordination. The Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness in 2005 
has called donors to better coordinate with each other, considering harmonization 
one of the core principles for aid effectiveness. The Accra Agenda for Action in 
2008 continued this line of thought and encouraged donors to specialize by 
concentrating their aid in fewer countries and fewer sectors within countries 
(OECD, 2005/2008). There is however a wide gap between words and deeds with 
Aldasoro et al. (2010) revealing that few donors have specialized on a limited set 
of recipient and aid sectors. Simultaneously, descriptive statistics show that aid 
fragmentation and proliferation persist and little progress has been made on 
coordination efforts (McCormick and Schmitz, 2011; Aldasoro et al., 2010). The 
most recent official evaluation and the Busan Forum on Aid Effectiveness have also 
reached the same conclusion (OECD, 2011b). Nunnenkamp et al. (2013) indicated 
that coordination has even weakened since the Paris Declaration in 2005. 
In face of the disappointing results in improving aid coordination some scholars 
have begun questioning why coordination seems so hard to achieve or why is aid 
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fragmented in the first place. These studies are interested in the strategic 
interaction between donors and the way those interactions influence donors’ 
behaviour collectively and individually (Torvisk, 2005; Halonen-Akatwijuka, 2007; 
Steinwand, 2013). In particular this literature is concerned about the incentive 
structure underlying donors’ motivations to coordinate. Some studies draw on the 
aid allocation literature to research if weak coordination is linked with donors’ 
commercial and political self-interests (Mascarenhas and Sandler, 2006; Fuchs et 
al., 2013) or if it results from increased competition between aid agencies 
(Roodman, 2006; Annen and Moers, 2012). The other main strand in the aid 
literature consists of inquiring, mostly empirically, whether donors react to each 
others’ allocation decisions (Cutrone, 2012; Öhler, 2013; Frot and Santiso, 2011) 
and to which extent coordination drives aid allocations (Davies and Klasen, 2013).  
Finally, some scholars have even begun to question whether coordination is 
achievable (Annen and Moers, 2012; Steinwand, 2013) or even appropriate 
(Torvisk, 2005; Woods, 2011) as it might reduce the recipient country’s incentives 
to help the poor. The majority of these studies take a cross-sectional or country 
approach. 
Literature on coordination at a regional and sector level is however rare in the 
literature.  The critical question of how aid is used and distributed within a country 
and the implementation of coordination on the ground has been largely neglected. 
Lack of coordination on the ground implies critical problems such as duplication of 
aid efforts, ineffective and unsustainable delivery of aid and unequal distribution 
of resources.  According to Powell and Findley (2011: 3), “if donors are not only 
failing to coordinate at a national level, but also sub-nationally, the costs of failed 
coordination could be even higher than currently estimated”. The few cases 
analysing donor coordination other than across recipient countries include 
Aldasoro et al. (2010) and Nunnenkamp et al. (2013) that employ sector-specific 
data at the country level to assess coordination between different donors, and 
Powell and Findley (2011) and Öhler (2013) that look at coordination across 
regions within a recipient country with the later also considering sectoral 
dimensions of projects.  
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Powell and Findley (2011) look at coordination between the World Bank and the 
African Development Bank across regions within six different countries and find 
that donors suffer from a lack of coordination in the spatial placement of foreign 
aid projects. Öhler’s (2013) results indicate a modest degree of donor coordination 
across regions and sectors within Cambodia. Specifically, he points out that 
bilateral donors’ coordination efforts are small and this might result from donors 
favouring their political and economic interests. 
This paper aims to bring the macro and micro literature a step closer by providing 
a meso level analysis of coordination. In particular it explores the coordination 
efforts of aid agencies by disaggregating the analysis to a single sector and single 
country. Furthermore, the analysis is not limited to bilateral donors, but also 
includes multilateral agencies and NGOs which require different levels of 
coordination. Encouraged to contribute to opening the black box of aid 
effectiveness, as Bourguignon et al. (2007) call it, this paper explores the reasoning 
behind aid agencies’ motivations to coordinate (or not) in the health sector in 
Mozambique. There is a wide gap between the reality of aid coordination and its 
prescription.  In this paper I attempt to provide a more complete picture of aid 
coordination by providing an explanation of why coordination seems so hard to 
achieve based on the analysis of how it is implemented in practice on the ground.  
To do so, I first provide an insight into the implementation of coordination in the 
health sector in Mozambique as perceived by different partners.  Secondly, based 
on the distinction between public and private good properties of coordination, I 
explore why different agencies differ in their motivations to coordinate. Finally, 
based on a collective action theory framework and aided by Schelling’s (1973) 
diagrams I illustrate why it is so hard to coordinate. 
This paper brings together the aid coordination and aid allocation literature by 
exploring the dynamics of interaction between aid agencies while reflecting on aid 
agencies’ individual motivations to provide aid and to coordinate. In addition it 
adds to the literature by uncovering novel insights that explain donors’ lack of 
willingness to properly engage in coordination that are informed by evidence 
collected through fieldwork research. Finally, it attempts to develop a theory of aid 
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coordination that is based on empirical findings and is not restricted to bilateral 
donors. 
Mozambique presents a very interesting case for analysing coordination 
mechanisms for three main reasons. Firstly the country is recognized for having 
the most advanced coordination mechanisms in place (DSW, 2011). Secondly the 
health sector is a tracer sector in terms of aid coordination and fragmentation due 
to high aid volumes. Finally, Mozambique is considered a donor-darling country 
with a flood of agencies operating in the country. The natural question is: having 
such good settings and prospects is coordination working? Although this paper 
takes the form of a case study, it allows some degree of extrapolation to other 
cases as it is focused on the aid agencies’ behaviour, rather than the recipient’s 
which tends to be similar across countries.   
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 4.2 provides a short background 
information of the aid coordination structures in the health sector in Mozambique. 
Section 4.3 introduces the methods and analytical framework. Empirical results 
from fieldwork research are presented in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5 I derive the 
theoretical framework, while in Section 4.6 the analysis is presented. Section 4.7 
concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
4.2 BACKGROUND TO THE CAS E  
Box 4.1: A brief note on coordination 
Donor coordination refers to horizontal coordination among donors, also known as 
harmonization. Coordination appears because each aid agency has its own plans 
and activities that need to be organized to take place in harmony or not to ruin one 
another (Woods, 2011). Coordination means that aid agencies maintain their 
individual programmes but try to work with each other in order to maximize 
cooperation and minimize competition (Acharya et al., 2006). According to Woods 
(2011: 8) “coordination is not ambitious, principally it serves to prevent 
inadvertent damage caused when donors are ignorant of each other’s actions”. 
Coordination structures may vary between countries but generally they involve 
establishing common arrangements, simplifying procedures and sharing 
information (Balogum, 2005). Besides procedural issues, coordination is usually 
accompanied by specific aid modalities and programmes such as Sector Wide 
Approach (SWAp), budget support or sector specialization (Acharya et al., 2006).  
In this chapter I focus essentially on the structures of coordination, occasionally 
providing some links with the financing mechanisms in place in the country. 
 
Coordination soon became an issue with the influx of external aid after the civil 
war in Mozambique in 1992. Projects in the health sector were arising everywhere 
every minute (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001) with donors focusing on specific 
provinces, developing their own projects sometimes without the knowledge of the 
Ministry of Health (MoH). The MoH was considered the “ministry of projects”. 
Fragmentation was a concern at the financing, policy and strategy levels (SCMS, 
2007). 
At the same time HIV was becoming an epidemic in the country. In light of this, two 
coordination mechanisms were put in place by the government and the health 
partners: the National AIDS Council (CNCS) and the SWAp. Having started in 2000, 
currently a total of 26 partners use the Health SWAP structure, a programme that 
aims to coordinate the financing and planning between donors and the 
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government in support of the Health Sector Strategic Plan (PESS). A number of 
partners (14) provide support through a common fund called PROSAUDE with a 
Code of Conduct and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) governing the 
relationship between donors and the MoH (SCMS, 2007). 
Within the SWAp structure, partners have a partner specific mechanism –the 
Health Partners Coordination Framework (HPCF) – which provides a structure for 
collaboration and dialogue between cooperating partners in the health sector. 
According to the terms of reference (ToR) “the main purpose of this framework is 
to help coordinate the large number of health partners, represent the diverse 
range of their interests and build on the comparative advantages that each partner 
brings”.  The framework also specifies that “health partners are organizations such 
as bilateral donors, UN agencies, international NGOs, national NGOs and private 
organizations who are engaged in support to the health sector.” (HPCF, 2012: 1) 
There are several forums where health partners come together namely: the Aid 
Effectiveness Working Groups (WGs), the Health Partners Group (HPG) and the 
Focal Partner Team (FPT). These meetings feet into the monthly SWAp meetings 
namely the Joint Coordination Committee (CCC) and the biannual Sector 
Coordination Committee (CCS) between partners and the MoH. Figure 4.1 gives an 
overview of the Health SWAp mechanisms showing the links between the MoH and 
development partners, highlighting the different types of health SWAp meetings at 
different levels. There are three pillars and three levels. The three pillars include 
the Government, the Partners and the Joint pillars. The three levels are the 
WGs/Taskforce, CCC and CCS. Partners and government have their own meetings 
before the joint meetings take place. After the joint meetings, the separate 
meetings continue throughout the year building on the feedback from the joint 
meetings and preparing for the next ones (HPCF, 2012). 
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Figure 4.1 Overview of the formal coordination mechanisms in Mozambique’s 
health sector: the Health SWAp structure. 
Note: The Health SWAp is made of three pillars and three levels. For a complete description of this figure and an 
explanation of how the pillars and levels fit together see Appendix F. 
(Source: HPCF, 2012) 
In addition to the health platforms, separate HIV platforms also co-exist. Although 
some steps are being made in order to have a better collaboration between the two 
platforms and specifically link HIV to the health sector in a more consistent way, 
coordination bodies take place independently of each other and have separate 
ToRs and MoU. The Pre Partners Forum (PPF) (equivalent to the HPG for health) is 
“a platform that constitutes a level of the interaction of bilateral, multilateral 
agencies including the private sector as well as representatives from national 
umbrella HIV/AIDS civil society networks that work in the fight against HIV and 
AIDS with “Conselho Nacional de Combate à SIDA” (National Aids Council-CNCS) 
(PPF, 2012: 1). Just like the HPG, the PPF is made of three levels and three pillars 
and develops similarly to what is depicted in Figure 4.1.   
Mozambique was one of the first countries to become a signatory of the 
International Health Partnership (IHP+) Country Compact in 2008. The Country 
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Compact reaffirms the commitment of all partners to increasingly harmonise and 
align their support with nationally defined priorities while consolidating the 
HIV/AIDS framework (CNCS) with the Health SWAp (DSW, 2011). 
NGOs also have their own coordination meetings. At the central level NAIMA 
(standing for Network of Organizations working in Health and HIV/AIDS) started 
informally in 2001 in a way to coordinate different organizations working in HIV, 
and in 2005 it expanded to include all health-related NGOs. NAIMA’s key areas are: 
i) coordination within the network and with the MoH, donors and civil society, ii) 
representation of NAIMA in different forums, iii) communication within members 
and iv) advocacy. NGOs have to pay an annual fee to become members of the 
network and participation is completely voluntary (NAIMA, 2011). 
Sub national coordination structures also exist and aim to feed into the national 
mechanisms. However at the province and district level coordination mechanisms 
are less formal and less developed.  
4.3 METHODS AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
This research involves two main parts: i) a presentation of findings collected 
through field work research (section 4.4) and ii) the interpretation of data using 
collective action theory (sections 4.5 and 4.6). Whereas the first part aims to 
explain how coordination works in practice, the second explores why coordination 
seems so hard to achieve. It uses a mixed-methods approach employing a 
sequential exploratory strategy in the sense that quantitative results assist in the 
interpretation of qualitative findings previously described. As a result, when first 
presenting the qualitative findings the aim is simply to describe the reality rather 
than attempting to interpret or justify it. The second part of this chapter 
illuminates the mechanisms behind a coordination shortfall, shedding light on 
many of the “frustrations” expressed in the previous section. It is transformative 
since collective action theory is used to explore the research question.  
The results reported in this paper form part of a larger study that was set out to 
understand aid agencies’ dynamics and strategic interactions with each other and 
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the recipient country. The findings presented in this paper represent a sub-set of 
the data collected concerned with coordination mechanisms in Mozambique. A 
qualitative case study approach was adopted in order to understand in practice 
one of the complex structures of aid: the implementation of aid coordination. 
Specifically fieldwork research aimed to elicit: i) information on the existence of 
national and sub-national coordination structures, ii) stakeholders’ perception on 
the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms in place in the health sector in 
Mozambique and iii) factors underpinning each organization’s motivations to 
coordinate.  Data collection took place in Maputo from February 2012 to June 
2012. Chapters 3 and 4 share the same fieldwork methods. Please check Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.1 (pages 85-87) for a complete description of the methods used. These 
chapters differ however, in their approach, research focus and analytical 
framework. 
To arrive at the research aim of this chapter, three steps are taken. The first is to 
understand aid agencies’ general perceptions of coordination. The second is to 
conceptualize coordination based on different agencies’ motivations to coordinate. 
The last step focuses on exploring the outcomes of aid agencies’ interactions on 
coordination success reflecting on their incentives to coordinate.   
The analytical process followed a thematic content approach (Ritchie and Spencer, 
1994; Patton, 2002) and involved familiarization with the data collected (including 
data cleaning and checking for consistency), development of a coding scheme 
based on the identification of a thematic framework, mapping, charting and 
interpretation. Results were organized into five main themes. After having a 
structured picture of the qualitative findings, a theory of donor coordination is 
explored. At the core of this theory is the conceptualization of coordination as a 
public or private good. Collective action theory guided the interpretation of results 
and it is used to understand the conflict between individual and collective best 
outcomes. A collective-action occurs whenever a desired joined outcome requires 
the outputs of several individuals. Collective action-problems take place when 
individuals select options that are less desirable to the group than others available 
to them (Gibson et al., 2005).  In this framework it is complicated by the fact that 
actors also do not share the same view regarding coordination as a collective best 
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outcome. Schelling’s (1973) diagrams are used to aid the analysis and seek 
explanations for the findings observed. The theory developed in this research is 
therefore informed by results on the ground. 
4.4 STAKEHOLDERS ’  PERCEPTIONS OF COORDINATION  
4.4.1  MEANIN G AN D MEMBERS HIP  
Mozambique is known for having one of the most advanced coordination 
mechanisms in place at the moment (DSW, 2007). However, misunderstanding of 
the mechanisms was a common issue among partners. Firstly, the way that 
different groups and meetings fit within each other (depicted in Figure 4.1) is not 
commonly perceived by all development partners. Secondly, despite all formalities, 
guides and ToRs, there is no common understanding of main concepts and 
principles of the coordination framework. Specifically, the real meaning of SWAp is 
not clear for everyone, especially for non-state actors. Interviewees reported that 
they were not really clear about whether SWAp was mainly a coordination tool or 
a financing mechanism. 
“I think that at the beginning when we talked about SWAp we were 
referring to the basket fund. Now the basket fund is called PROSAUDE so I 
guess the SWAp refers more widely to the collaboration that exists between 
the MoH and the health partners…But it is not very well defined.” [NET/1] 
A common concern expressed by the donors interviewed was that despite the fact 
that everyone had signed the MoU for PROSAUDE there was no common 
interpretation of its basic principles. One interviewee even questioned: 
“If we don’t have the same understanding of where we are going, how can 
we work together?” [BIL/3] 
Thirdly, different documents guide donors’ code of conduct and not all of them 
applied to all donors: some are PROSAUDE donors while some are only general 
health partners.  
Furthermore, some partners are not sure about their “place” within the SWAp and 
the right to participate or not in certain forums. One donor reflected that: 
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“In principle, SWAp has an inclusive and not exclusive approach and 
therefore it is assumed that health partners have the right and interest to 
attend the group meetings, have a contribution to give and have a role 
within the group.” [BIL/8] 
However in practice there are main issues around membership and participation 
in group forums. The way donors perceive coordination has a huge impact on how 
they see all different donors fitting together for a common purpose. Some donors 
were of the opinion that only donors that contribute to a given modality should be 
attending specific meetings; as one donor referred: “It is like buying a share in the 
business; so if you don’t have a share why should I let you have a chair free of charge 
and seat by the table?” [BIL/3] A controversy that was made clear with regards to 
the coordination framework in Mozambique was that the U.S. does not channel 
their aid through the government systems (like some of the other partners) but it 
still gets the chance to participate in the majority of meetings, without providing 
any counterpart. Simultaneously they are entitled to a parallel coordination system 
with the MoH with whom they meet regularly and exclusively without the 
presence of other donors. For a country that advocates for a SWAp approach, 
informants argued that having the lead donor outside represents a major challenge 
in both the ideology and practice of coordination. A key informant from a bilateral 
organization asserted that the Paris Declaration and the SWAp do not really make 
sense when the biggest donors in the country are not on board. [BIL/3] 
At the same time large donors, such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunisation (GAVI) and the GFATM only participate in the highest level meetings 
(CCS) and rarely participate in the lower-level ones mainly due to lack of local 
representatives. According to the informants this decreases the effectiveness of the 
higher level meetings as these donors do not have the necessary background 
knowledge about the country.  
The subject of membership is particular critical in relation to the HPG, it was noted 
through the interviews and direct observation of meetings. The ToRs of the HPCF 
refer that the HPG is aimed at “all interested health partners” (HPCF, 2012: 1). 
Nonetheless despite the formal terms, there is no common agreement about 
whether non-state actors’ participation is both desirable and constructive for the 
group. Most of the NGOs interviewed perceived the HPG as a donors’ group. Some 
159 
 
were not really sure whether that was a forum they were supposed to be 
participating in or even if they should wait to be invited to; while others were 
convinced that despite donors’ disapproval on having NGOs on board, they felt they 
had the right to be present. To illustrate the lack of common understanding an 
interviewee told the following story: 
“Once I went to a HPG meeting and saw a colleague from another NGO. 
Surprisingly I told him: “Oh…you are also here....” He answered me: “Sure I 
am. I had to step into this group. This is not a donors’ partners group but a 
health partners’ group.” [iNGO/9]  
In addition, as illustrated by the previous quote, some NGOs do not understand 
why some non-state actors do participate in this forum whereas others do not.  
Based on interviews and direct observations from meetings with the development 
partners it was noticed that donors do not share the same view with regards to 
NGOs’ participation: some see the HPG as a universal partners’ forum and attribute 
the lack of NGOs’ involvement to their own fault. In fact these donors refer they 
would like to see more interest coming from the NGOs to participate in this forum, 
referring that specifically national NGOs, who are often invited, never come on 
board. On the other hand, some admit they do not really want NGOs to spoil this 
forum as this is a place to discuss process-level content, specifically procurement 
and public financial management issues which are not particularly relevant for 
NGOs. As a result they consider being enough to have a representative from a 
national and international NGO that should then feed back to other partners. The 
question then arises: are these representative NGOs representing all NGOs or their 
individual interests? Simultaneously, the large number and diversity of NGOs 
makes it very difficult to have a representative partner covering all different 
ideologies. NAIMA is now taking the representative position for NGOs which is 
appreciated by the donors but not unanimously by NGOs who would also like to 
have a place in this forum. 
In addition to a lack of understanding about who should constitute the group, NGOs 
and donors do not share the same opinion regarding the content of the meetings. 
NGOs feel there should be a place in the agenda to discuss operational issues 
happening on the field including some time for advocating main health issues. They 
argued that donors lose their understanding of the problems on the ground at the 
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province or district level since the majority of donors fund PROSAUDE and the 
others fund vertical initiatives independently of each other. NGOs feel there is lack 
of communication going on between NGOs and donors in general. Donors on the 
other side feel the HPG is not a place to discuss ground-level issues but instead to 
feed into the wider SWAp structure as depicted in Figure 4.1, by sharing 
information and updating from the WGs, prepare for CCC and CCS meetings and 
review the progress in the sector (HPCF, 2012).  For some aid agencies it remains a 
challenge to find a forum where NGOs can report to donors on more substance 
topics. Others, on the contrary, think that although desirable, it will remain a 
rhetoric goal as too many forums are already taking place in the sector. 
NGOs also showed dissatisfaction with the content of the NGOs’ meeting group, the 
NAIMA. According to the interviewees the content of those meeting is primarily 
about updating general health sector information instead of focusing on 
coordinating each others’ activities. When NGOs were asked specifically in the 
interviews whether they would talk about each other’s plans, priorities, strategies, 
they answered: “No”, straightaway [iNGO/3]. In addition, in 2008 NAIMA became 
a formal organization with their own physical office and staff, instead of an 
informal network as it was before. Following this institutionalization NAIMA 
turned very much like an NGO struggling for survival and the meetings’ main focus 
became very much about the financial sustainability of the organization, it was 
noted by the informants. 
4.4.2  COOR DIN ATION :  AN  OV ER ARCHIN G GOAL ? 
Most of the health partners seem to agree that in theory coordination is both 
needed and desirable for the health sector as a collective aim. However, despite all 
the good intentions for coordination, informants revealed a general feeling of 
disappointment and saturation when reflecting on how coordination has been 
implemented in the health sector in Mozambique. For most agencies coordination 
became a “goal in its own rather than a means to achieve an overarching outcome”. 
[MUL/4] 
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One informant even referred that 
“Sometimes you have to be careful that all these partner coordinating 
bodies can develop a life on their own”. [BIL/5] 
On one hand partners are proud of the advanced coordination mechanisms in 
place in the country, on the other they feel that the structure they applauded once 
is now backfiring against them.  For some donors it seems that coordination has 
become part of the overall problem and not a way to fight the problem; i.e. 
coordination is fragmented as well. The extensive number of meetings, extended 
negotiations and consensus building at different levels, the bureaucracies of the 
coordination system and the unproductive meetings are considered a “burden” for 
most donors who see coordination as a very time consuming activity that 
generates no compensatory benefits. In particular, for those donors that take the 
role as Focal Partner (FP) and Vice Focal Partner (VP), coordination represents a 
full-time job. These costs of coordination have been described in the literature 
before (see for instance de Renzio et al., 2005; Balogum, 2005; Bigsten, 2006; 
Acharya et al., 2006) and seem to be more outspoken that the potential benefits of 
coordination, specifically the reduction of transaction costs for the recipient 
country (OECD, 2003).  Balogum (2005) argues that little evidence was found on 
the reduction of transaction costs, and that might be a result from a shift in costs 
from the recipient country to the donors. Anderson (2011) adds to the debate by 
showing that at a macro level greater fragmentation of bilateral aid across many 
recipients tend to raise their transaction costs. 
At the end of the day some partners feel that there are high opportunity costs by 
choosing to completely embrace and engage with the coordination framework and 
therefore they “have to decide how much they want to fall into and how much they 
will stay on the side line”. [BIL/3] 
NGOs feel even more strongly about the costs of coordination both at the national 
and sub-national level. Like donors, NGOs believe there are high opportunity costs 
for attending NGOs’ meetings, and therefore “coordination for the sake of 
coordination is not a wise way to spend money” [iNGO/8], it was illustrated by one 
NGO. Coordination implies not only the indirect costs such as the time consuming 
activities, but also direct costs of having to employ enough staff that can participate 
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in different coordination forums taking place across the country, sometimes 
simultaneously. Coordination events provide a full time schedule for an employee 
displacing them from more outcome-driven activities.  
“Usually we do not go to the NAIMA meetings. I receive the emails, pay my 
fee each year and provide information when they need to do a report; 
however I do not feel like going to the meetings.” [iNGO/10] 
“Honestly, I look at my agenda and if there is something useful for our 
organization and what we are doing then we go to the meetings.”  
[iNGO/3]  
“The problem in Mozambique is that you have so many forums, and 
everyone talks about the same thing but no one talks about anything!” 
[iNGO/8] 
Coordination meetings were also reported as not being effective as they should be 
with NGOs complaining about lack of follow-up.  NGOs seemed to commonly agree 
that is better to simply just work than engaging into time consuming and 
unproductive meetings. For the majority of agencies the perceived benefits of 
coordination are nowadays not compensating against all the costs. 
 “Because it is not mandatory to be part of the coordination mechanisms 
NGOs that are better established feel they do not need to have a group to 
coordinate them”.  [NET/1] 
4.4.3  OWN ERS HIP  AN D LEADER S HIP  
Who should be coordinating all efforts? This is a question commonly addressed in 
all collective action situations and lack of agreement on this subject constitutes a 
collective action problem (Gibson et al., 2005). That is exactly the scenario in 
Mozambique with the key question being: “who should be coordinating the 
coordination?” 
There are two opposite positions. Some argue that the government should be 
coordinating while others think it is a partners’ responsibility. The ones that 
support the first position are of the opinion that too much time is spent on 
coordination and if the government would take the role as the main coordinator, 
agencies could concentrate on more productive activities. In addition, for these 
agencies, taking the lead on coordination would show a strong government 
ownership. One consultant interviewed referred that the international community 
worries too much about coordination but that should be a main government’s 
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concern and not the other way around. The interviewee pointed out that donors 
complain frequently about the coordination mechanisms however they do not 
delegate the “coordinator” role to the MoH. In fact the opposite happens: the lack 
of technical and human resources’ capacity at the MoH forces the MoH to delegate 
tasks to the health partners which should be the government’s responsibility. For 
the interviewee this is one of the main pitfalls of the aid coordination framework in 
Mozambique.  [MUL/2]  
Not all the informants shared the same opinion. Some argued that the MoH is very 
overcrowded with work; they have no time, no sufficient number of staff and the 
right people who would feel comfortable and familiar in leading the donors’ 
community. Specifically in a scenario where there are many players it means that 
there are more people thinking and having their own ideas and own resolving 
problems. The MoH simply does not have the time to stop and listen to what 
everyone is planning. To these informants it is a partner obligation to engage with 
each other in the interest of the country. [MUL/1] 
The issue of leadership might as well be discussed from the perspective of the lead 
donor. Lead donorship, as used by Steinwand (2013), might be understood as a 
long-standing stable and exclusive relationship between one donor and a recipient 
country. However it might as well represent the biggest provider of foreign aid or 
the one that has highest influence (Steinwand, 2013).  In the case of the health 
sector in Mozambique, interviewees were unanimous to consider the U.S. as the 
lead donor, due to its massive contributions to the sector specifically on HIV/AIDS.  
“Understanding aid for health in Mozambique is not possible without 
accounting for the biggest player: the U.S.” [iNGO/1] 
“Before the Americans were not part of the game. As soon as they entered 
and became the largest contributors to the health sector everything 
changed.” [CONS/1] 
“The Americans are everywhere (through their implementing partners) 
and they are really influencing everything that happens in the health 
sector.” [iNGO/2] 
The issue with this donor being appointed the lead donor is particularly  
controversial since it does not fund through the government systems, has a parallel 
coordination mechanism with the MoH and the majority of funds are provided off-
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budget. The lead donor does not therefore act as an appointed representative of 
the donor community, but instead arises from its massive presence in the country. 
Despite not providing funds to the sector budget support, the U.S.-MoH 
relationship remains quite strong. Naturally this plays out to the other donors who 
feel they have to “adapt” to this donor’s plans.  This pattern of dependency rather 
than coordination might seem odd; donors are not sure whether at the end of the 
day they are being accountable to the U.S. through the MoH; in other words, is the 
U.S. dictating the rules of the game, the MoH following those rules and the donors 
being forced to align as well? One informant reported: 
“U.S.-MoH relationship!!?? Hum…you know it is the same everywhere: Who 
has the money is in charge!!” [CONS/1] 
Formally, within the coordination framework there are some donors who are 
appointed the Focal Partner (FP) and the Vice Focal Partner (VP) and lead the 
dialogue between the MoH and the partners. This leader is supposed to be a 
coordinator of the health partners representing one partners’ voice and becoming 
the entity that tries to reduce the transaction costs for the ministry. Some donors 
however, are not very confident with the fact that individual donors are also FP for 
the wider donor community. The FP has a double role by representing the 
interests of its own agency while at the same making sure that it represents all 
partners in Mozambique in relationship to the ministry. No common 
understanding exists on this matter as well. As one interviewee observed: 
“Do I trust in you to take decision for me because you are now elected a 
Focal (FP) or is a FP a facilitator/coordinator of a consensus building 
process?” [BIL/3] 
According to this interviewee these issues were never discussed and were never 
clear.  The interviewee clearly objected to the fact that the FP could take decisions 
on behalf of other donors. The interviewee stated they were not naïf and they were 
aware that different donors have their own agendas and might take advantage of a 
leading role to promote their own interests in detriment of the group’s goals. 
According to the informant this was clearly a grey area that needed to be discussed 
and surprisingly enough, it was never a topic at the round table.  
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The discussion of ownership and leadership is also common across NGOs. 
However, unlike donors, they seem to universally agree that coordination efforts 
should be the responsibility of the government. On the field, it was commonly 
argued that the DPS and DDS should be the ones interested in coordinating the 
partners, as they are the ones who supposedly have the mapping of NGOs in the 
region. Interviewees referred that in the past coordination mechanisms were 
enforced at the DPSs but did not work or ended up not happening on practice. 
During a NAIMA meeting observed, an informant from an NGO informed the 
colleagues that there were some mechanisms of coordination in place at the 
ground level where NGOs were supposed to register through the DPSs. 
Surprisingly, only one person in the room was aware about this procedure and no 
apparent reason for this to happen was discussed.  
4.4.4  FUN DING  
Despite the bet on a common fund for health, not all donors in Mozambique 
adhered to PROSAUDE. The target of 50% of external funds to be channelled 
through PROSAUDE has not yet been reached, informed a key donor [MUL/2]. A 
great percentage of donors’ funds are channelled outside government systems and 
directly managed by the partners. In 2012, PROSAUDE accounted for US$88 
million while off-budget funds were estimated on US$112 million60 (UNICEF/FDC, 
2012). 
Various donors argued that channelling aid, outside the government systems has 
been having a negative impact on coordination, not only for the MoH but also 
within partners. The issue has been particular intensified by the fact that some 
programmes that take the form of vertical initiatives are mainly financed by 
external aid (e.g. HIV is 97% funded by donors). At the same time, as different 
donors fund different aid modalities, the challenge to coordinate all efforts is 
exacerbated. Finally, and as discussed previously, there is no common 
understanding about how coordination mechanisms should work and who should 
constitute the coordination group since donors have different funding modalities. 
Should all donors come together independently of their financing mechanism or 
                                                        
60 This value represents a conservative projection from USA development agencies (USAID and 
CDC) (UNICEF/FDC, 2012). 
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should the right to participate on specific coordination structures be determined 
by the aid modality? 
At the same, projects for HIV/AIDS have been disproportionally resourced 
compared with other health needs. The coordination setting for HIV/AIDS is led by 
the National Aids Council (CNCS) and a specific partners’ coordination framework 
(PPF) attached to it. This does not include health-specific activities. Not all donors 
involved in the HIV/AIDS coordination framework participate in the health-
coordination structures. In fact donors jump from one group to the other according 
to their own agendas: for instance the aid agency for HIV, PEPFAR has a huge 
presence and dialogue in the HIV/AIDS coordination forums but its role on the 
health sector coordination is more an observational one. There is therefore an 
additional problem of coordinating efforts between the health sector and the 
HIV/AIDS sub-sector, it was frequently argued by the informants. 
4.4.5   EXP ECT ATIO N AN D IN FORMATIO N  
 
“There is a lot of expectation going on”. [BIL/3] 
Asymmetric and ineffective information or lack of it, have long been described as 
one of the major barriers to coordination across levels between different aid 
actors, and Mozambique is not exception to the case (Acharya et al., 2006). 
Respondents were unanimous to consider lack of communication as one of the 
major issues hampering aid effectiveness. Donors and the government considered 
that information sharing is crucial and always highlighted it as a major pillar of aid 
coordination that needed improvement in the near future. 
Despite the time consuming issue of coordination activities, respondents 
considered that there are major communication concerns especially within the 
health partners. Each donor has its own interests, goals, strategies and agenda. To 
complicate, partners do not widely share their individual plans with one another. 
There is no proper mapping of each other’s activities and according to the 
respondents agencies are not very keen to share their individual information. This 
situation is particularly worrying due to the number of off-budget funds and 
vertical initiatives that are planned and implemented by individual partners with 
little accountability to other members. As referred previously, the U.S. has its own 
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monthly meetings with the MoH which is held in parallel to the other partners’ 
forum. While the U.S. has a seat on the health partners’ forums, the opposite does 
not happen. Even with PROSAUDE partners information is not widely shared as 
some donors also provide aid through additional aid modalities, such as direct 
funding to the provinces or to NGOs. Although partners are usually aware of the 
general priority areas, provinces or modalities of each partner, their knowledge 
remains quite superficial. Interviewees commented that information given by 
donors (especially vertical donors) is not very explicit and refers only in general 
terms about particular areas of intervention, such as HIV or malaria (for instance), 
without going into detail about any particular niche of interventions. 
Some coordination instruments were introduced to promote aid and budget 
transparency, in particular the ODAMOZ database and the newly established 
government electronic state financial administration system (E-SISTAFE) that 
aimed at improving budget execution to the health sector (IGG, 2010). 
The ODAMOZ is a database where individual agencies are expected to voluntarily 
submit information regarding their funding commitments and disbursements. 
However despite the rhetoric on the usefulness of this instrument, health partners 
fail to provide information. A key informant interviewed was not even aware of the 
existence of such platform and enquired myself if ODAMOZ was really useful. 
Despite being relatively new in the country, the interviewee was quite shocked for 
not having any information about this database and commented on the lack of 
interest from other partners to put everyone on board and on the same page. The 
interviewee eventually questioned himself: “why isn’t there a package for new 
incomers?” [BIL/7] 
Donors recognized that they do not consistently provide input to the ODAMOZ 
database. While some complained about the major technical issues of the database 
which do not facilitate donors’ commitment in providing information; others 
expressed their lack of understanding about the real purpose of this instrument 
and how this database is supposed to go up and be used by the government. 
Because the meaning and purpose is not clear, some donors reported that they 
preferred not using it.  Some even argued that by providing information they are 
more vulnerable to criticisms and evaluations from the government. Finally, others 
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referred that if vertical donors do not input their commitments and disbursements, 
the database is not really a useful coordination instrument. An additional problem 
declared by the informants was that even within those who share information 
there is sometimes wrong imputation of data and it is not adequately linked with 
the data entered in E-SISTAFE.  
Non-sharing information is a problem within donors but becomes a major problem 
for the government who cannot plan adequately. It was noticed by a representative 
of the MoH that each partner has its own rules, priorities and timelines which 
harms government planning. Lack of predictability has been considered a major 
barrier on aid effectiveness and can derive from three issues: i) funds that are on 
budget but are managed by the donors (on-budget but off-cut/off-treasury), ii) 
funds erroneously included in the state budget (on-budget erroneously) and iii) off 
budget funds (funds not included in the state budget) (IGG, 2010). The government 
launched E-SISTAFE, an instrument that is able to keep track of the origin of the 
resources and therefore represents a very good instrument for planning as the 
balance of external funds can be re-inscribed into the budget for the next year. 
However, only PROSAUDE donors signed the MoU which establishes that funds 
from donors are made available through the Single Treasury Account (CUT) using 
E-SISTAFE. As a consequence E-SISTAFE, although reliable, does not provide a 
complete picture of the real external budget as the biggest share of external 
finance comes from donors who provide vertical funding and are neither on-cut 
nor on-budget. At the time I was in Mozambique the U.S. was however, starting to 
consider channelling funds through E-SISTAFE and was dialoguing with the 
Mozambican government about this procedure.  
The MoH has also taken a stronger position and tried to clarify to the partners the 
importance of providing information for both donors and the MoH, having 
launched a second edition of the ODAMOZ in 2012. However as there is no 
punishment for not filling in the database, informants from the MoH referred they 
were not very confident that partners will ever provide timely and reliable 
information. 
It is not only within donors that information sharing is an issue. In fact, it appeared 
to be even more problematic with NGOs. In regard to NGOs-MoH relationship there 
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are clearly some issues: although NGOs tend to align with the MoH they do not 
enjoy having to report both at the central and provincial level. When this research 
was conducted in Mozambique, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) wanted to 
create indicators to evaluate NGOs’ work in the country – NGOs would have to fill 
in a questionnaire that auto-evaluated their work which had to be signed off by the 
DPS and the MFA. NGOs were not very satisfied with this measure as they felt they 
were being evaluated and were not given the chance to evaluate the MoH back. 
Particularly they were worried that providing too much information could backfire 
against them, i.e., the government might end up dictating some NGOs’ focus or even 
make some of them redundant and force them to abandon the country. When they 
were discussing the best way to approach this issue, NGOs unanimously agreed 
that more clarification was needed, and the less information they could provide the 
better. 
Coordination within NGOs was also reported to be a big challenge. In the ground it 
is common that NGOs are not aware of any other organizations working in the 
same province or even district, interviewees reported.  It was added that even 
when NGOs were aware of other partners working in the same place they might 
not communicate. As one interviewee reported: 
“It happens that two partners are in the same hospital: one supporting 
cardiology and other paediatrics and they do not talk with each other.” 
[iNGO/6] 
NGOs reported that while on the field they often meet other NGOs and networking 
takes place frequently. However they do not really consider it as an “informal 
coordination” as the main goal is manly to introduce themselves rather than trying 
to find synergies. Some NGOs also referred that they tend to know better the work 
of the partners that are funded by the same donor as they meet with each other 
more frequently. Except for those, they only have a vague idea of the work of the 
remaining NGOs.  
“If you ask me about what Save the Children is doing in Mozambique I just 
know in general that it is a NGO that works with children and does 
treatment. However I am not aware of their projects, approaches and 
locations.” [iNGO/3]  
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4.5 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
“It seems there is a secrecy culture among health partners going on. It took 
me some time to understand it all but now I figured it out.” [BIL/3] 
Fragmentation of aid has long been appointed as a major cause of aid 
ineffectiveness. Aid is received in many pieces from many donors, which is 
translated into having a large number of donors per sector (Acharya et al., 2006). 
The aid allocation literature has recognized that donors do not share the same 
goals and interests which generate complex collective action problems (Gibson et 
al., 2005). Coordination would then be the instrument to attenuate donors’ 
differences in the interest of the overall development of the country. However, 
coordination seems very hard to achieve. Donors face collective action problems 
and have different incentives to coordinate their actions.  
Collective action theory was mainly developed by Olson’s seminal work, ‘The Logic 
of Collective Action’ (Olson, 1965). Calling ourselves rational individuals, Olson 
(1965) questions our willingness to cooperate believing that if one believes he can 
receive the benefits of cooperation without contributing to the costs, free-riding 
occurs and cooperation is left to the others. Olson (1965) believed that cooperation 
is only possible if the group is small, so that free-ride would be noticed, if there are 
selective incentives in place to induce cooperation or if individuals are coerced to 
do so (e.g., through centralized government impositions). 
The theoretical case for donor coordination that takes collective action as a 
framework has been relying mainly on the public good characteristics of aid. 
Modelling foreign aid as a contribution to a public good was first developed by 
Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) with scholars such as Azam and Laffont (2003) and 
Torvisk (2005), continuing this line of thought. Their focus is however different. 
Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) show that for aid with public good properties, the 
contributor with the largest marginal returns on the contribution to a public good 
caries the largest burden. Azan and Laffont (2003) consider the “consumption of 
the poor” as an international public good in order to show how an aid contract can 
be designed to ensure optimal provision. Torvisk (2005), assuming the public good 
characteristics of poverty alleviation, refers that cooperation is beneficial if donors 
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can enforce contingent contracts but reduces the incentives of the recipient 
country to help the poor. 
It has been recognized however that aid does not exhibit only public good 
characteristics with recent research modelling the private characteristics of aid 
(Knack and Smets, 2013; Steinwand, 2013). Knack and Smets (2013) explore the 
trade-offs and complementarities that donors face between public goods (pursue 
of development objectives) and private goods (commercial, security and other 
objectives) by studying the impact of aid fragmentation on the practice of aid tying. 
Steinwand (2013) distinguishes between public and private properties of aid, 
exploring the role of a lead donorship in facilitating coordination. According to 
Steinwand (2013) foreign aid exhibits private good properties, in the sense that 
donors are not solely interested to pursue development objectives but have self-
interested objectives that have no value to the recipient or other donors. Donor 
coordination than becomes complicated by the fact that there are different base 
scenarios for providing aid, each one with different logic of cooperation 
(Steinwand, 2013). Steinwand (2013: 4) argues that coordination means different 
things for private and public good aid but in reality “aid is a blunt policy 
instrument and both characteristics are usually present” considering that the 
“relative mixture can vary widely”. 
My argument follows the line of thought of Steinwand (2013) however it differs in 
the formal roots. Unlike Steinwand (2013) who modelled aid as a contribution to 
both public or private good I explore the public and private properties of 
coordination that arise from the donor’s perspective, i.e., the incentives that 
donors face to coordinate based on the way they perceive coordination which by 
turn  is a reflection of how they conceive the “raison d’être” of aid. Having become 
an “end” in itself rather than an “aim” to achieve an overall outcome, the way 
donors behave towards coordination is a spectrum of their own motivations and 
interests.  
The fundamental problem of collective action, known as the tension between 
individual and collective best interests, is then exacerbated by the fact that donors 
have different ideologies of coordination as a collective good. The mixture of public 
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and private good coordination donors determines the viability of coordination 
mechanisms in-country and the later success or failure of its implementation. 
4.5.1  CHAR ACT ERIS TICS  O F T H E GOO D  
Public goods have two main properties: their benefits are non-rivalrous (or non-
substractable) in consumption and non-excludable. Non-rivalrous means that one 
person’s use of the good does not subtract the consumption of the good available 
for others. Non-excludable refers to the fact that it is not possible to exclude 
someone from using the benefits of the good, i.e. non paying actors cannot be 
prevented from accessing the group (Samuelson, 1954).  On the other hand private 
goods are rivalrous and excludable.  
In theory we could argue that coordination takes the form of a publicly provided 
good, i.e., coordination entitles an inclusive approach where participation is 
voluntary and one extra agency involved in coordination mechanisms does not 
subtract the usefulness of the instrument to the others. In theory this means that 
the coordination structures are open to all and are universally desirable to ensure 
the achievement of a common goal. Individual agencies use coordination 
mechanisms to promote goals that are shared and enjoyed by other donors. In 
theory, coordination would be a tool to increase aid effectiveness. However we 
have seen that reality is different from prescription. To explain this gap I argue that 
we have to understand the properties of coordination that arise from the donors’ 
perspective, i.e. not all donors see coordination as a contribution to a public good. 
This means that donors who see coordination as a private good do value things 
such as membership and private information, i.e. exclusivity. These donors value 
efficiency and therefore the presence of an extra member might hamper the value 
of coordination mechanisms, i.e., an extra donor is a rival in the sense that it might 
decrease the usefulness of the mechanism to the other members of the group, in 
particular itself. It is also a rival in the sense that it “enters in the market” and 
therefore competition increases.  
The problem of coordination in Mozambique is that although it theoretically 
exhibits characteristics of a public good, not all donors share that view and there is 
no common understanding of what real form coordination should take and what it 
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should represent. Donors cannot exclude other partners from using coordination 
mechanisms however, not all partners’ presence is desirable. Donors enjoy equally 
and simultaneously the benefits of participating in coordination forums however, 
some think that the value of their individual benefits decreases as one more donor 
steps into the scene.  
The way aid agencies perceive coordination has a direct impact on their individual 
incentives to participate in coordination forums and to make a real effort for 
coordination to work out. Public good coordination implies that donors are willing 
to participate and contribute to the wider forums for a common goal. Information 
sharing is needed and the benefits extracted from the efforts to coordinate 
compensate the eventual costs, such as time consuming activities, unproductive 
meetings or administrative burden. Private good coordination on the other hand 
implies that donors’ willingness to coordinate their activities and their 
participation in wider forums depends on the benefits they can extract from 
coordinating. For these donors there are high opportunity costs for participating in 
these forums which has to be balanced out with the potential benefits that 
coordination mechanisms can bring. Because private good coordination implies 
that donors obtain a benefit that is not shared with other donors, they act as 
competitors. It has been recognized that donors compete for aid impact of their 
projects (Annen and Moers, 2012). Competition is enemy to coordination. While 
the former results from different actors maximizing the relative impact of their 
projects, the latter is taken from a collective point view where donors have to care 
about the absolute impact of their actions.  Donors do not only compete for 
promising projects; according to Acharya et al. (2006) donors compete as well for 
the attention of policymakers, the cooperation of qualified local staff and influence 
over the policies of the recipient government. Information sharing therefore is not 
desirable and effective coordination is not an ultimate goal. Coordination for the 
private good donors is likely to impair agencies’ freedom to pursue their 
commercial and political interests through their aid programmes (Cassen et al., 
1994). In addition, donors know that there are subjects on which they are likely to 
collectively disagree while coordinating which is costly in administrative time and 
expense. One informant reflected that: 
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“Why is that nobody is really interested in ensuring that everybody is on 
board when it comes to information? That everybody is talking the same 
language? Because we are so many different donors...we should invest 
much more in having the same kind of understanding about what are we 
talking about. But we don’t! It is a problem from the donor side! And here I 
am coming to the next thing which is that we are all playing our political 
games because if I know more than you I can trick you; and although I 
have signed the MoU I also have my agenda which I want to promote 
towards the minister. It is not necessarily “our” agenda so my feeling and 
experience is that it has been the individual countries’ agenda and 
selfishness that overwrite the common good.” [BIL/3] 
Private good coordination amounts therefore to a delineation of spheres of 
influence and impact (Steinwand, 2013). Private good coordination implies that 
donors want to benefit from these mechanisms. Their involvement and 
participation in coordination depends on the magnitude of influence they are able 
to achieve. Best established donors do not “need” coordination mechanisms while 
others see it as a way to ensure that they have wider influence, i.e. they “need 
coordination”. 
“I think the U.S. does not need us...They got so much money and power they 
can make decisions without having to consult other partners. We can’t! If 
we want to do something we don’t have that much influence on our own. 
We have influence because we are part of a bigger structure so we have to 
influence everybody else. The U.S. doesn’t.” [BIL/1] 
Ironically, this means that donors might need or not to coordinate and that 
determines their incentives to collaborate. Private good coordination arises to an 
extent from an individual need rather than a collective aim; while in private good 
coordination donors might need coordination for achieving individual self-
interested goals, in public good coordination, coordination is needed for ensuring 
that everyone is on board and works side by side.   
The idea that “donors need coordination” is opposite to the established idea that 
“coordination needs donors”. The fact that not all donors share the same ideology 
in what regards the essence of coordination is per se an obstacle to ensure 
effective coordination. The success or not of coordination will then depend on the 
proportion of different types of donors within the group. 
4.5.2  CHAR ACT ERIS TICS  O F T H E GRO UP  
Group size and group behaviour is commonly discussed in the literature (see for 
instance Olson, 1965). Usually the larger the group, the harder it is to achieve a 
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collective optimal. However, in the literature of aid coordination little attention has 
been paid to the characteristics of the group. Although being recognized that aid 
structures entitle a plethora of actors that differ in their magnitude, goals and 
strategies, there is no account of how of the conflicting dynamics prevail within the 
group and their wider effect on the external environment. My argument is that the 
group composition is a strong determinant on the failure or success of 
coordination mechanisms in country.  
In Chapter 3 of this thesis I have shown that health partners vary greatly and that 
has impact on the relationship they have with the recipient government, their 
choice of aid modality and strategy. Health partners have in addition to take into 
account each others’ existence. The group’s composition and particularly the 
proportion of different types of donors determines the equilibrium, i.e., whether 
donors do coordinate or not and the effectiveness of that equilibrium- if it is Pareto 
optimal or not.  
4.6 INTERPRETING COORDINATION PERCEPTIONS AND INCENTIVES  
 
“Coordination mechanisms already exist! What we need is to make them 
work! This can only be achieved if individuals are really willing to 
coordinate. And maybe we should seriously think of something if we want 
them to become more dynamic.” [NET/2]   
4.6.1   PUBLI C AND PRIV AT E GOOD COOR DIN ATION  
I consider two types of donors: public good donors and private good donors. 
Whereas the former see coordination as a public good, the latter see coordination 
as a private good. The defining property of a public good donor is that coordination 
is always desirable and therefore the utility from coordinating always outweighs 
the potential utility of defection (not coordinating). For the private good donor the 
utility of coordinating is outweighed by the utility of defecting once coordination 
has been achieved in a certain threshold value, i.e. coordination is not always 
desirable. Coordination entitles a formal or informal structure of relationships 
between different actors with or without the same interests, motivations and 
identities. Naturally it complicates if actors vary in identity and size. Coordination 
is not an individual outcome, i.e., an actor’s incentive to coordinate and the 
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efficiency of coordination mechanisms depends on how the other actors behave. 
Unlike the idea of “self-interest” coming from the aid allocation literature in which 
a donor is considered strategic or altruistic accordingly to individual motivations, 
the concept of coordination encompasses a wider context where individual 
motivations are balanced out by the external environment and others’ decisions. A 
donor might want to coordinate but no one else wants to do so or the other way 
around and the success of coordination and the utility the donor gets from it 
depends on how the others behave or decide. Schelling (1973) calls these 
externalities. An “externality” occurs if one person cares about one’s choice or if 
one’s choice affects others’ choices. “In economics an externality refers to the 
effects of a firm’s, person’s or agency’s actions that are beyond and outside “-
external to” the firm’s accounting or the agency’s purview or the person’s interests 
and concerns, but within the accounting, the purview or the interest of somebody 
else” (Schelling, 1978: 212). Because coordination is an n-person game and donors 
cannot coordinate alone, they care about others’ behaviour or decisions towards 
coordination when deciding or not to coordinate.  
I use the Schelling’s (1973) diagrams to aid the interpretation of my theoretical 
framework. In a population of n individuals, each has a choice of L (Left) and R 
(Right). For any individual (here labelled Self) the payoff of a choice of L or R 
depends on how many others choose L or R. In graphical terms, Schelling (1973) 
expresses the payoffs associated with both the “preferred” and “unpreferred” 
choice as a function of the population selecting the unpreferred alternative. He 
calls Left (L) to the preferred choice and Right (R) to the unpreferred choice.   
Let’s first consider a public good donor. For this donor we would expect that it 
always prefers to coordinate and therefore a Left choice (in this case: to 
coordinate) is always superior to a Right choice (not to coordinate) no matter the 
number of agencies that choose the Right choice, i.e. not to coordinate. A truly pure 
public good donor would always make the most effort to coordinate no matter the 
number of organizations that choose the same or different options. These are the 
donors that welcome everyone to the group meetings independently of their aid 
modality or funding mechanism, support the presence of NGOs in all forums no 
matter the number of participants in those forums and completely endorse the 
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Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Multilaterals organizations tend to behave 
more in this way. To these donors it is important to have everyone on board, to 
share information and increase communication in order to achieve a collective 
maximum. If everyone had the same view, the equilibrium would then be that all 
donors would coordinate (all L) (see Figure 4.2). 
Number choosing R 0 AllNone
R
L
Utility
 
Figure 4.2 Public good donor utility curves. 
Note: The preferred choice for the public good donor is to coordinate (L). R is the unpreferred choice (not to 
coordinate). The x-axis represents the number choosing R, i.e., the number of donors that prefer not to coordinate. 
The payoff curves slope downwards since it is expected that the utility from coordinating decreases as the number 
of donors choosing not to coordinate increase. 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
Let’s now turn to the private good donors. Although in theory the private good 
donor understands the usefulness of coordination, in practice it tends not to prefer 
this alternative or considers it a “burden”. For the private good donor, the larger 
the group the worst it is for himself and for the collective group: a lot of time is 
spent on coordination, the meetings are not effective and there are huge 
opportunity costs for engaging in coordination. For private good donors, 
coordinating means not spending time working on their own plans and increases 
the potential that other donors would individually benefit from their information 
which would then increase the competition between them. These donors face a 
trade-off: in theory they support coordination; in practice they consider it a hurdle 
that can hamper their self-interested goals. Due to this trade-off donors do not 
have the same unconditional choice. As observed in practice, donors might not 
want to coordinate, however due to political pressure they tend to participate up 
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to a certain degree in coordination forums61. In Figure 4.3 we see that the payoffs 
curves intersect, i.e. coordination is not universally preferred as it was before for 
the public good donors. In order to facilitate the interpretation of results I consider 
that donors’ preferred choice (not to coordinate) is now a function of the 
population selecting the unpreferred alternative (to coordinate). This fraction of 
the population is represented by the public good donors who prefer R. Right (to 
coordinate) is the preferred choice when the number of choosing Left (not to 
coordinate) is high, whereas Left is the preferred choice when the Right choice is 
dominant. In practice this means that when there is a higher number or proportion 
of public good donors, a private good donor would prefer to defect, i.e. not to 
coordinate. This is a reflection of the fact that a public good donor would always 
want to spend too much time coordinating which is not optimal for the private 
good donor. The more there are of those who want to coordinate; the worse it is 
for the private good donor who does not universally prefer to coordinate. On the 
other hand, if the number of public good donors is small, the private good donor 
has more interest in trying to coordinate for several reasons: firstly the meetings 
are more efficient due to the reduced number of public good donors, secondly 
having less public good donors on board means there are more private ones - in 
this scenario the Self donor would prefer to have as much information as possible 
about the market and therefore it could achieve that through coordination. In the 
case that the Self donor is not a leader, it would take advantage of coordination 
mechanisms by accessing information and influencing the wider international 
community. However this is only optimal until a certain t- (the point where the two 
curves intersect). As reported before, some donors might need coordination 
whereas other might not. This is made explicit in Figure 4.4. Letter codes indicate 
which choice is preferred, by how much (y-axis value) and the direction of the 
payoff differences (arrows) will drive the equilibrium. This structure leads to an 
equilibrium at the intersection of the two payoff curves.  
 
                                                        
61 I do not consider the case when “no coordination” is universally preferred by some donors. This 
is because in practice that does not happen. Even for those donors who do not prefer to coordinate, 
some degree of involvement in coordination mechanisms always takes place as they are politically 
forced to do so. 
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Figure 4.3 Private good donor utility curves. 
Note: The preferred choice for the private good donors is not to coordinate (L). R is the unpreferred choice (to 
coordinate). The x-axis represents the number choosing R, in this case, the number of donors who prefer to 
coordinate – the public good donors. Nash Equilibrium is at t-. 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
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Figure 4.4 Nash Equilibrium for private good donors. 
Note: R (coordination) is only preferred until a certain point t-. Afterwards, L (no coordination) is preferred. 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
4.6.2  A  N-PLAYER  GAME WIT H DI F FER EN T I DENTI TY  DONO R S  
If we merge Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 we have a picture of how the overall 
incentives to coordinate look like in Mozambique. As we saw, the public good 
donors will always prefer to coordinate, whereas the private ones will only prefer 
to coordinate if the number of public good donors is less than t-. So the question is: 
what is the equilibrium when all players interact and they are playing their 
individual games? 
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If the number of public good donors is bigger than t-, the equilibrium is that all 
public good donors coordinate (C1≻ D1) whereas all private good donors defect 
(do not coordinate) (D2 ≻ C2). If the number of public good donors is less or equal 
to t- the equilibrium is that all public good donors coordinate, some private good 
donors coordinate as well but the rest defect (Figure 4.5). 
Number choosing C 
Utility
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Figure 4.5  A N-player game with private and public good donors. 
Note: The payoffs associated with both coordinating (C) or not coordinating (D) are expressed as a function of the 
population selecting coordinating (C). 1 represents the public good donor. 2 represents the private good donor. 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
Will all donors ever coordinate? 
As we saw donors have different identities and perspectives towards coordination 
which are translated into their efforts to coordinate or not. Fieldwork research 
informed about donors’ lack of motivation to coordinate and a general feeling of 
dissatisfaction about coordination mechanisms. To some donors, the rhetoric of 
coordination is romantic at best. An informant would even argue: 
“Coordination…that does not exist.” [BIL/3] The theory might be good but in 
practice it is not really viable. Are the donors, to whom I called private good 
donors, willing to increase coordination efforts at this stage? 
The discredit that private donors have on coordination mechanisms is making 
them reluctant to increase their efforts. Simultaneously, increased pressure for 
measuring aid impact is being demanded which hampers coordination efforts. 
Let’s than now turn to the scenario where private good donors do not prefer to 
increase coordination efforts and that remains the preferred choice independently 
of the number of public or private donors. In that case we have a straight payoff 
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curve as represented in Figure 4.6. Point A is the situation where all donors have 
chosen not to increase coordination efforts, the preferred choice. At the far right, 
on point C everyone has chosen to increase coordination efforts while in between 
there is a continuum of options where some choose L and others R.  Let’s consider 
two discrete positions on those curves, B1 and B2. The individual payoff at C is 
higher than A but not as high as B1, the reward for the Self for not increasing 
coordination efforts. Starting from C, one sees that B1 is clearly better, and since 
everyone will figure this out, and no one wants to get trapped in position B2, not 
increasing coordination efforts is clearly the right choice for one individual. 
However, despite recognizing the benefits of C (increasing coordination efforts), 
the Self prefers not to increase coordination to avoid B2 and hopes it will be in B1, 
where Self is not coordinating while some others are. However it settles for A, the 
Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) - no one increases the coordination efforts. This is the 
typical case of a Prisoner’s Dilemma where the equilibrium is sub-optimal. 
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Figure 4.6 Pareto suboptimal equilibrium. 
Note: L (not increase coordination efforts); R (increase coordination efforts). The x-axis represents the number 
choosing R, in this case, the number of donors who prefer to increase coordination efforts. N.E. is in point A. 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
Is it possible to reach C? 
We see that the unpreferred payoff curve crosses the X-axis at k-.  This point 
represents the minimum size for the R movement- the critical mass, i.e. all of those 
choosing Right will be better off than they would be if all had chosen Left (where 
the payoff for everyone is nominally zero), even if the remainder continues 
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choosing Left. Will this ever happen? If all choose Left, there is no incentive to 
switch to Right unless the creation of a coalition can be assured. As so, because Left 
is always preferred it always pays to “cheat” on one’s coalition members. This is 
one of the most common problems of collective action denoted as free-riding. k- is 
therefore not stable in the long term. In this case free-riding represents a case 
where a donor might not coordinate while expecting the others to coordinate for 
him. 
How to ensure a viable coalition? 
As soon as donors see the potential benefits of k- they have incentives to recruit 
more members from the population (in this case represented by the donor 
community). However, in order for this coalition to be viable there must be some 
form of real commitment. Enforceable contracts are often appointed solutions for 
generic cases, however once can easily see that it does not work for coordination 
mechanisms. Alternatively the Self must then see what others will do. There must 
be a moment of recognition which shows that most would do the shift from L to R. 
The end must be seen to be achieved. Schelling (1973) uses coalition to indicate 
those that are induced to choose R. The institutional definition however refers to a 
subset of population that can arrive at a collective decision for its members. That 
can take two forms: “i) disciplining individual choices of the members or ii) making 
collective choices on behalf of them” (Schelling, 1973: 394). Strong leadership 
might be a way to achieve the former, i.e. to influence a voluntary shift to R. For the 
private good donors, however, a strong leadership would need to come from the 
government as they are of the opinion that the government should be the one 
coordinating the coordination, leaving more time for the donors to work on their 
plans. Another type of strong leadership would be the case of a lead donor who 
would widely share and collaborate on coordination efforts. One of the main 
problems in Mozambique is that the lead donor, the U.S., does not share the same 
coordination mechanisms and funding systems of other donors. If it would come 
on board with the others in a more open way or if the funding mechanisms could 
somehow be aligned, donors would find their efforts to coordinate more rewarded. 
At the moment, some donors are questioning the need for coordination when the 
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most important donor is not even on board and has a parallel system with the 
government.  
With regards to the second form of coalition, some donors are not really 
comfortable with other donors making collective choices on their behalf. This is 
because they are aware that in addition to collective goals, donors have their own 
personal and private agendas. This situation is portrayed for instance, with the 
case of the Focal Partner (FP), a partner that should represent all other donors’ 
views and ensure that communication with the MoH is efficient. The problem in 
Mozambique is that this matter is not clear and there is no common understanding 
of which form of “coalition” should the FP role entitle. 
Does the incentive to stay out of the coalition remains constant? 
What happens to the difference in value between Left and Right? Does the 
incentive to choose Left and stay out of the coalition increase, decrease or remain 
constant with the size of the coalition? In other words, does the cost of an R choice 
remain constant as the number of people (i.e. aid agencies) choosing R increases? A 
constant relationship between L and R, as shown in Figure 4.6, would mean that 
private good donors would be indifferent to the coalition size meaning that their 
incentive to keep choosing L and the disadvantage of R are constant.  An increased 
difference in value between L and R would mean that the more others choose to 
coordinate and switch from L to R, the more the Self gains by staying out of the 
coalition.  Alternatively, if joining a coalition of people that want to coordinate 
means that the cost of an R choice decreases as the number of people switching to 
R increases, the incentive to choose R has a diminishing difference (see Figure 4.7). 
The incentive would depend on the type of actor we are looking at. A very well-
established actor for instance, would not see an increased value of joining a 
coalition as this means giving more to the group than receiving. The same might 
happen with a strong leader who sees itself gaining from staying out of the 
coalition and marking its way through independently of all other donors. On the 
other hand, for less established donors, a switch to R is an easier alternative if that 
means only “paying their share” to be part of the group, it becomes more 
rewarding as more agencies join. At the same time these donors would be better 
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off if they would reduce the competition between them and coordination achieves 
this. This is measured by the change in the vertical distance between the two 
curves with the number that choose R. In Figure 4.7-A the curve opens towards the 
right, showing an increasing difference between L and R whereas in Figure 4.7-B 
there is a diminishing difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Increasing and diminishing difference between L and R. 
                  A- Increasing difference between L and R.  
                  B- Diminishing difference between L and R. 
                         (Source: author’s illustration) 
Community versus individual welfare 
The incentive difference does not only depend on how agencies are incentivized to 
choose L or R but also on how they see that a collective maximum can be achieved. 
Let’s imagine that the collective maximum occurs only when all choose R, i.e. when 
all choose to coordinate, if the terms of the coalition have been properly set. 
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Alternatively it might occur that the coalition for coordinating is too strict or imply 
some hidden costs, such as huge time consuming activities for instance, and 
agencies may be collectively better if some still choose Left, that is if some stay out 
of the coalition. In Figure 4.6- the Prisoner’s Dilemma - the dotted line is a 
weighted average that represents the average population’s payoffs. We can see 
that the population’s average welfare increases as more choose R. Collective 
maximization occurs when everyone chooses R- to coordinate. In Figure 4.7-B 
collective maximization also occurs when all choose R however the dotted line is 
not straight. However in Figure 4.7-A the situation is different. The collective 
maximum is short of the right boundary, i.e. the optimum number of organizations 
to coordinate is less that the entire population. The structural problem in this case 
represents a very recent debate about whether total coordination is desirable or 
not. It might be that if everyone coordinates, the system is not efficient enough, too 
much time is spent on coordination mechanisms and coordination structures 
might not work in an optimal way so that they have the desired impact on the 
population, i.e. to increase their welfare. Also as defended by Torvisk (2005) a 
successful coordination, i.e., a situation where all donors actively coordinate, might 
reduce the incentive for the receiving government to help its own citizens and 
increase its own contribution. Overall if that happens, coordination by donors is 
not optimal, i.e., the collective maximum might not be the point where the entire 
population of donors coordinates. 
In all cases there is a conflict between individual versus collective decisions, i.e. 
decisions that would be made on behalf of the society as the natural equilibriums 
are not necessarily at the points that produce the overall best outcome. The Nash 
Equilibrium for the three cases (depicted in Figure 4.6 and 4.7: A & B) is when all 
donors do not increase coordination efforts (all L). In all cases the collective 
maximum is considerably to the right of the N.E., with Figure 4.6 and 4.7-B having 
it at the right extreme. Naturally these results always have social implications; 
without any sort of government intervention only a radical restructuring of 
rewards can make possible to achieve the collective maximum. However as we saw 
from all the past description, a collective optimum outcome seems almost 
impossible to achieve mainly due to different actors identities and attitudes 
towards the collective perception of coordination.  
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Is the state of coordination Pareto optimal now? 
Private good donors seem reluctant to increase coordination efforts. At the same 
time public good donors have the opposite preference: they always prefer to 
increase coordination efforts. The equilibrium is than a situation where each type 
of donor chooses their preferred alternative (see Figure 4.8). This equilibrium is 
Pareto suboptimal if R< p, i.e. if the number of public good donors is less than p. 
This is because if less than p donors increase their efforts, the utility from 
coordination efforts is Up, that is less than what they would have gained if all 
donors had increased coordination efforts. Figure 4.8 illustrates the importance of 
the ratio of public good donors versus private good donors for the outcome to be 
Pareto optimal or not; i.e. if more public good donors exist coordination efforts are 
increased and coordination itself has a better chance to become optimal.  
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Figure 4.8 The utility curves of increasing aid coordination efforts or not for public 
and private good donors. 
Note: The payoffs associated with both increasing coordination efforts (C) or not increasing coordination efforts 
(D) are expressed as a function of the population selecting increasing coordination efforts (C). 1 represents the 
public good donor. 2 represents the private good donor. 
(Source: author’s illustration) 
 
Weights versus number 
Up to this point I have been deriving models where the choices of individual 
donors are mediated by the number of others choosing their unpreferred 
alternative. The characteristics of the “others”, represented in the x-axis were 
neutral and only their number was relevant. However, one might think that more 
important than the number of “other” donors is the “relevance” or “influence” that 
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they have on the wider aid community. A donor’s decision to coordinate or not 
might be influenced by whereas the lead donor is involved or not in the 
coordination group. If we assign a weight factor to each agency according to their 
volume of contributions, the x-axis would not represent all others choosing R but 
the combined player weight of those choosing R. If the combined player weight is 
bigger than k- a coalition might emerge and it might become viable if it is taken 
seriously. A private good donor might in that case change to R if the combined 
weight of all other actors is big enough for it to change, i.e., if the top-X agencies are 
trying to coordinate, a Self donor might win more if it joins the group than if it 
remains out of the coalition with other “less influencing” donors. Again, if the U.S. 
would join the group in a consistent and collective form, all other donors would 
more easily see the benefits of coordinating while being allied to a major donor. In 
this case from an individual perspective one donor with a higher weight would be 
enough to make other donors switch to R. Still, it would take a majority of donors 
to ensure that the outcome would be an effective coordination. 
4.6.3  DONOR S-NGOS R ELATI ONS HIPS  
NGOs keep complaining about the inefficiency and lack of interest in their own 
coordination meetings. However when it comes to higher level meetings with the 
donors, represented for instance by the Health Partners Group (HPG), NGOs have 
interest in joining the group. Their interest does not however necessarily derive 
from their wish to increase the collective good, but their interest to get to be 
known by the wider donor community and have more visibility. Additionally, they 
want donors to know what is happening on the ground through their lenses, the 
partners that implement donors’ projects. Despite the fact that the HPG is not the 
appropriate forum for NGOs to be recognized by the international community, they 
feel the opposite and in particularly they are of the opinion that more can be 
achieved on those forums that on NGO-level forums, since donors are the ones 
providing the money and deciding everything.  
Donors do not share the same opinion with regards to NGOs’ involvement in 
coordination forums: some think that NGOs are very welcome in their forums, 
others are not happy with their presence. However they seem to agree that the 
HPG forum should not be spoiled by a huge number of NGOs who, as a larger 
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group, would then compete with the donors themselves. This reflects a situation 
where the equilibrium is an intersection between two payoff curves, with the x-
axis representing the number of NGOs who choose R- to coordinate. In equilibrium 
only some NGOs manage to attend the forums and donors have to adapt to their 
participation. If the number of NGOs is bigger than t-, donors prefer them not to be 
involved and not to coordinate, if that number is less than t-, donors (on average) 
accept their involvement in the group. The graphic would be similar to the one in 
Figure 4.3. 
4.6.4  NGOS-NGOS  
NGOs-NGOs games are somehow different from donors-donors games. Unlike 
donors, NGOs depend on external funding for their survival. Unlike donors NGOs 
do not imply transaction costs for the recipient. Unlike donors, NGOs cannot be 
used as bargaining power with recipients because they are micro aid (Knack and 
Smets, 2013). As a consequence, with donors’ pressure and the lack of political 
pressure, NGOs’ motivations differ from donors. NGOs face a much more private 
good attitude towards coordination which is natural, taking into account the 
structural context in which they are embedded. Being accountable to the donors, 
NGOs are therefore much more interested in what happens at that level, than with 
what happens within the NGOs level. Therefore the way NGOs behave and decide 
to coordinate or not is mediated by the donors’ behaviour and not necessarily by 
the NGOs’. Striving for survival, NGOs’ main focus is measuring impact of their 
projects. Coordination is then very complicated to achieve because each NGO has a 
different donor; each donor has indicators that NGOs are forced to reply to. 
Informants explained that each NGO has its own work plan that they signed over a 
contract and they have to respond to it, independently. Simultaneously NGOs do 
not have any incentive to coordinate with each other. Unless donors provide NGOs 
incentives to coordinate with each other, they will not feel inclined to do so. Some 
interviewees argued that it is a donor’s responsibility to ensure that NGOs 
coordinate and that that could be achieved through enforcing a contract where 
coordination was part of the deal.  
“NGOs are business partners who manage to participate in a tender 
process, and won a contract to deliver a certain service on behalf of a 
donor. They do not necessarily come with a development agenda in the 
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first place. So if you according to your contract arrangements are not 
obliged/ forced to focus on partner coordination, you don’t do it.” [BIL/2] 
“If you are a donor agency and you fund your money through a NGO I think 
you have the moral obligation to ensure that you save coordination.” 
[MUL/1] 
Eventually it can happen that NGOs belong to a consortium funded by the same 
donor where each NGO has a very specialized task and work in a complementary 
way. When that happens, coordination can be achieved. “CONSACA” for instance is 
a consortium of NGOs (Concern, Care and Save the Children) funded by DFID that 
works together in emergency projects. However this type of coordination is rather 
limited as it only encompasses the members of the consortium that are funded by 
the same single donor. Others however, argue that coordination is a MoH’s 
responsibility. At the moment NGOs feel they are lacking government leadership in 
what regards coordination. In sum NGOs consider that in order for coordination to 
work out it has to come from the top: either through the government or enforced 
by the donors.  
Picturing a NGO-NGO game using Schelling’s (1973) diagrams would look like the 
one in Figure 4.6 where a Self NGO would not have incentives to increase 
coordination independently of the number of other NGOs choosing to coordinate. 
In this case the equilibrium is a situation where NGOs do not coordinate with each 
other. This equilibrium is Pareto suboptimal; enforcing aid coordination could 
potentially give rise to a Pareto optimal outcome as NGOs would move from L to R. 
However, as we have seen before, donors’ lack of incentive to coordinate hampers 
this idea. Because it is difficult to measure each donor’s individual impact on health 
outcomes in-country, donors compete for aid impact. If donors compete, NGOs 
compete as well. Coordination becomes then a secondary goal. Two measures for 
increasing aid effectiveness: increase aid impact and increase coordination, seem 
to go in opposite directions (Annen and Moers, 2012). 
According to the informants coordination within NGOs is also complicated due to a 
high turnover. The average working time for an employee in an NGO is 2-3 years. 
In particular, the national representatives are forced to be redundant after 4-5 
years of placement due to potential conflict of interests. The high rotativity of staff 
brings positive aspects for the organization such as development of new ideas and 
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increased creativity. However, it can hamper coordination efforts which take a 
long time to achieve. By the time a NGO starts engaging in coordination, another 
country’s representative arises with a different idea that is not linked with the 
work developed so far, it was pointed out.  
Finally some NGOs referred to the fact that their work is mainly about community 
development programs, and therefore coordination is not taken very seriously nor 
is regarded as needed (as it should be for instance when NGOs work in clinical 
treatment). NGOs revealed that community programmes are never enough, so the 
more the better and coordination becomes a secondary issue. Despite their 
justification, this seems more of an excuse for not coordinating rather than a valid 
argument. 
4.6.5  A  FIN AL NOT E :  FR AGMENT ATIO N O N THE GRO UN D  
 
“Did it happen to your organization to have a project in one place and get 
to know that there were similar projects running at the same time by other 
NGOs?” 
“Yes” 
“How did you react then? Did you keep doing your project?” 
“Sure…People don’t mind having the same training twice” 
(silence going on…) 
“Don’t you feel that there should be a formal coordination structure within 
NGOs so that those situations do not occur anymore? 
“Yes…but that is our live. We exist because a donor funds us. If it wants us 
to go to a specific location even if it is crowded with other NGOs we go and 
that’s it. This is just an example to show that duplication arises from self-
interest. These are the rules of the game. After all we are all here because 
we want to help and we do so many things for the population…but this is 
our job as well…” [iNGO/3]  
This conversation illustrates how NGOs’ willingness to coordinate is rather weak 
and has immediate effects on the ground. It is not that NGOs do not want to 
coordinate, however coordination between them is simply not a critical issue nor 
something they think they should be worrying about. Putting it straight, in a way 
NGOs feel that coordination is not their business. The structure in which they are 
embedded is such that NGOs’ accountability seems to be exclusive to the donors. 
NGOs’ work plan set by the donor is so fixed that there is very low margin for 
coordination even within the same donor. A NGO was revealing that if they have 
different projects running in the same community they are not allowed to share 
cars or any other equipment from other projects. And that happens irrespectively 
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of whether NGOs’ funding for different projects comes from the same donor or 
different one. “Everything has to be worked out independently” [iNGO/6]. 
Duplication and overlap of projects is also a common practice in Mozambique. One 
informant referred:  “NGOs always think about their own survival and success even 
if they have a neighbour NGO that is doing the same project” [MoH]. This situation 
is particular critical when the same community receives contradictory training 
from different NGOs which unfortunately is quite common. For instance, with 
regards to HIV, different ideological perspectives are put in place and influence the 
type of HIV community programs: some are pro prevention whereas others focus 
more on treatment. There are also those who favour sexual abstinence which is not 
supported by some.  
NGOs’ lack of coordinated support is particularly problematic for the MoH. Firstly 
because the MoH does not have a proper mapping of NGOs’ work and therefore it 
complicates internal planning and secondly, because NGOs’ support is very 
fragmented. According to the informants, NGOs are supposed to fill in forms and 
report to the MoH who should then try to coordinate. However, many NGOs do not 
do it and are not questioned about it. 
By focusing only on their scopes, NGOs tend not to consider other aspects of the 
wider environment and leave it for the MoH or other partners to worry about, it 
was commonly discussed by the informants. Many projects are therefore non-
sustainable. For instance, it happens with community training programs that NGOs 
simply train the population and have no extra funding to pay them the subsidies or 
provide medicine kits. For NGOs this is not their responsibility but something the 
MoH should take the lead on. According to an informer this is a very narrow and 
fragmented approach to aid. It could be solved if NGOs would really make an effort 
and acknowledge their limitations, trying to coordinate with other partners so that 
their services could complement each other. However, that does not seem to be 
common practice, it was noted by an interviewee [MUL/1]. As referred by Acharya 
et al. (2006) there is a lack of sense of responsibility for the outcomes of aid as 
donors and NGOs focus on obtaining results for their projects and not an overall 
goal. 
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According to informants from the government, very frequently the MoH does not 
get to know what NGOs are doing which becomes particularly critical when they 
have overlapping programmes. For instance, Community Health Workers (CHW) 
are a program coordinated by the MoH where they provide a very specific and 
intense training course across the country in order to form appropriate staff. NGOs 
also train CHW however their approach differs: i) the training is different (NGOs’ 
training is two weeks against the four months of the training provided by the 
MoH), ii) the job is different (CHW from NGOs are like mini doctors working in a 
health post whereas MoH’s CHWs are more like mobile staff that approaches 
communities in their houses) and iii) the terminology used also differs. At the end 
of the day two different models are developed under the same programme and no 
coordination is taking place. The informant concluded that the MoH is not aware 
about who coordinates with whom and who communicates with whom. 
“Harmonization means coordinating among agencies to ensure that two wells are 
not built side by side in the same place; or that two different agencies vaccinate the 
same children twice inadvertently damaging them” (Woods, 2011: 5). It seems so 
simple in theory… 
4.7 CONCLUSION  
This paper explores empirically and theoretically aid agencies’ coordination efforts 
in Mozambique. The starting point for this research is the implementation of 
coordination in the health sector in Mozambique as it is perceived in practice by 
different partners. Informed by such findings I believe that distinguishing between 
coordination as a private or public good uncovers different agencies’ identities, 
strategies and incentives that underpin the possibility of coordination failure. I 
explore the roots of agencies’ incentives to coordinate and illustrate why 
coordination seems so hard to achieve. I believe that the debate around 
coordination and fragmentation does not necessarily address these issues. This 
research reveals a picture of aid coordination that has more to it than just a calling 
for more and better coordination as suggested by the global agenda. 
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The empirical results from fieldwork research in Mozambique suggest that there is 
a general attitude of discredit and dissatisfaction towards coordination despite the 
advanced mechanisms in place in the country. There is lack of common 
understanding of coordination as a concept and what it entitles. There is a clear 
issue of membership and leadership however aid agencies’ opinion on the best 
way to overcome these issues varies greatly. For most agencies coordination has 
developed a life of its own which is translated into high opportunity costs, 
especially for those striving for impact and fast results. There is no proper sharing 
of information within agencies which is particular complicated due to the amount 
of vertical off-funding initiatives in the country. 
The theory developed from empirical grounding suggests that in equilibrium 
public good donors coordinate and some private good donors coordinate while the 
rest defects. However, the equilibrium differs from the collective maximum: an 
optimal coordination can only occur if more (or all) private good donors are 
willing to coordinate.  
Taking on the private donors my analysis revealed that their incentives to 
coordinate are neither strong nor stable. The establishment of a strong coalition 
could potentially influence donors’ motivation to coordinate. That could be 
achieved through more leadership from the government and/or the involvement 
of the lead donor, who appears to have a rather passive presence in coordination.  
NGOs’ incentives to coordinate with each other are even weaker. Their financial 
dependency and accountability to donors makes coordination within NGOs a 
rather irrelevant topic or something they do not feel responsible for. Enforcing 
coordination either through donors-NGOs’ contracts or mandates from the MoH 
could potentially make the switch, with NGOs feeling forced to coordinate. But 
once more, donors also do not have incentives to coordinate their NGOs. 
Competing for impact, they strive for individual results. If donors compete, NGOs 
compete as well and that has immediate effects on the way aid is delivered on the 
ground.  
Coordinating with donors is however a different story for NGOs. Either to gain 
individual visibility or share information of ground level progress, NGOs feel the 
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need to be much more involved in donors’ coordination forums, which is not 
appreciated by most of the donor community. The result is a situation where there 
is no clarity, definition of purposes and a suboptimal outcome for the collective 
group, i.e., those forums are not effective enough.  
This chapter raises the question whether coordination is then achievable or not. 
Private good donors must be willing to coordinate both at a macro and micro level. 
The government must be willing to provide leadership. The lead donor must be 
willing to be more involved within the wider aid structure. Otherwise, the success 
of coordination rests on the proportion of public versus private donors. 
From a policy perspective this research suggests that unless the incentives of 
private good donors to coordinate are addressed and the government is involved, 
there is no guarantee that coordination will ever be achieved. The efforts to 
improve aid coordination are doomed to failure and “cheap talk” (as referred by 
Annen and Moers, 2012) if we treat aid as a black box; it is not enough for agencies 
to share information if they are not willing to coordinate. A clearer and more 
transparent understanding of coordination, a proper setting of responsibilities 
shared between agencies and the government and an accurate awareness of 
agencies’ diverse identities are the roots for advancing improvements in 
coordination. This research accentuates Annen and Moers’s (2012) reflection that 
coordination and aid impact, two measures for increasing aid effectiveness, 
generate opposite effects.  In particular, I add that aid agencies which compete for 
aid impact do not have strong incentives to coordinate.  
Another measure commonly referred in the literature to promote aid effectiveness 
at a macro level is donor specialization either on a specific sector or country. This 
would happen if donors would take a global or regional approach and try to reduce 
the number of actors involved in each case. In this context, would some donors 
consider to leave the health sector and specialize in other more “needy” or 
“disproportionally financed” sectors? Evidence suggests that this is a good idea in 
principle but it is not being applicable in practice (Acharya et al., 2006) and 
Mozambique is not exception to the case. The international community is as keen 
as working in Mozambique as it is in working in the health sector.  According to the 
informants, the health sector in Mozambique has a special place in the government 
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because many politicians came from the health sector; in other words for the 
donors that want to get influence, the health sector is very strong politically. 
Delving deeper on aid agencies’ incentives to work in the health sector and 
particularly in specific areas within the sector (e.g. provinces or health subgroups’ 
specialization) should be explored in future research. 
Finally in this research I focused on modelling the aid agencies’ side while 
abstracting from the recipients’ game. An interesting extension of my analysis 
could be to investigate the recipients’ incentive to facilitate or lead the aid 
agencies’ coordination. This could potentially shed light if there is any feedback 
mechanism from donors’ incentives to coordinate to recipients’ behaviour towards 
coordination and vice-versa.  
Torvisk (2005) provides some first insights on the negative consequences of 
coordination on domestic policy by decreasing recipients’ willingness to increase 
their budget. Are recipients than not willing to make coordination work for 
donors? Answering this question could provide a more robust answer to the 
question of whether coordination is achievable or not. In addition it could 
eventually inform the current debate about whether coordination is desirable or 
not and by whom and cleared out some of the smoke screen on aid coordination 
and fragmentation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5 CONCLUSION 
5.1 CONTRIBUTION AND RELEVANCE OF THIS THESIS  
This thesis aims to contribute empirically, methodological and theoretically to the 
debate on aid effectiveness. 
A major methodological contribution is provided on Chapter 2 through the use of a 
multilevel model to investigate the effect of health aid on health outcomes taking 
into account the aid heterogeneity that exists between Mozambique’s provinces. 
This method takes into account a sub-national level of aggregation to research aid 
effectiveness and although being constrained to the case of Mozambique in this 
thesis, it can easily be replicated to other countries, data permitting. Furthermore, 
this research attempts to be methodological innovative by employing a mixed-
methods approach that integrates game theory with qualitative methods, thus 
moving beyond the traditional methodological approaches to study aid 
effectiveness. Modelling qualitative evidence is rare in the literature and presents 
here an original case application. 
Empirically, all chapters are of academic relevance. Chapter 2 merges data from 
the Official Development Assistance to Mozambique database (ODAMOZ) with data 
from the Demographic Health Survey (DHS). The use of these databases and their 
combination, presents an original application to study aid effectiveness that was 
developed specifically for this research and, to my knowledge has never been used 
to date. Chapters 3 and 4 make use of qualitative evidence purposely gathered 
through fieldwork research that includes information from a variety of actors 
(bilateral and multilateral organizations, foundations, local and international 
NGOs, members of civil society, research institutes, consultants, government and 
former aid workers) analysed together in this research. Instead of focusing on one 
type of aid agency, as it is commonly found on the literature, this research 
considers all the main actors of the aid industry at different levels, thus exploring 
an extensive number of links that exist between aid organizations. 
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Finally, the goal of Chapters 3 and 4 is to develop a theory of health aid 
disbursement decisions and coordination, respectively. Both chapters contribute 
to filling a theoretical vacuum in the aid effectiveness literature using game theory 
as a systematic and dynamic framework. Chapter 3 aims to provide a systematic 
narrative on aid disbursements in-country. Chapter 4 brings new theoretical 
insights by framing the aid debate using collective action theory in a novel 
application of Schelling’s (1973) work on externalities, to the theory of aid 
coordination. Finally, Chapter 4 contributes conceptually to the understanding of 
coordination.  
Last but not the least, a critical goal of this research is to inform policy. Policy 
recommendations are developed on whether and how health aid could work better 
and more effectively, looking essentially at the behaviour of aid organizations. 
5.2 THESIS LIMITATIONS  
Despite the vast literature on aid-growth models at a macro level, evidence at the 
sector level is scarce. One of the major contributions of the first paper is to provide 
a new model to study aid effectiveness while looking at health sector aid 
specifically. To my knowledge, this is the first paper taking a multilevel approach 
to measure the impact of health aid on health outcomes at the country level. In 
addition, this paper uses an original dataset that merges two databases: the 
ODAMOZ and the DHS. Although this dataset is unique and represents a major 
contribution to this research it is worth noting its limitations. Firstly, the paper 
takes a cross-section approach and compares two points in time: 2003 and 2009; 
however, while the former dataset uses birth recodes as the unit of the analysis, 
the latter uses data from the AIS/DHS where women are used as the unit of 
analysis and therefore there is no account of the particularities of each child birth. 
The use of these cross-sections to address the research question should then be 
considered a first step and should be improved further on with a new dataset at 
the child level from the DHS for a more recent time period, which was not available 
at the time this thesis was written. 
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The ODAMOZ dataset is also a valuable source of information for this research 
since it provides detailed data on disbursements of Official Development 
Assistance in Mozambique by province. However, as noted before it has some 
imperfections: not all donors input data in the ODAMOZ database; wrong 
imputation of data by the donors might occur and, more important a lot of the 
funding from vertical initiatives and private aid agencies is not accounted for. Aid 
from these sources is becoming increasingly important and in Mozambique, 
specifically, this type of aid had a steeper increase in 2002 with the emergence of 
global health initiatives such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Global 
Fund, PEFAR to mention the most important. This situation has been referred in 
the cross-country literature (see for instance Mishra and Newhouse (2009), among 
others) and the difficulties in finding reliable private aid data have been 
mentioned. Finally, when accounting for a sub-national level of aggregation, 
province level data is even harder or almost impossible to achieve. As 
demonstrated throughout this thesis sharing private financial information is not 
widely appreciated by donors: it is not simply the fact that the information is hard 
to collect but actually it is not available for anyone (not only for the general public 
but also for the wider development partners’ community). 
Finally, the multilevel model developed in this research deserves further 
investigation. This research concentrated on determinants of child mortality at the 
individual level while considering the provincial effect of health aid. An interesting 
extension of this model would be the inclusion of additional province-level 
variables not correlated with health aid. Also, the use of an instrumental variables 
approach would relax the endogeneity threat, even though in this model it might 
not be a case of concern as previously explained in Chapter 2. 
Chapters 3 and 4 provide a major contribution to the field of aid effectiveness by 
using primary data collected through fieldwork in Mozambique. Ideally, the 
partners’ identity would be revealed, however due to confidentiality this was not 
possible. In addition, most of the data was collected in Maputo where the agencies’ 
main office is based. An interesting complement to this research would be to 
present detailed case studies of a group of aid agencies or individual ones at the 
province level.  
199 
 
Chapter 4 uses Schelling (1973) diagrams to shed light on coordination failure.  In 
this research I restrict to straight lines for the payoffs functions.  However, the 
payoff configuration of the curve can take many forms. As referred by Schelling 
(1973: 425) “the curves even if monotonic can be concave or convex, S-shaped, 
flanged or tapered; and of course, they need to be monotonic”. A number of factors 
influence the shape of Schelling (1973) curves: the number of equilibrium, the role 
of information, the sizes of potential coalition and the importance of discipline or 
enforceable contract, the population size and so on. Again, this research attempts 
to provide a first step into the usefulness of game theory to explain coordination 
failure; further research might delve deeper on more robust classification schemes 
for payoff curves. 
5.3 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDI NGS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
In this thesis I explore three determinants of aid effectiveness focusing essentially 
on the donor side: i) distribution of health aid in-country, ii) aid agencies’ decisions 
and relationships with the recipient country and iii) coordination between aid 
agencies.  Each chapter had its own extended conclusion therefore only a summary 
of the main findings and a link with policy suggestions is presented here. 
Failing to attribute a causal effect between health aid and health outcomes, 
Chapter 2 has more to it than just a call to increase or decrease aid flows. In 
summary, Chapter 2 provide us three main findings: i) the effect of health services’ 
utilization on child survival varies across provinces ii) that effect is higher in 
provinces with a number of children alive below average, iii) the insignificance of 
health aid might be justified by aid being directed to provinces where the impact of 
health services’ utilization on health outcomes is small.  
These findings have huge policy implications. Recognizing the differential effect of 
health services’ utilization on health outcomes, this research suggests that aid 
should be targeted to the provinces where the effect of health services’ utilization 
is higher. I argue that “aid effectiveness cannot be achieved” by targeting aid to the 
neediest places or the preferred ones. It is not effective to have health services in 
Niassa, the neediest province if no one uses those services, if they have poor 
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quality or if accessibility is difficult. It is not effective if aid is targeted to Maputo, 
one of the preferred provinces, if the level of development is already stable, i.e., if 
health outcomes cannot be improved further. Further research is needed at the 
province-level in order to recognize their particularities and understand the 
reasons behind a different effect of utilization of health services across provinces.  
Chapter 3 provides a systematic analysis on how aid negotiations are developed at 
a country level through different stages and how they culminate on actual 
outcomes on the ground. In this chapter, I show that donors and recipients 
respond tactically to each other’s behaviour which has direct effects on how 
donors opt for different strategies for disbursing aid. However, more than 
assessing which type of channel of delivery or aid modality is better this paper 
aims to provide a comprehensive framework of the sequential disbursement 
decisions of aid agencies. Understanding in depth donors and recipients’ 
motivation offers a more informed picture on the effectiveness of aid and can 
provide a solid ground for better policy implementation. It is advised that aid 
agencies should be more transparent about their identity and motivations and 
acknowledge their direct implication on the outcomes of aid, through their choice 
of specific channels of delivery. In particular, this chapter reveals that trust in 
donor-recipient relationships is under threat due to the existence of multiple 
channels of aid delivery that donors can opt for. At the moment, there are two 
critical substitutes of trust: the international financial crisis on the donor’s side 
and the recipient’s capacity. Together, they are making it easier for donors to 
abandon the principles advocated in the Paris Declaration and subsequent forums 
of aid effectiveness. Donors want to control their money and the tax-payer in the 
West is demanding quick results. It is strongly advised that the recipient country 
works on re-building trust. Donors, in turn, should ensure an open and honest 
communication with the recipient; otherwise, vertical funding will re-conquer its 
place on the top.  In this chapter it is also recognized that donors’ decision on the 
channel of delivery, more precisely who should spend their aid in country, is 
influenced by whether the recipients follow their preferences of not. Latter in this 
chapter it is shown that donors’ strategic paths have strong implications on where 
aid is actually disbursed on the ground, i.e., to which locations and health 
priorities. Particularly relevant in this chapter is the differentiation between a 
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principal versus an agent’s role on deciding where to disburse aid. As for policy 
recommendations:  the public sector is recommended to promote increased 
ownership. Donors, in turn, should ensure that their preferences are better aligned 
with the government ones. To stimulate autonomous decision-making, 
international NGOs are proposed to become more financially independent from the 
donors. This would contribute to the debate on the “raison d’être” of NGOs as 
governmental or non-governmental organizations. 
Chapter 4 reveals a lack of common understanding of coordination as a concept 
and what it entitles. It finds that donors’ motivations to coordinate differ and 
explores the reasoning behind this. The findings from this paper disclose that some 
aid agencies do not have strong incentives to coordinate. This chapter alerts for the 
importance of a lead donor and/or government involvement to ensure that 
coordination is effectively implemented. From a practical point of view my results 
suggest that real and honest efforts to achieve coordination are needed. They 
include a clearer and more transparent understanding of coordination, a proper 
setting of responsibilities shared between agencies and the government and an 
accurate awareness of agencies’ diverse identities. The lead donor, the U.S. should 
be more involved with the rest of the donor community. Donors should also 
provide incentives for NGOs to coordinate with each other.  
To conclude, while focusing on the donor side in this thesis I abstract from 
exploring in depth the recipient’s motivations. However two people are needed for 
a marriage. By no means have I suggested that the recipient country has a passive 
role on the effectiveness of aid. In fact I suggest the opposite. Some deep issues 
remain open to question: why is Mozambique not increasing its internal resources 
to health? Is it convenient to be an aid-dependent country? Why is no one really 
interested in ensuring that everyone is on board when it comes to information 
sharing? Is the government not willing to facilitate donors’ coordination? Is it just 
about capacity issues and availability of funds?  
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“I have never worked in a country that has taken me so much time to 
understand the systems and structures of the health sector. At the 
beginning I thought: something is wrong somewhere and is not me because 
I have my education degrees...it is not because I don’t understand the 
sector. Slowly, slowly I came to understand that this country is the culture 
of secrecy and hiding. At the beginning I thought it was low capacity. But 
this is not about low capacity; this is about making a smoke screen...The 
more donors  don’t understand the more behind the small screen we can do 
whatever we want. Why is it that the information is not very easily 
available? Why there is no package for new incomers? I think we are naïf...I 
think we don’t enough consider the political economy and the power 
structure in which we are working and this comes partly out of donor 
ignorance.” [BIL/3] 
An interesting extension of this thesis would be to research the recipient’s 
motivation to receive aid and link its behaviour with the aid dynamics explored in 
this thesis.  
5.4 A  FINAL REFLECTION  
This work suggests a number of policy recommendations stressing the importance 
of addressing aid agencies’ behaviour and disbursement decisions. Throughout 
this thesis I stress out that is not enough to change policy, programmes or 
procedures. For aid to be effective aid agencies must be willing to change their 
behaviour and that should visible to others. A strong and transparent commitment 
is the basis for moving forward. Rests the question: are aid agencies really willing 
to promote aid effectiveness? 
Simultaneously, global aid dynamics are changing. It is known that “who has the 
money is in charge”, but a new question is rising now: “who has the money?” 
Emerging donors, like Brazil or China, are steeping into the scene while traditional 
donors find their way to justify their existence. At the same time recipient 
countries like Mozambique, experience a climate of economic expansion which is 
projected to increase in the near future: “will they need aid?” Some suggest that aid 
effectiveness is already out of date; instead one should inquire: “why should we 
give aid at all?” [BIL/2]. Others argue for a new model that implies an entire 
redefinition of what aid should be. It might consist of an integrated approach that 
includes the private sector in aid while balancing with the role of the state in 
providing the services for their people. 
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These are pertinent questions which deserve careful reflection in the near future. 
However, no matter what form aid takes or who gives it, as far as it continues to 
exist it must be effective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The difference between what we do and what we are capable of doing would suffice to solve most of 
the world’s problems.” 
 
-- Mahatma Gandhi 
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APPENDIX A:  MOZAMBIQUE ’S HISTORICAL CONTEXT  AND ITS IMPACT ON 
HEALTH SYSTEM-RELATED DIMENSIONS  
Dates and periods 
designation 
Context dimensions 
Health system-related dimensions 
(impact) 
Civil 
War 
 
1975 Independence 
1975-82 
 
Post-
Independence  
ambitious 
recovery 
Political context: 
- Marxism-Leninism line. 
- One party state. 
 
Economic context: 
- Central planning. 
- Nationalization of social sectors. 
 
Health policy framework: 
- Nationalization of health services.   
- Primary Health Care (PHC) is adopted. 
 
Health expenditure and financing: 
 - Health expenditure increases significantly. 
 
Health service delivery: 
- Coverage and outputs expand. 
1982-89 
Fragmentation 
Political context: 
 -Conflict: Escalation of the civil war and war alert. 
 
Economic context: 
- Economic crisis. 
- Structural adjustment (launched in 1987). 
- Transition to a market economy. 
 
Donor influence and dependence: 
- Aid agencies and NGOs pour into the country 
and take the lead. 
- Proliferation of emergency-oriented projects. 
 
Physical environment: 
 - Floods and drought. 
Health expenditure and financing: 
 - Internal financing is reduced, capital shortage and 
international aid increases. 
 
External aid and coordination: 
- The National Health Services (NHS), struggling for 
survival, becomes largely dependent on external aid 
for its basic functioning.  
 
Health service delivery: 
- The NHS becomes a military target – health units 
are destroyed, health workers are murdered and 
kidnapped. 
- Access to basic services contracts. 
 
 
1989-92 
Peace 
Negotiations 
Political context: 
- Renounce of Marxism ideology (1989). 
- Transition to a multiparty democratic system 
(1990). 
- Peace Negotiations (1990-1992). 
 
 
External aid and coordination: 
- MoH prepares plans for reconstruction with the 
help of IMF and the World Bank 
 
1992 Peace Agreement 
 
 
Post -
War 
period 
1992-94 
Transitional 
Period 
Political context: 
 -Progressive unification of the country under the 
same administration. 
-UN mission of peace-building, such as 
demobilization, de-mining, support for elections, 
reintegration programs, etc. 
 
 
Health service delivery: 
- The rehabilitation of the health network starts. 
- Health services return to previously closed areas. 
- Private practice is reintroduced. 
 
1994-99 
Normalization 
 
 
Political context: 
- First democratic elections (1994). 
- Second democratic elections (1999). 
-Decentralization is endorsed by the government 
and slowly introduced. 
 
Economic context: 
-Economic recovery under free-market principles. 
- Part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) 
 
 
Health expenditure and financing: 
-Increase of resources to the health sector. 
 
Health policy framework: 
-The Health Sector Recovery Programme (HSRP) is 
launched. 
- PHC is emphasized. 
 
External aid and coordination: 
-Policy dialogue between donors and the MoH gains 
strength 
-Original tools to manage external resources are 
introduced (first steps towards developing common 
funds for health) 
 
Health service delivery: 
- Reconstruction and expansion of the NHS.  
-Skilled health workers (previously concentrated in 
secure areas) are redeployed. 
-More qualified and appropriately trained 
professionals gradually replace unskilled or low-
level workers. 
2000 to date 
Vulnerability 
Physical environment: 
 - Cyclones and severe floods devastate 
swathes of the country (2000). 
- Droughts (2002-2003). 
- HIV Epidemic. 
- Cyclone Favio (2007). 
 
Political context: 
- FRELIMO supremacy and dominance. 
- Corruption. 
 
Donor influence and dependence: 
 - Mozambique is a highly dependent country. 
 
Socio-Economic context: 
 - Generalized Poverty and Inequality. 
 
  
Health policy framework: 
- PARPA I (2000-2005) assumes human capital and 
particular health as one major pillar for the 
government strategy.  
- PARPA II (2005-2009) continues to include health 
improvement as a major priority paying special 
attention to the poor. 
 
Health expenditure and financing: 
 -Large inflow of relief resources to the health sector. 
 
External aid and coordination: 
- Kaya Code. 
- Sector Wide Approach to Health Sector (2000). 
Health service delivery: 
- Inequalities in service provision. 
-Huge inequalities in distribution of resources 
among provinces and levels of care. 
- Inequities in access to health care.  
 
 
 Note:  squares highlight specific aid and health system’s related dimensions. 
Source: author’s illustration modified and updated from Pavignani and Colombo (2001). 
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APPENDIX B:  ODAMOZ  DETAILS  
Table B.1 List of development partners for health registered in the ODAMOZ 
database, by type of aid agency 
 
  
 
Bilateral Development Agencies                                                
 Austria 
 Belgium 
 Canada 
 Denmark 
 Finland 
 Flandres 
 France 
 Germany 
 Ireland 
 Italy 
 Japan 
 Norway 
 Netherlands 
 Portugal 
 Spain 
 Sweden 
 Switzerland 
 UK (DFID) 
 USA (MCC) 
         USAID  
         European Commission (EC) 
 
 
Multilateral Development Agencies 
 
         World Bank 
 
       United Nations 
      United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS)  
       United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)  
       United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)  
       World Health Organization (WHO) 
 
         Regional Development Banks  
        African Development Bank (AFDB) 
  
Global Health Partnerships 
        Global Fund Against AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria 
(GFATM) 
 
 
 
Table B.2 Exchange Rate to the US$ used in ODAMOZ, based on OECD 2007 
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Table B.3 Comparison between ODAMOZ and OECD-DAC databases, US$ millions 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
ODAMOZ  140.381 123.691 220.867 267.944 283.873 
OECD-DAC 122.166 129.466 155.907 174.582 200.620 
 
Note: Values represent disbursements. ODAMOZ values are in constant 2007 USD millions; OECD-DAC 
are in constant 2008 USD millions. 
(Source: ODAMOZ and OECD (2009) databases) 
 
APPENDIX C:  DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DATABASE  
C.1 The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) Database 
The database was downloaded from the DHS website (available at: 
www.measuredhs.com) after permission was obtained. The data from birth 
recodes was already in STATA format which facilitated the process of handling 
data. Because the household specific indicator - wealth quintiles - was not included 
in the births recodes’ database 2003, I had to merge births recodes and household 
recodes databases. This was not necessary for the 2009 database as the 
information needed was gathered in the same database. The data was filtered to 
2002 births and to births that occurred between 1998 and 2002 in order to 
construct the infant and child database, respectively.  For the 2009 database 
women recode was used due to the inexistence of child birth recodes and the data 
was first filtered to women who had at least one child aged five or less. 
 
C.1.a) Detailed description of variables’ transformation 
All variables were labelled properly after consulting the Description of the DHS 
Individual recode datafile available in the Guide to DHS statistics from DHS (2008) 
since they appeared as code variables.  
For the 2003 database a dummy variable reported whether the child was alive or 
not at the time of the interview (0-Not alive, 1-Alive). For 2009, a dummy variable 
was created for whether a women had all their children alive (independently of the 
number of children) or at least one child had died (0-At least one child died, 1-All 
children alive). The variable on education that was previously labelled as (0-No 
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education, 1-Primary, 2-Secondary, 3-Higher) was recoded in only three categories 
due to the low number women with higher education (0-No education, 1-Primary, 
2-Secondary or Higher). Prenatal care and delivery assistance were split into seven 
different variables for doctor care, midwife/nurse, auxiliary midwife traditional 
birth attendant, friend and other, and were previously defined as (0-No: Some care, 
1-Yes: No care). The variables were transformed to binary variables (0-No care, 1-
Yes care) where care included only medical trained staff (doctor, nurse/midwife). 
Improved water source was originally defined as (10-Piped Water: inside the house, 
inside neighbour’s house, public water; 20- Open Well Water: in own land, in neighbour’s land, 
unprotected public well: 30-Covered Well/Borehole: protected public well; 40- Surface 
Water: river/Lake, 51- Rain Water, 96-Other). Following the World Bank definition a 
variable ‘Access to Improved Water Source’ was created where (0-No access, 1-Yes 
access) with Improved water source (=1) including Piped Water, Covered Water, 
Rainwater collection and Other. ‘Access to Improve Sanitation’ originally defined 
as (10-Flush Toilet: flush toilet, 20- Pit Toilet Latrine: latrine, no flush toilet; 30- No 
facility; 96- Other) was afterwards recoded as (0-No access, 1-Yes access) where 
Improved sanitation (=1) included flushed toilet and pit toilet latrine. 
Vaccination62 was originally split into BCG1, Polio1, 2 and 3, DTP 1, 2 and 3 and 
Measles. These variables were combined together in just one variable to represent 
whether the child was fully immunized and coded as (0-Not fully immunized, 1-
Fully immunized). Fully immunized (=1) included all eight different vaccines.  
Variables that did not need transformation include the duration of breastfeeding in 
months and the mother’s age in years. Nevertheless, a square-root and square 
transformation of both variables where included in the models where appropriate. 
Missing values were dropped since they were present in very few observations. 
 
C.2. The ODAMOZ database 
Information on health aid was accessed through the ODAMOZ website (available 
at: http://www.odamoz.org.mz). The search was specified for the health sector 
only. A full list of all projects was available with each project having the 
information of the region they were implemented in. The projects were initially 
                                                        
62 Vaccination is used as an alternative dependent variable for proxying health outcomes and for 
contrasting those results from those obtained using mortality as the main dependent variable.  
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divided by province. Because the database does not differentiate financially a 
project that is implemented in multiple provinces when more than on region was 
specified the data were divided equally between provinces mentioned. Some of 
project’s information on regions was limited (e.g. project implemented in several 
provinces, project implemented in seven provinces) and was therefore discarded. 
A second step involved aggregating province health aid information by time period 
(1996-2002 and 2003-2008). The database contained information on actual start 
date and actual end date for each project. The actual start date of each project was 
chosen as the year of reference due to missing data on the actual end date of a 
significant number of projects. It is assumed that the project starts having effects 
from the date when it actually starts. The data was then averaged and divided by 
the population in order to obtain averaged per capita flows for each province and 
each time period of interest. A summary of the variables used in the research can 
be found in Table C1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
223 
 
Table C.1 List of variables, operationalization of concepts and data sources, by level 
of analysis 
                                                        
63 Label definitions taken from the World Bank. 
Individual-Level 
  MAIN VARIABLE PROXIES LABEL DEFINITION VARIABLE 
TYPE 
SOURCE 
Dependent 
variables 
Main 
health 
outcome 
Infant Survival 
Infant  is alive on the 
date of the interview 
0 No  “ Is not alive ” 
1 Yes  “Is alive” 
 
Qualitative- 
binary 
DHS 
Child Survival 
Child is alive on the 
date of the interview 
0 No  “Is not alive” 
1 Yes  “Is alive” 
 
Qualitative- 
binary 
DHS 
All children are alive, 
per women 
0 No  “At least one children 
is dead” 
1 Yes  “All children are 
alive” 
 
Continuous DHS 
Alternative 
health 
outcome 
Vaccination 
Child is fully 
immunized on the year 
of the interview 
0 No “Not immunized” 
1 Yes “Fully immunized” 
Received  BCG, Polio 
(1,2&3), DTP(1,2&3) and 
Measles 
 
 
 
 
Qualitative- 
binary 
DHS 
Individual-level controls 
Children characteristics 
Breastfeeding 
Duration of 
breastfeeding (in 
months) 
- Continuous DHS 
Gender Child’s sex 
0 “Female” 
1 “Male” 
Qualitative- 
binary 
DHS 
Mother characteristics 
Mother age Mother’s age Mother’s age in years Continuous DHS 
Education 
Women’s highest 
education level 
 
 
 
1 "No education" 
2 "Primary" 
3 "Secondary and Higher" 
 
Qualitative-
Ordinal 
DHS 
Household characteristics 
Wealth index Quintile 
1 Poorest 
2 Poorer 
3 Middle 
4 Richer 
5 Richest 
Qualitative-
Ordinal 
DHS 
Improved water 
source 
Access to an improved 
water source63 
0. No “Access to unimproved 
water source including 
vendors, tanker trucks, and 
unprotected wells and 
springs” 
 
1 Yes “Access to improved 
water source such as hold 
connection, public 
standpipe, borehole, 
protected well or spring, 
and rainwater collection” 
 
Qualitative-
binary 
DHS 
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Note: The Exchange rates to the US$ used in ODAMOZ are the average exchange rates used by the OECD in 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
64 Label definitions taken from the World Bank. 
Individual-Level (cont.) 
Improved 
sanitation 
Access to improved 
sanitation facilities 64 
0 No “Access to unimproved 
water sanitation facilities.” 
 
1 Yes “Access to improved 
sanitation (Improved 
facilities range from simple 
but protected pit latrines to 
flush toilets with a sewerage 
connection)”. 
 
Qualitative
-binary 
DHS 
Health care utilization   
Assistance 
Women had prenatal 
assistance 
0 No “No assistance” 
1 Yes “Had assistance with a 
doctor, nurse or midwife” 
 
Qualitative
-binary 
DHS 
Women had assistance 
at delivery 
0 No “No assistance” 
1 Yes “Had assistance with a 
doctor, nurse or midwife” 
 
Qualitative
-binary 
DHS 
Province-level 
 
MAIN VARIABLE LABEL DEFINITION SOURCE 
Main explanatory 
variable 
Health aid 
Average per capita health aid disbursements by province 1997-
2002, US$ 
Average per capita health aid disbursements by province, 2003-
2008, US$ 
ODAMOZ 
Province-level controls 
Number of health units Number of health  units in 2003 and 2009 INE 
Number of doctors 
Number of doctors in 2004 and 2009 INE 
Number of habitants/number doctors  INE 
Health spending Per capita health spending, US$ 2003 and 2006 INE 
Population Population in 2003 and 2007 INE 
225 
 
APPENDIX D:  PAIRWISE CORRELATION  
 
Table D.1 Pairwise correlation coefficients for province-level variables 
Variables 
Av.Health 
aid per 
capita 
9702 
LnDoctors 
/Inhabitants 
Health 
units 
03 
Health 
spending 
03 
Av. Health aid capita 9702 1.0 00    
LnDoctors/Inhabitants -0.7612 1.0000   
 (0.0000)    
Health units -0.5823 0.6664 1.0000  
 (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Health spending 03 0.3615 -0.5811 -0.5629 1.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
 Note: P-values in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
226 
 
APPENDIX E:  SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW  
 
1. Tell me about Mozambique’s (health) aid context in general: 
a) What are the main health needs? 
b) How much progress has been made? 
c) How much regional variation is there? 
d) What is the role of your organization in this? 
 
 
2. Tell me about your organization in general: 
a) What it does? 
b) What are the primary areas of action? 
c) What type of aid is given? (budget support,  project aid, etc.) 
d) How does the entire aid process work, from the donor to the beneficiary? (e.g., 
log-frame) 
 
3. Tell me about your organization’s decisions for disbursing aid: 
a) What are the main determinants for disbursing aid? (e.g., donor considerations, 
budgets, needs of the population, etc.). Why? Which one would you consider the 
main one? 
b)  Does the disbursement depend on other factors? (e.g., experience + networks in 
a given area, confidence in local capacity in a given area, etc.) 
c) How are the context’s needs (province, type of health priority) assessed before 
deciding where and when to disburse aid? 
d) What is the degree of flexibility and autonomy of the field site (in Mozambique) 
versus the office site (outside Mozambique)? 
e) How does budget allocation vary with budget cycles? 
 
4. Tell me about the coordination with other aid agencies: 
a) What are the mechanisms of coordination in place in Mozambique’s health 
sector? 
b) What do you think about the implementation and effectiveness of coordination? 
c) How much are you involved in the coordination structures? What is your 
motivation to coordinate? 
d) How is the relationship between your organization and the government and the 
MoH? How is the SWAP reflected in practice by your organization? 
e) Do you take into account other health projects being developed in the same area 
(geographical and health-related)? 
 
5. Tell me about the relationship between disbursement and impact: 
a) Do you think the decision about where to disburse aid has a major impact on 
actual outcomes on the ground? And why?  
b) Does your organization perform an impact/monitoring/evaluation analysis of 
different projects? And to what extent? 
c) What are the major barriers for a project/program to have the intended impact? 
d) Which ways would you suggest for increasing the effectiveness of health aid? 
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Figure F.1 Overview of the formal coordination mechanisms in Mozambique’s health 
sector: the Health SWAp structure. 
Note: The Health SWAp is made of three pillars and three levels. The three pillars are: 1) the 
Government (MoH) led at the top by the Minister at the middle by the Permanent Secretary (PS) and 
at the lower level by the Directors and Departments Heads; 2) the Partners pillar is led by the Head of 
Mission (HoM) and Head of Corporation (HoC) at the higher level, by the Focal Partner (FP) and Vice 
Focal (VF) at the middle level and by the Co-Chairs at the technical level; 3) the Joint pillar where the 
two pillars intersect represents the joint group/meetings which are led by the Minister. The three 
levels are: 1) the CCS that is the highest body within SWAp and is when MoH and partners join 
together to consider strategic issues, centred around the Annual Joint Review (ACA) meetings and the 
endorsement of the annual Sector Economic and Social Plan (PES). These are bi-annual meetings 
chaired by the minister; 2) the CCC chaired by the PS is when the MoH and partners interact on a 
monthly basis to deal with planning and operational issues, providing a good opportunity for a small 
number of representatives to deal with some critical issues; 3) the WGS/Taskforces is when the MoH 
and partners interact on a technical and operational level centred around formal and ad hoc WGs 
interaction, chaired by MoH staff and co-chaired by partners. These joint meetings provide an 
opportunity for the MoH and partners to jointly review or oversee specific areas of health policy when 
a more in-depth analysis is required prior to their adoption by the broader SWAp forum (HPCF, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
